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DEXQCRACY. CITIZENSHIP & UTOPIA 
SUDARY 
In this work I attempt to explore and correct a misconception of democracy. 
Standard accounts of democracy, I argue in Chapter One, adopt a 
functional/normative approach and focus upon either the institutional 
mechanisms for the fair and peaceful resolution of conflicts, or upon the 
moral opportunities of citizenship which the Liberal Democratic State 
provides, or upon the intrinsic benefits of political participation. The 
adoption of these perspectives leads to an account of democracy in which 
the citizen is seen as the holder of nominal political power. That this 
obstructs our understanding of democracy can be seen by asking what would 
be required in order to further democratise political agency, independently 
of extending democratic practice into non-expressly poli tical life-spheres. 
The answer to this question requires a conception of the citizen as 
exercising effective political power; and only from this point can we 
construct the institutions within which such power is to be exercised. This 
is refered to as a 'bottom-up' perspective of democracy. 
The problem of democracy which confronts us is thus conceptual. The 
task is that of elaborating a concept of democracy which is centred on the 
citizen as the holder and exerciser of effective political power; ie. one 
grounded on a 'rich' conception of citizenship. 
The argument of the thesis develops as follows. In Chapter Two I 
consider whether the justification of government is to be sought for solely 
in its good consequences or whether political participation is a necessary 
element. Here, I develop J S Mill's argument by considering the rule of a 
benevolent despot which would obviate the need for a protective function in 
political participation. The argument forms the ground for a critique of the 
instrumentalist view of political participation. 
In Chapter Three I begin the reconceptualisation of democracy by 
constructing non-functional models of democracy; models which are ordered 
according to the effective and formal power held by the individual citizen 
• 
and which take the minimum expression of polt tical power to be 'anterior 
popular consent', The three models generated are termed Minimal, Medial and 
Maximal Democracies. The construction of these models restricts its focus 
to a central theme of democratic theory: the legislative process. This 
refusal to address the problem of the democratisation of executive, 
administrative and judicial powers both aids clarity and serves to 
emphasise the enormity of the project of democratisation, The models 
presuppose no given socio-economic context. 
Chapter Four seeks to clarify some of the sources of confusion in the 
conceptualisation of medial and maximal democracy by examining three non-
minimal models: Robert Paul Wolff's model of an 'Instant Direct Democracy'j 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's theory of the sovereignty of the general willj and 
the democratic practice of classical Athens. Both Wolff and Rousseau, it is 
argued, present medial and not maximal models of democracy. Our under-
standing of democracy, I argue, is underpinned by a conception of the 
responsible exercise of power. 
In Chapter Five I construct the reflective model of medial democracy: 
that of democracy as popular assent. The project here is essentially 
Rawlsian: of using the model to examine and refine our intuitions regarding 
democracy, thereby achieving a 'reflective equilibrium'. The model assumes 
an elective legislature which generates, discusses and revises, and approves 
or rejects legislative proposals i but that the ultimate power of enactment 
rests with the citizenry: popular assent must be secured before such 
proposals can become law. The reflective model envisages concentrating this 
power of assent in randomly chosen sub-sets of the citizen-body. This 
provides an opportunity for all citizens to exercise effective political 
power, but not conjointly. This places in a position of therapeutic trust 
those citizens chosen to confer or withold assent for any given legislative 
proposal. The reflective model is thus analogous to the familiar practice of 
jury service. The question of whether all citizens should be invited to 
exercise effective political power is thus brought into sharp relief j and 
the tensions between the twin demands of democratic equality and democratic 
utility are explored. 
Chapter Six pursues that question through the attempt to sketch the 
characteristics of a rich conception of citizenship. The approach adopted is 
to ask what would have to be the case for citizenship to be considered a 
• 
worthwhile activity. Kill's theory of lower and higher pleasures is adapted 
for this purpose. Neither the rich conception of citizenship, nor the 
consideration of political judgment which follows, conclusively resolves the 
tension between the demands of democratic equality and democratic utility. 
The attempt to elaborate a bottom-up theory of democracy, grounded on 
a conception of the citizen as the holder and exerciser of effective 
political power, represents a radical challenge to the pluralist conception 
of the Liberal Democratic State. That challenge, however, need not be 
external to liberalism. In Chapter Seven I argue that the eunomic strain of 
utopian thought, as represented by Thomas More's Utopia, offers a competing 
liberal conception of the State. This chapter thus examines some central 
issues in and critiques of utopian thought. The analysis of the Utopia is 
set within the context of Kore's life and leads to the identification of the 
'utopian project' as the attempt to stimulate the desire for political reform 
by extending the bounds of plausibility with respect to political 
possibilities. The chapter concludes with the attempt to defend utopianism 
against both its liberal pluralist and its Marxian critics and argues that 
there is a need for a utopian element within Marxian socialism. 
• 
Chapter 1 The Problem of Democracy 
CHAPTER DIE 
THE PROBLEX OF DEXOCRACY 
In order to gain some initial purchase on the dimensions of the problem of 
democracy, let us consider the following hypothetical extension to the 
fictional career of Dr. John Watson: 
For some years after the death of Sherlock Holmes, his old 
colleague John Watson joined with Inspectors Lestrade, 
Gregson and Hopkins in making an annual pilgrimage to the 
scenes of their mentor's celebrated exercises in deductive 
enquiry: one year to Dartmoor, where the hound had struck 
terror into the heart of a Baskerville; on to Tredannick 
Wollas, where devilish things had been afoot; and back to 
King's Pyland and Holmes' discovery of the missing Silver 
Blaze. Another year they toured Sussex, once home to the 
mysteries of Vampires, Lion's Manes and Black Peter. Other 
years and they would content themselves with staying in 
London where virtually every street brought back memories 
of Holmes' adventures. 
Being fair-minded men, they had agreed to share the 
costs by opening a joint bank account, each paying in a 
monthly minimum; though Watson, now quite wealthy from 
publishing Holmes' memoires, regularly contributed more. 
They would meet in April to decide the itinerary for that 
summer, the plan seeming to emerge by osmosis: ideas would 
be thrown out, discussed and, without heated argument or 
dissent, a consensus would be formed. 1 
Could there have been a more perfect example of democracy in action? 
Voluntary, with an identifiable aim common to alli financed by all on the 
basis of minimum contributions (with additional payments from those in a 
position to make them); the full participation of all in the generation, 
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discussion and final agreement of their holiday plansj and a firm basis of 
equality and trust among friends. 
But it was too good to be true: 
One year, at their April meeting, Watson arrived late and 
found the three Inspectors decidedly on edge. 'We have a 
proposal' Lestrade began. 'Don't take it badl y , Hopkins 
interrupted. 'Its the one place we haven't been' Gregson 
said. 'We know the travelling won't be easy for you' 
Lestrade sympathised, 'but ... ' 
Deep inside, Watson had always known it would come to 
this. They wanted to visit the Reichenbach Falls, scene of 
the fatal struggle between Holmes and Moriarty. But he 
wouldn't go. True enough, his old war wound made travelling 
difficult; but it wasn't that. He simply couldn't bear to see 
the accursed place again. Even though it had been Moriarty 
and not Holmes who had plunged to his death, the memories 
were still too vivid, still too sour. If he had his way, no-
one would ever go there again. 
Yet, it was quite understandable that the other three 
should want to go there. But to do so instead of taking 
their summer break with him! And the cost, the money - his 
money! He'd paid more into the account than the others. Why, 
he'd been subsidising their hOlidays these last few years. 
'You must believe us, John' Lestrade said, 'we really do 
want you to come with us. It wouldn't be the same without 
you. No matter how painful the memories will be, we want 
you to come. Furthermore, we think it would help you to 
overcome the nightmare of that dark episodej and with us at 
your side you would have nothing to fear. Besides, think of 
the story it would enable you to write!' 
What was Watson to do? Being simple fellows, Lestrade, Gregson, Hopkins and 
Watson had made no prOVision for such disputes. There were no accepted 
procedures to be followed, no common agreement as to whether there was a 
power of veto, or whether a majority decision was to prevail. 
Watson, then, has a series of options before him, which we can broadly 
characterise as follows: 
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(a) to withdraw (in dismay or disgust) from the association and, if 
possible retrieve his balance of the contributions to the joint account; 
(b) to insist that his preferences and (narrowly construed) interests are 
not prejudiced by exercising a veto (in this case, refusing to authorise 
the expenditure from the common fund, thereby effectively preventing 
the other three from making the trip)j 
(c) to continue the debate with his companions until such time as a new 
consensus emerges, one embracing his point of view: that he had no 
wish to go, that they should uphold the traditions of their 'club' and 
holiday together, and that, being so much younger, they could go once 
he was dead; 
(d) to insist that since he and Lestrade are the senior members of the 
'club', they should each put their point of view to Hopkins and Gregson 
'and ask them to vote on it; 
(e) to accept, without little further consideration, the majority decision, 
yet ~aintain a dissenting voice by staying at home. 
(f) to accept (or at least, be prepared to put to the test) Lestrade's 
argument that it would be in his best interests to make the trip, 
thereby enabling him to lay the ghost of the Reichenbach Fallsj 
(g) though unconvinced by Lestrade's claim, to appreciate that his 
(Watson's) contributions were essential to the three Inspectors 
realising their common desire; and furthermore, that his presence on 
the journey would be integral to the realisation of that desire; 
(h) to identify his interests more broadly by giving priority to the values 
of the 'club' above his own, personal preferences; in particular, the 
desire not to introduce an element of dissent, and to share the desires 
and activities of his friends; 
Given these options, what was Watson to do? 
.. 
Roughly speaking, these options correspond to competing conceptions of the 
democratic state. Ignoring for the moment the first of Watson's options, the 
second (that of exercising the power of veto) captures the spirit of 
(though it doeen It perfectly correspond to) the first model of democracy 
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proposed by Macpherson, in his The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy.2 
Macpherson's project is to outline the historical development of democratic 
thought and practice in the liberal state; and to reveal the underlying 
assumptions as to class structure implicit in that historical development. 
Whilst broadly sympathetic to this project I shall not follow the details 
of Macpherson's Marxian analysis. 
The first model is drawn from the theories of James Mill and Jeremy 
Bentham, which Macpherson terms 'protecti ve democracy' . In brief, the 
argument for this model is both anti-paternalistic and anti-despotical: the 
individual alone is in the position to determine his own preferences and 
thus must be given the opportunity to express those preferences and to 
prevent (so far as is possible) the potentially injurious intrusion of 
others into his sphere of interests. This protection is secured principally 
by means of an equal and universal suffrage.':': 
Watson's next two options «c) and (d)) represent a development of this 
and are captured by Macpherson's model of 'equilibrium democracy'. In point 
of fact, JlIacpherson has collapsed both forms into this one model. Watson's 
passionate insistence on his own preference typifies the pluralist model of 
democracy proposed by Dahl.A. According to Dahl, a pluralist democracy is 
sensitive to the intensity of personal preferences, as (typically) 
manifested by pressure and interest groups. Thus, the formal equality of the 
protective democracy is not actually abandoned though in effect it becomes 
modified to allow this expression of passionate concern. Watson's option 
(d) (to polarise the issue as between himself and Lestrade) exhibits some 
of the features of what has come to be known as 'democratic elitism': 
democratic structures are analysed (and Schumpeter is the classic exponent 
of this viewS) in terms of self-perpetuating elites who compete against 
each other for the voter's allegiance at the ballot box. As Macpherson 
points out, this is a highly market- or consumer-orientated perspective: 
political parties, policies and candidates are presented (by the leaders) as 
goods to be purchased by the consumer (voted for by the elector) according 
to which set of 'goods' best match his or her preferences. 
As should be clear, all three of these options represent a certain 
approach to Watson's problem: that of maximising the benefit or minimising 
the harm to Watson's immediate interests (although in this case, the 
emphasis is on the minimising of harm). Indeed, option (a) (that of 
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quitting) might properly be seen as the limiting case of this protective 
function. These options also tend to regard interests and preferences as 
having the status of givens, requiring little or no reflective examination: 
the individual has an unobstructed access to them, comprehending them 
clearly and without ambiguity. They are thus taken as legitimate; the only 
question being that of whose views are to prevail. Option '(e), that of 
majoritarianism, is the most familiar method of sorting between competing 
claims; and with (b), the exercise of a veto, mostly fully corresponds to 
the model of protective democracy. 
Furthermore, these models focus on strategies for the resolution of 
conflicting demands. This is the principal concern which occupies Singer in 
his Democracy and Disobedience. To be sure, Singer's precise focus is that 
of demonstrating the legitimacy of democratic means of dispute-resolution 
(as opposed to, say, the resort to violence) and the consequent generation 
of obligations. His argument is that, in the first place: 
one ought to accept a decision-procedure which 
represent[s] a fair compromise between competing claims to 
power. 'Accept' here involves both participating in and 
abiding by the results of the decision-procedure. Secondly 
... that participation in a deciSion-procedure, when others 
are participating in good faith, creates a prima facie 
obligation to accept the results of the procedure.6 
I shall not in this work pursue the subject of the generation of poli tical 
obligations. Rather, it is the question of power which will be central. In 
this context, Singer's remarks are significant. For, the competition for 
power applies to the situation prior to the adoption of the fair-compromise 
procedure; and since this procedure is legitimate, according to Singer, only 
if it succeeds in establishing an equalisation of power, ie. effectively 
nullifying the power held by any given 'club' member qua individual. That 
is, the power held by any given individual is merely nominal: it is neither 
more nor less than that of any other individual and thus is power, strictly 
speaking, in name only. 
Singer's treatment of democracy as a fair-compromise procedure is 
acute, though not unproblematic. It is acute in so much as it epitomises 
that tradition of democratic thought which takes as its primary concern the 
(peaceful and fair) resolution of conflicts; the answer to which has been 
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the equalisation of political status and the confering on each of a nominal 
political power. It is problematic on three counts. First, it provides no 
firm basis for determining which of the strategies (options (a) to (e) for 
Watson) represents the fairest compromise. Anyone of the options might 
have been adopted by the four friends in advance of the dispute, with no 
obvious prior grounds for saying which one would have been the fairest. The 
exercise of a veto might give us greater cause for hesitation; yet, given 
that Watson's position was significantly different from that of the others 
(he was older, less fit, had a particularly strong reason for not visiting 
the Reichenbach Falls) we might still want to sanction its use. The veto 
would seem to be the most appropriate protective device given significant 
differences. Against that, its openness to abuse (thereby thwarting the 
desires of others for no good cause) also gives us pause. Even though 
Watson's position may be genuinely and significantly different from the 
other three, there is no guarantee that he will exercise his veto 
responsibly, with good cause, and not, say, out of sheer bloody-mindedness. 
This brings me to the second problem area generated by Singer's 
account and thus by the over-arching model of protecti ve democracy which 
his model represents. It implies a 'thin' conception of democracy and of 
citizenship. Its narrow concern with the resolution of conflict, by a fair-
compromise procedure which (as far as is possible) protects equally the 
interests of all the 'club's' members, suggests the conclusion that this is 
all there is to democracy: it is simply the (fairest) means to a given end, 
that of dispute resolution. Its focus is thus on the institutions which have 
been or which might yet be developed to achieve this particular aim. As 
such, the subject of the individual citizen becomes, on this institutional 
approach, an increasingly remote concern. Such theories of democracy are 
top-down in their perspective. The starting point is that of asking how 
government can best be organised to produce the most fair, though also the 
most effective, compromise procedure between the competing and agglomerated 
interests of the citizen body. 
There is, then, something of a paradox at the heart of the protecti ve 
model of democracy. Whilst it claims to be principally concerned with 
protecting the interests of the individual, its focus becomes almost 
exclusively institutional. Its top-down perspective fails to capture 
Watson's remaining three options in our story. 
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The possibility that democracy might be regarded a as means to enabling 
some to satisfy their needs and desires is not easily compassed by the 
protective model i though there are no clear a priori grounds for rejecting 
this move. Indeed, if democracy has as its central concern the preferences 
and interests of 'club' members, then it must encompass options (e) and (f). 
For, it is not that Watson sacrifices his preference (here, not to revisit 
the Reichenbach Falls) but that he reformulates his preference in the 
context of what others think. In (f) he is prepared to accept that, in the 
long run, it may be in his interests to make the trip, given the context of 
mutual aid and support. Similarly, in (g) his presence on the journey 
enables Lestrade, Gregson and Hopkins to fully satisfy their desire (for 
Watson to point out what happened where, and so on). 
On a broader palette, we have here the germ of welfarism in the context 
of the Idealist tradition of citizenship. This begins to relocate the focus 
of democracy, away from the insti tutional mechanisms and towards the 
citizen-citizen interface, ie. its perspective is horizontal rather than 
vertical. As Vincent and Plant comment of this tradition of 'social 
democracy' : 
The Idealists ... saw the role of the state not merely as a 
set of instrumentali ties for securing material welfare but 
as the focus of a sense of community and citizenship, an 
institution in which a good common to all classes and 
recognisable by all interest groups could be articulated.7 
There is thus an explicitly moral dimension to welfarist or social 
democracy which escapes the protective model. It takes neither interests 
nor desires as brute, to be determined by the individual in (non-reflective) 
isolation from his fellow-citizens, but as contextualised by and a factor of 
the differing (though not necessarily competing) desires and interests of 
others. 
Both options (f) and (g) posit the reformulation of Watson's preference 
in the light of the qui te specific arguments put forward by the three 
Inspectors (within the context of mutual aid and support). That is, there 
was no pre-commitment on Watson's part to accepting the arguments of his 
friends. However, it might have been that there was, if not a pre-
commi tment exactly, then a presumption that Watson would abide by his 
f"riends' wishes. The commitment would be to the over-arching concept of the 
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'club' as non-identical to any given member or set of members, nor to any 
given decision or set of decisions, but to the values and traditions of the 
'club' as embodied in specific individuals and decisions. This situation is 
represented by option (h). The perspective here is not easy to identify. It 
seems to be neither horizontal nor vertical. A generous interpretation would 
be that its perspective is dialectical: a continuous interplay between the 
individual, the over-arching body and the constitutive members (and back). 
A less generous interpretation might hold that there simply is no focus. 
What seems clear is' that the relations between fellow ci tizens are not 
direct but are mediated by the institutions of the over-arching body. This 
expressly moral form of political commitment represents a conservative view 
of democracy in which disputes are not so much resolved as dissol ved by 
the individual identifying his interests and values with those of the over-
arching body. This, I shall argue in Chapter Four I represents Rousseau's 
theory of the general will. 
There is a further difference between these last three options and the 
ones which preceded them (and this forms the third objection to accounts 
, 
such as Singer's). The institutional focus endorses an instrumentalist 
conception of democracy (as no more than a device, a means to a given end) 
and of political participation (which is justified solely in terms of its 
success in the protection and prosecution of one's interests). Opposed to 
this instrumentalism is an intrinsicalist conception of the value of 
democracy: that the act of political participation is itself to be valued 
independently of any subsequent success or failure. This position will be 
clarified by consideration of a further model. 
Options (f), (g) and (h) are similar to, but ultimately significantly 
different from, a further model: in Macpherson's terms, 'developmental 
democracy'.9 This too is not easily compassed by the protective model. Here 
the focus is on the intrinsic benefits to the individual of political 
participation. For Singer, political participation is important, but only in 
so far as it generates a specific set of obligations. Shouldering the 
burdens of duty implied by those obligations may indeed form part of the 
context in which these benefits accrue; yet their precise nature is not 
easily spelled out (though some attempt at this will be made in Chapters 
Two and Six). The locus classicus of this account is to be found in John 
Stuart Mill's Considerations on Representative Government. In brief, by 
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participating in the decision-making procedure the individual is encouraged 
to broaden the scope of one's concerns, to evaluate one's own interests 
against those of others and thus to develop the 'moral, intellectual and 
active' aspects of one's character.9 The great benefits to be gained from 
taking part in the political process are, on this view, independent of the 
specific outcome of any particular participatory act <though the value of 
participation which never succeeds may be questionable). It is not that one 
merges one's identity and values with those of the 'club' or re-examines 
one's preferences in the context of the preferences of others. Simply, the 
climate of participation is conducive to character development. Here the 
perspective seems to be unwaveringly fixed on the individual. Since I shall 
be much concerned throughout this work wi th the insights and inadequacies 
of this model of democracy, I shall not dwell further on it here. 
We have, then, a range of democratic options subsumable under three 
broad categories: protective, welfarist and developmental. The latter two 
have a strong moral element to them; the first is political in the everyday 
sense of that word <which is to say, 'political' according to the liberal 
pluralist conception of 'politics'). The first takes institutions as its 
focus and thus has a top-down perspective; the second focuses on the 
relations <mediated or immediate) between citizens and has a horizontal 
perspective; and the perspective of the third is simply that of the 
individual citizen. 
There is one last consideration I wish to introduce here; one which 
elaborates and incorporates themes from the protective and the 
developmental conceptions of democracy and which calls for a bottom-up 
perspective. In order to introduce this, I shall develop the story somewhat: 
Over the years, their summer pilgrimages became well known. 
At first, it was just a few friends who joined themj but 
steadily the pressure from distant relatives, even more 
distant friends, and complete strangers grew - to the point 
whereby they set up their own company: Sherlock Holmes 
Tours Ltd .. 
Being fair-minded men, they set up a system whereby 
members of the 'club' <one took out a life membership on 
joining) were offered a choice of tours for the year ahead, 
at a range of prices i the majority preference determining 
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which one was selected for that summer. And so it happened 
that the subject of a trip to the Reichenbach Falls came up 
again. The last time this was suggested (before the company 
was established) Watson had held to his position and 
Inspectors Lestrade, Gregson and Hopkins had backed down. 
(They had settled for a tour of East Anglia instead.) This 
time, the Inspectors insisted that it be offered to their 
members as one of the choices for that year. It would, they 
were sure, command popular support. They were not wrong. 
The options so far canvassed can, I think, be applied to this new situation 
without distortion. However, in this newly expanded 'club' the centre of 
focus shifts from the four founding members to the new members. It would 
not stretch plausibility too far to see Sherlock Hol1Iles Tours Ltd. as 
loosely equivalent to a parliamentary democracy. And the question I wish to 
ask of both parliamentary democracy and of Sherlock Holmes Tours Ltd. is 
this: What power does the ordinary 'club' member have as an individual? 
ff 
The categories under which the various democratic options have been 
subsumed have this much in common: they seek to describe the source of 
value ascribed to democracy in functional terms. Thus democracy is thought 
to be a good thing (on the models so far proposed) because: 
(1) it enables individuals to protect and advance (as far as is possible) 
their interests and preferences without resort to conflict and by means 
of the adoption of a fair-decision procedure; or 
(ii) it creates the context for a range of moral relations; or 
(iii) it best facilitates the full development of the individual's character; 
or (iv) it (possibly but not probably) combines all three. 
My dissatisfaction with this functional/normative approach is this. Both (i) 
and (iii) (though perhaps not (ii» require the exercise of political power. 
But as I argued above, the protective model of democracy devolves only 
nominal power on the individual citizen. Thus, the question to be confronted 
i8 that of how the ordinary member of Sherlock Hol1Iles Tours Ltd. might be 
Page 10 
Chl'-pter 1 The Problem of Democracy 
brought to enjoy the same range of powers (in proposing, discussing, and 
planning in detail the holiday options) which Watson and his friends 
originally shared between them. The selection of one only from among a 
range of pre-determined options represents the exercise of nominal power. 
By failing to adequately address the central problem of democratic theory, 
the effective political power held and exercised by the individual citizen, 
the functional/normative accounts muddy the waters of democratic thought; 
such that our thinking about what might constitute a more democratic 
society (a 'direct' or 'participatory' democracy) tends to assume the same 
top-down perspective, modified by the horizontal one of citizenship. Let me 
put this another way. 
Suppose we were to assume that democracy is a good thing and that, 
like all good things, we wanted more of it. How would we set about the 
further democratisation of society? 
To begin with, we might try to ensure that the scope of citizenship was 
as extensive as possiblej and to satisfy ourselves that the institutional 
mechanisms did not systematically discriminate against any particular 
class, group or set of individuals. Then we might want to introduce 
democratic practice into non-expressly political institutions such as the 
work-place, the school and such voluntary associations as we might join. 
These are worthy tasks; and there is much work still to be done if such 
spheres are to be democratised. Yet, generally speaking, such projects fail 
to move beyond the existing model of democratic practice. That is, they do 
not address the question of how such practice can be made more democratic. 
And the sole answer to that is: by giving individuals more power. 
I suggested above that Singer's over-arching model of democracy as a 
fair compromise decision-procedure gave no clear grounds for Watson to 
exercise choice between the competing options. If we apply this to the 
extended version of the story, and ask which decision-procedure should be 
adopted, then I suggest that the situation is the same: there are no clear 
grounds for choice. We are now in the position to understand why this is. 
All the models (with the exception of the problematic individual veto) are 
variants of the same power status, that of nominal power. 
The problem, then, in contemporary thought about democracy is that it 
is vitiated by the assumption of an institutional, top-down, perspective in 
which the power of the individual citizen qua citizen is nomin~l. Attempts 
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to remedy this by proposing some form of 'direct' or 'participatory' 
democracy (such as that proposed by Robert Paul Wolff, which I discuss in 
Chapter Four) fail to escape the problem. It is not enough simply to remove 
the institutional structures associated with the Liberal Democratic State 
and which mediate potentially conflictual demands, and thereby assume that 
this disperses more power to the citizenry and thus further democratises 
the political domain. This approach remains entrenched in the institutional, 
top-down perspective; ie. it assumes that the problem is one of the 
insti tutional structure of the State. Similarly, the Idealist tradi tion of 
citizenship, with its horizontal perspective focusing on the citizen-citizen 
relation, whilst creating a moral role for the citizen, assumes the existing 
power relation between the citizen and the State. 
A new bottom-up perspective is thus required; one which takes as its 
focus the political power of the individual citizen and asks how this can 
be significantly increased, and only then enquires as to what institutional 
structures would be necessary to embody this increase in political power. 
Furthermore, the adoption of a bottom-up perspective provides the basis for 
the examination of the conditions necessary for the responsible exercise of 
political power. It is a central claim of this thesis that this conception, 
of the responsible exercise of political power by the individual citizen, is 
basic to our understanding of democracy. 
Although it is a deeply held belief of mine that democracy is indeed a 
good thing, and that the further democratisation of society is to be 
desired, the delineation of models of democracy according to the power 
status of the individual citizen (thereby eschewing the functional approach) 
remains neutral with respect to normative assumptions. The question of why 
we might want to augment the power status of the individual citizen to one 
of effective political power is considered in the following chapter. 
The need for such a bottom-up perspective of democracy, a conception of 
the citizen as the holder and exerciser of effecti ve political power, is 
illustrated by the following argument presented by John Dunn: 
[I]t is ... instructive to note the increasing expression of 
doubt as to whether in fact the maintenance of capitalism 
itself is compatible with even the degree of democracy 
which we at present enjoy in Great Britain .. , We may also 
be quite certain that we cannot all in fact rule our own 
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societies, let alone somehow rule collectively the world as 
a whole. But the extent to which governments can in fact be 
rendered responsible to those over whom they rule is still 
a very obscure question and one which urgently demands 
reflection.' 0 
Dunn argues for the need for a developed conception of political prudence 
among the ci tizenry (of the western world) if we are to overcome the 
threats of nuclear disaster, resource depletion, pollution etc.. However, 
implicit in Dunn's argument is the assumption that the would-be agent (the 
ordinary citizen) already enjoys effective political power; power sufficient 
to make significant action a possibility. For it is only when such power is 
held that the question of how best to use it, ie. of prudence, becomes vital. 
The attempt to analyse the conditions for the exercise of effective 
poli tical power, prudence and judgment has not seen the equal of Mill's 
Considerations and that work, and Mill's social and ethical theory in 
general, will form the basis for this thesis. Mill, I shall argue, was 
broadly right in his characterisation of these conditions; but his theory 
was fatally flawed as a result of his belief that universal adult suffrage 
would confer sufficient, ie. effective, political power on the individual 
citizen. 
*** 
The problem of democracy which confronts us is thus conceptual. The task is 
that of elaborating a concept of democracy which is centred on the citizen 
as the holder and exerciser of effective political power; ie. one grounded 
on a 'rich' conception of citizenship." 
The argument of the thesis develops as follows. In Chapter Two I argue 
against the instrumentalist view of democracy by adapting Mill's example of 
rule by a benevolent despot. 
In Chapter Three I construct non-functional models of democracy; models 
which are ordered according to the effective and formal power held by the 
individual citizen and which take the minimum expression of political power 
to be 'anterior popular consent' . The three models generated are termed 
Minimal, Medial and Maximal Democracies. These models presuppose no given 
socio-economic context. 
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Chapter Four seeks to clarify some of the sources of confusion in the 
conceptualisation of medial and maximal democracy by examining three non-
minimal models: Robert Paul Wolff's model of an 'Instant Direct Democracy'; 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's theory of the sovereignty of the general will; and 
the democratic practice of classical Athens. Both Wolff and Rousseau, it is 
argued, present medial and not maximal models of democracy. 
In Chapter Five I construct the reflective model of medial democracy: 
that of democracy as popular assent. The model seeks to utilise aspects of 
modern 90mmunications technOlogy, though it is not dependent on this. It 
assumes an elective legislature, with the ultimate power of enactment on 
legislative proposals resting with the citizenry. The reflective model 
envisages concentrating this power of assent in randomly chosen sub-sets 
of the citizen-body. All citizens may thus exercise effective political 
power, but not conjointly. The tension between the twin demands of 
democratic equality and democratic utility is explored by considering 
whether all citizens would be invited to exercise this power. 
Chapter Six pursues that tension through the attempt to sketch the 
characteristics of a rich conception of citizenship. I ask what would have 
to be the case for ci tizenship to be considered a worthwhile acti vi ty. 
Mill's theory of higher and lower pleasures is adapted for this purpose. 
Neither the rich conception of citizenship, nor the consideration of 
political judgment which follows, conclusively resolves the tension between 
the demands of democratic equality and democratic utility. 
The attempt to elaborate a bottom-up theory of democracy, grounded on 
a conception of the citizen as the holder and exerciser of effective 
political· power, represents a radical challenge to the liberal pluralist 
conception of democracy. In Chapter Seven I argue that the eunomic strain 
of utopian thought, as represented by Thomas More's Utopi .. 'i, also offers a 
competing, though yet liberal, conception of the State. This chapter thus 
examines some central issues in and critiques of utopian thought. The 
analysis of the Utopia is set within the context of More's life and 
identifies the 'utopian project' as the attempt to stimulate the desire for 
poli tical reform by extending the bounds of plausibili ty with respect to 
political possibilities. The chapter concludes with the attempt to defend 
utopianism against both its liberal pluralist and its Marxian critics and 
argues that there is a need for a utopian element within Marxian socialism. 
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CHAPTER TYO 
THE CHAliliEIGE OF IRE BEJEVOLEIT DESPOT 
I have already explained why our understanding of democracy is in need of 
refinement and re-evaluation. I wish t;o begin my contribution to this 
process from a less than usual starting point: by considering the 
theoretical problems raised by the Benvolent Despot. I shall focus in this 
chapter on lUll's formulation of the problem and return at a later point to 
discuss Rousseau's variant, his theory of the Ideal Legislator. Although it 
is legislation rather than general executive powers which is the central 
concern of my argument there is much to gain at this stage by discussing 
the wider problem. The concept of the Benevolent DespotlIdeal Legislator 
owes much to the role Plato assigns to the philosopher kings in The 
Republic; but I shall discuss this work only briefly at the end of this 
chapter, most of the salient points being covered in the treatment of Mill 
and, later, Rousseau. 
The problem of the Benevolent Despot posits the rule of an all-powerful 
<in temporal terms) sovereign who is genuinely concerned to rule in the 
best interests of her people; and who, with some initial plausibility, can 
claim success in this concern. <In my version, the despot is a woman only 
because I find this more plausible than that it should be a man j which is 
not to say that I grant the idea itself very much plausibility.) I assume it 
to be of no material consequence, at this point in the argument, whether we 
focus for our example on the rule of one person (the despot) or of few (a 
council of elders, philosopher kings, whatever). What counts is that the 
sovereign power be highly restricted. For the simplicity of the argument I 
take it to be one person rule. 
It is worth noting that Mill's concern with the problem has a 
particular force, in as much as he saw, with some justification, the East 
India Company (into which he had followed his father as a London-based 
administrator) as exercising the function of benevolent despotism in its 
more general Indian affairs. 1 (And, of course, this was a highly popular 
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justification of The Empire.) Thus we can expect a greater urgency and 
sensitivity to his theorising on the subject, though we should be wary of 
the possibility of some partiality. However, it is ultimately with the more 
general problem that we are concerned. At its deepest, it can be expressed 
no more succinctly than as here by Joel Feinberg: 'Which in the last 
analysis is the more important: to have the goods most worth having or to 
be the sort of person most worth being?':;:: Although I shall only rarely 
return to this explicit formulation, this thesis is largely directed to the 
argument that, at least politically, we can have the goods most worth 
having only by being the sort of persons most worth being. 
Whilst there may be much that could be said against such a regime as 
that of a benevolent despot, I shall concentrate on a specific set of 
objections and doctor my example to focus on these. The type of objection I 
am concerned with questions whether the immediate consequences of good 
government <in terms of fairness, the protection of interests, general 
prosperity, and so on) is a sufficient justification of such a form of 
government, or whether, given the good consequences, there is still 
something left out of the account - and if so, what? In part, this is 
directed to the free-rider problem in relation to politics: gi ven existing 
good consequences, is there any further reason why I should concern myself 
with political affairs <let alone actually partiCipate in any way)? It also 
addresses the question of the rationale for political change. Given 
(generally) good consequences of any system of government <whether it 
exhibits democratic features or not) is there any further reason to become 
more democratic? 
Certainly Mill thought that benevolent despotism was the appropriate 
foil to highlight the specific and more intrinsic virtues of democracy, 
though his argument needs some examination. But as one of the few 
proponents of democracy to take the problem seriously (at least, as a 
theoretical challenge) his account demands attention. Prior to that I shall 
briefly discuss those aspects of the problem with which I am not here 
concerned. 
There are prudential arguments against the actual adoption of a 
benevolent despotism, each of which is forceful and which together are nigh 
conclusive. The first is the implausibility of finding a single ruler who 
proves immune to the corrupting influence of absolute power. Even where 
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such rule has a proven record of benevolence, past history furnishes no 
guarantee as to future conduct. Were we prepared to embrace the risk of 
future conduct proving less than benevolent the problem of succession would 
yet remain: how would the power vacuum resulting from the despot's 
death/retirement be filled? We couldn't rely on finding another suitable 
candidate for the post. And beyond all this, there is the argument from 
social complexity (which will re-emerge in a later chapter): that the 
benevolence of one person, albeit an absolute ruler, is insufficient to 
guarantee a benevolent regime in a modern complex society. It would, as Mill 
points out3 , require a superhuman individual to master the information 
necessary for efficient executive and legislative action, to supervise both 
the administration and its personnel, and to be responsive to the people's 
needs and desires. <One answer to these objections might be found in the 
res'ort to bureaucratic despotism, in which the problems of succession and 
individual corruption are deemed to be under control. Mill acknowledges this 
response and his criticisms of it for inducing an endemic condition of 
passivity in the people will be considered later.) 
These arguments, to greater or lesser extents, can be directed against 
all forms of personalised or absolute rule (eg. the Hobbesian sovereign). 
The question remains as to whether there are more specific objections to a 
benevolent despotism. Suppose we could find Mill's superhuman despot, and 
could overcome (or agree to embrace the risks involved in) the other 
problems, then should we, ought we to, accept such a regime? 
* 
Mill advances what he clearly believed to be conclusive arguments against 
benevolent despotism. I shall explore these by way of the following story. 
Once upon a time there was a small country ruled by a great 
and good queen whose name was Margaret. Now, Margaret was 
no ordinary queen. First of all, she was so kind and 
loving that everyone trusted her and considered her to be 
their friend. So she was known by all the people of this 
country as, simply, Auntie Maggie. But Auntie Maggie was a 
despot. She had overthrown a particularly nasty tyrant to 
gain powerj and she was going to hold on to it! She made 
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all the laws and took all the big decisions in her realm; 
she personally appointed all those who had to implement the 
laws, as well as those who took the lesser decisions; and 
she was commander-in-chief of the armed forces. 
The trouble for the ini tial doubters was that she was 
really good at her job! Everyone had to admit that her 
laws were always just; that they never showed a hint of 
bias towards herself or other sections of the community; 
and that her appointees were always the best of all 
possible persons. Arts, crafts and sciences flourished; and 
the realm prospered. Of course, there were disputes, but 
again, everyone agreed that, Solomon-like, she resolved them 
wisely.' She even encouraged the formation of a parliament 
of elected representati ves to debate and draw up laws for 
her to accept or reject (or revise) - but always her 
decision was final and seen to be right. 
One further thing we should know about Auntie Maggie -
she was a martian; and as everyone knows, martians have a 
fixed life-span on earth of exactly five hundred years. No 
martian can die of natural causes or be murdered within 
that time. Their powers of regeneration and recuperation are 
simply too great. 
On the whole Auntie Maggie enjoyed her job, though she 
often found it tiring. But one worm of doubt nagged away 
at her and often kept her awake at night: Vlere her people 
happy and would they, in some way, have been better off 
without her? 
At heart this is the problem which Mill presents (though indirectly) in 
Chapter 3 of his Considerations on Representative Government. As will be 
appreciated, the sources of the more obvious objections to the benevolent 
despot have been, if not eliminated, at least marginalised. Our martian 
friends are known to be exceptions to Acton's dictum4 about the corrupting 
influence of power; there is no immediate problem about the succession to 
power (assume Auntie Maggie has another four hundred years to go); and 
perhaps, as the utopists of old believed, there is a close relationship 
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between a just political system and social peace and happiness. (So we 
don't need to worry unduly here about political dissent, suppression, etc.) 
For the sake of argument let us pursue this fantasy (thereby casting 
aside any worries about the psychological implausibili ty of tales such as 
this) and grant that life in Auntie Kaggie's world would be the inverse of 
the Hobbesian State of Nature. Her doubt remains to be assuaged: would her 
people (would we) be happy? Further, ought they, ought we, to accept such a 
State - irrespective of the happiness involved? 
We might well believe that they/we would be. happy and would be right 
in accepting it. If one views the role of the political domain as simply 
that of determining and ranking needs, achieving a satisfactory allocation 
of resources and mediating conflicts, thereby leaving one free to pursue 
one's own devices and desires, then Auntie Kaggie's State must seem ideal. 
On the other hand, we might think there is something dubious about claims 
to happiness under such conditions. Humans, we well know, have a 
remarkable capacity to experience happiness in almost any given situation. 
It's called making the best of a bad job. The image of the happy slave, 
whilst a dangerous one to· employ lightly, is not beyond belief. But 
happiness under such conditions is constrained to the point where its value 
is in question. So perhaps we should say, 'the contented slave', following 
Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures; between the 
possibility of real happiness (though it be attended by great discontent) 
and mere contentment. Happiness, according to Mill, is the privilege of the 
free person; contentment the lot of the slave. 
Mill's argument requires some examination here. The criterion against 
which any government is to be judged, he argues, is not simply its success 
in maintaining social peace (ot, in the rhetoric of his times: Order) 
through the justice of its laws and its wise administration, but in its 
ability to promote Progress. Mill rejects any sharp dichotomy between Order 
and Progress. The conditions which satisfy the former are those which are 
necessary to the latter. Furthermore, some progress is necessary to 
maintain order - a posi tion of fixi ty, of no change, is impossible to 
sustain given the ever-present forces of retrogression. The metaphor is one 
of constant struggle to maintain what has already been achieved. Mill 
explicitly refers to the classical belief that the 'natural tendency of men 
and their works '5 is one of decay. This organicism, especially when applied 
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to political culture, seems alien to Milli but he gives a plausible 
justification for his view. It is an irreducible fact of our existence that 
'new inconveniences and dangers continually grow up"=: to disturb the calm 
of our labours. Initiative, enterprise and imagination are required to cope 
with these new demands. But where the primary focus has become one of 
maintaining the status quo these responses are likely to be lacking. It is 
only, XiII implies, where the culture at large and the political structure in 
particular embrace and encourage change that the present gains can thus be 
secured against future uncertainties. But it is not change simpliciter that 
is required, but change in the sense of improvement, ie. progress. 
Mill cashes out his conception of progress in a particular way. If 
Order involves the preservation of those goods (socially considered even if 
privately held) already achieved then Progress is the increase of those 
goods. Vhich goods? Mill, as I understand him, gives three, maybe four 
answers to what constitutes Progress. In the first instance it is simply 
the increase in those items already valued by society as the rewards of 
their industry, ie. the general prosperity. But this is a somewhat 
superficial answer. (Xill terms these the 'secondary objects' of progress, 
which, obsessively pursued, represent a 'misdirection of energy.I7) The 
deeper conception of Progress is the improvement in the qualities of the 
people at large. Mill frequently uses Bentham's formula of qualities 'moral, 
intellectual and· active'Elj but apart from being not a little vague, this 
formula slides over the moral force of Mill's criterion of good government: 
that it should promote <lead to progress in the development of) the 
cardinal virtues, viz. 'industry, integrity, justice, and prudence.'9 And it is 
the development of these virtues which is not only the pre-requisite for 
the maintainance of social peace but is also 'the most conducive to 
improvement." 0 In as much as these virtues are the property of individuals 
then this can be seen as a matter of personal salvation, to be carried 
through independently of governmental arrangements. But to the extent that 
any society may embrace and encourage these virtues, giving them prominence 
within the social values, this then becomes a cultural matter. 
I shall call these, respectively, economic and cultural progress (the 
latter subsuming individual progress). Thus economic progress is ultimately 
only of value if it promotes (or, at least , facilitates) cultural progress 
(and thus, generally, improvement in the qualities of indi viduals) . But 
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what unites them as Progress is the implicit comformity to the given value 
system, and it is this which provides the link with order. Progress, we 
repeat, is seen here by Mill as development, expansion, more of the same, if 
you will. These forms of progress are thus limited by the existing value 
system of the particular society. (There may be particular interpretations 
of the cardinal virtues, or differing emphases given among them.) To go 
beyond these values is to initiate change rather than progress in the 
economic and cultural sense. But Mill also recognises a form of progress 
which transcends the given social limitations, and I shall call this 
political progress. Of course there can be political development within a 
given society, and to that extent it constitutes political progress. But the 
more interesting sense is that which encompasses radical change from one 
poli tical system to another, from one particular set of values to another. 
If such changes are to be seen as progressive then they too must conform 
to a set of values, one which is more general than that of particular 
societies. 
Mill implicitly holds to a familiar theory of the pattern of human 
development in terms of 'stages of ci vilisation" 1 t one that sees human 
progress as passing through the stages of savagery, barbarianism, semi-
civilisation (ie, encompassing slavery), to constitutionally free states and 
ultimately, he implies12 , to communism. (Though, it must be stressed, he 
does not see this progress as inevitable. Quite the reverse, Mill is 
concerned with how we can ensure continued progress.) For Mill, the 
connecting value, of which each of these political stages represents an 
increase, is not so much freedom, I suggest, as moral worth. 
If this interpretation of Mill is correct then it seems to bring us 
into conflict with not only his utilitarianism but also his rejection of 
benevolent despotism as the perfect form of government. It is not, we 
recall, the institutional arrangements and the immediate consequences which 
form the whole of Mill's criterion of good government (though they form a 
part of it), but its effect on the character of the population at large, 
however indirect this may prove to be. It is not inconceivable (as the 
story of Auntie Maggie above is intended to suggest) that there may be 
economic and cultural progress under a benevolent despotism. But without 
political progress (which is excluded in Auntie Maggie's queendom) such 
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progress must be severely truncated. Why should this be? There are, I 
suggest, four arguments; only two of which Mill spells out. 
Kill's main argument relates to what he sees as the essential 
'passivity' of the people under a benevolent despotism. However much they 
exercise control of their day-to-day lives, in the last instance control is 
exercised for them, they become habituated to having their affairs managed 
for them. This would, perhaps, be okay if it stopped there; but implicit in 
Kill's cri ticism is the belief that it would not stop there. For exclusion 
from the political process implies an abandonment of the function of 
questioning and critical judgment. And abandoning this function in one area 
of life (the political) leads (though not perhaps inexorably) to abandoning 
it in other areas. It is passivity in this sense rather than one of mere 
indolence which Kill inveighs against. The argument, then, holds that the 
political structure may have a fairly direct effect on the general character 
of the people, a benevolent despotism inducing a state of endemic passivity. 
This argument can be deveioped: that the form of the political structure 
acts as a model for decision taking and value judgment throughout society. 
That is, it legitimates the permeation of the same structure into other 
areas than the political. I do not want to raise the question of the 
direction of reflection: whether the political structure reflects the social 
structure or vice versa? The causal origin of the reflection does not matter 
here; the ostensive legitimation of passive acceptance of the decisions of 
others does matter. 
The second argument returns to an aspect of the first: that benevolent 
despotism suppresses the development of the citizen's virtuous character by 
denying them channels of significant participation, ie. participation in not 
only discussion but also in decision-taking. Mill features strongly as one 
of the great propagandists of participation and I shall not at this point 
cover the full breadth of his arguments. Briefly, he views participation as 
educative, both in the general sense and in the narrower sense of moral 
education. By serving on juries, holding offices in local government, 
campaigning in elections, and even the simple act of voting, Mill argues, 
the individual is encouraged to entertain perspectives other than his own. 
Participation is thus generally educative in a two-fold sense. Beyond a 
minimal level, it introduces the individual to elements of the workings of 
the political system, thus providing a key to a more general understanding 
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of that system; and even at a minimal level, participation provides some 
encouragement to a broadening of one's knowledge. But it is not just the 
machinery of government that one discovers more about, but also people 
themselves - in the sense of seeing the world from their particular 
perspectives. However, Mill reserves greater emphasis for the other, moral, 
dimension: 
Still more salutary is the moral part of the instruction 
afforded by the participation, if even rarely, in public 
functions. He is called upon, while so engaged, to weigh 
interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting 
claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to 
apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for 
their reason of existence the common good. 13 
Where such opportunities for participation do not exist 'scarcely any sense 
is entertained that private persons, in no eminent social situation, owe any 
duties to society, except to obey the laws and submit to the government. 
Every thought or feeling, either of interest or of duty, is absorbed in the 
individual and in the family.' However, by participating the individual 'is 
made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is for their benefit to 
be for his benefit. 11 4 
Mill is in danger here of arguing in a circle. He has already claimed 
that the appropriate form of government for any given society depends on 
the qualities (intellectual, moral and active) to be found in that society. 
The people, Mill says, 'must be willing and able to do what [the government] 
requires of them to enable it to fulfil its purposes. IlS (Mill here is 
referring to the system of government, and not any particular holders of 
political power.) If the members of that society would generally be 
incapable of, say, performing the duties of jury service conscientiously but 
instead proved open to bribery or readily reached their verdicts without 
fully considering the evidence before them, then it would be worse than 
pointless to operate a jury system. More crucially to Mill's argument, it 
negates the role he gives to participation as an improver of the general 
qualities of the populus. It seems that Mill's argument reduces to this: 
given the presence of good qualities, participation enhances, and, perhaps, 
improves on those existing qualities. But where the good qualities are 
absent in the first place, participation is powerless to inspire them. 
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However, Mill's argument is not circular, but it does fail to make explicit 
a crucial step: that participation will generally have the effect he 
describes only where the would-be participants actually desire it. Of 
course, it may happen that a reluctant individual finds that participation 
engages his interest in an unexpected way; or that the keen participator 
becomes alienated. But Mill is surely right in seeing it as a cultural 
matter (specifically: a matter of political culture). Where the culture 
embraces participation, then we may generally rely on even reluctant 
participators to perform well their public functions. Given one proviso. 
That this is the case within the background context of progress (with 
respect to participation). This follows from Mill's organic thesis that a 
static condition is impossible: the body-politic is in a state of 
eitheradvance or decline. (A less extreme statement of this would be that a 
static state would be unstable; perhaps not actually in decline, but forever 
on the brink of it.) And this, I suggest, is a crucial aspect of progress: 
that it reveals the continuance of the original motivating desire. Given, 
then, that the desire for political participation is present and is 
culturally valued, then we may expect that participation to bring the sort 
of results that Mill posits. In fact, the situation is not quite so 
straightforward; but I will make further comments on the effects of 
participation when I discuss citizenship. The point to be stressed from 
this discussion is that participation, in the absence of the relevant desire 
throughout the culture, is not obviously attended by the sort of intrinsic 
benefi ts that he suggests. The problem remains that of generating the 
desire. 
The third argument concerns the question of interests. Generally, we 
would expect this to take the familiar form of a prudential argument to the 
effect that the only reliable means of protecting and advancing one's self-
interest is that of participation in the decision-making process. But I want 
to put this argument to one side, along with the others excluded by the 
Auntie Maggie story; for there is a more SUbstantial question to be 
addressed: that of the identification of self-interest. I shall only sketch 
the argument here; it will be considered in some detail when I discuss 
citizenship. In the first instance, one's interests consist in the capacity, 
and the facili tating of that capacity, to pursue and to satisfy one's 
desires. Beyond the structural pre-conditions which facilitate the exercise 
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of one's capacities (life, liberty, health, property, and so on) there remain 
the specific desires. We may reasonably expect that for the vast majority 
of persons, the total set of their desires will contain incompatibilities: 
that the realisation of some desires will exclude the realisation of others 
in the set. This is no more than a harsh fact of life. We have to choose 
between our desires, eliminating the motivating force if not the residual 
presence of some as we attempt to realise others. But what counts here is 
the condition under which this process of choice between competing desires 
is carried out. In so far as those choices are made for us (whether by 
parents, the 'economic system', or the Benevolent Despot) then it is only in 
a weak sense that we can say that it is our desires which are being 
realised. True (we assume) the original desire was held (as one amongst 
many) prior to the 'choice', and thus was not, as such, imposed upon us. But 
for any given individual we could put together several subsets of 
compatible desires, drawn from the pool of all desires held by that person, 
and any of these subsets would constitute that person's interests. And this 
would be to impose upon them, not the original desires, but that specific 
set of desires which is taken to consti tute their interests. That it is to 
say, it would not form their self-interest as we would understand it. Self-
interest would no longer be a matter of personal definition, but one of 
someone else's definition. 
The force of this argument, then, is to question whether a Benevolent 
Despot can properly claim to rule in both the general interests of society 
and of the self-interests of the individuals comprising that society. Auntie 
Maggie may indeed claim that her rule facilitates the realisation of subsets 
of desires already held by her subjects, individually and collectively. But 
we can only accept that claim if the subsets of desires realised perfectly 
coincide with those which would have been chosen in her absence. If we 
concede that another Benevolent Despot (say, Uncle Jim) would have realised 
(facilitated the realisation of) a different collection of subsets (with 
equally beneficial consequences) then her claim is immediately undercut. But 
this still leaves us in the domain of imposed conceptions of self-interest 
<and thus not properly self-interest at all). So, what is required to 
convert any given subset of desires an individual may hold into what I 
think we should now call a personalised self-interest? 
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I think we should see the process of personalisation of self-interest as 
being something like this. Rarely do we attempt to fully rationalise our 
desires; by which I mean that few if any of us ever expressly sort our 
desires into compatible subsets and then choose from among them the one 
which we wish to attempt to r.ealise. Of course, there are moments of 
crucial choice (Do I marry, or do I take the vow of celibacy and enter the 
priesthood?), but such moments are, mercifully, rare. And although in so 
choosing we may seriously constrain our hitherto open field of choice (if I 
become a priest I cannot take on the role of parent), we do not usually use 
such occasions to sort out the rest of our desires. Instead, we carry with 
us our set of desires, trying to realise a bit of one here, a bit of another 
there; frequently taking this inchoate mass of desires to our death-beds -
unless we have had to make specific choices between other competing 
subsets. And it is this selection of some and elimination of others, forged 
in the cauldron of unavoidable choice, which indelibly stamps them as ours 
- and thus the attempt to realise them as b~ing unmistakeably in our 
personalised self-interest. 
I am not saying that we cannot be mistaken, in some sense, in our 
identification of our interests; that is, in the identification of those 
desires which we ought to attempt to satisfy. There may be arguments from 
rationality, prudence, and morality which need to be taken into account. But 
ultimately that process from argument through persuasion to change of 
choice among desires and thus reformulation of interest remains a personal 
project. There are two points to be stressed from all of this. In the first 
place, what constitutes our personalised self-interest ream ins open and 
evolving (in so far as we are forever generating new desires) until closed 
by death. Secondly, that it is only in the agony of decision that strong 
definitions of interest occur; that in the absence of anything or anyone 
counting on our choice our field of desires remains unaffected. Speculation 
in idle moments need not be totally idle, but is nonetheless lacking in 
weight when nothing is at stake. 
As should be clear from the above discussion, I am rejecting any facile 
conception of rational self-interest. Rational self-interest is claimed to 
be the specific subset of desires which it would be to the individual's 
advantage (or to the advantage of all individuals) to attempt to satisfy. 
The point is not whether our despot can be seen to rule in accordance with 
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a set of hypothetical interests which the members of the political 
communi ty might hold if they shared some common perception of rationality, 
but whether her rule coincides with the interests they actually hold. 
To return to the problem of Auntie Maggie's queendom. If our argument 
above holds then her subjects can have no political aspect to their 
personalised self-interest (such as it may be), given that they have no 
intention of exercising political power. The corollary of this is that they 
are unable to form a critical assessment of the benefits of her government. 
Their judgments, that is their political judgments (judgments with regard to 
other aspects of their lives may remain unaffected), are fundamentally 
flawed as a result of being detached from any serious possibility of 
practJ.cal consequences. They simply have to take it on trust that Auntie 
Maggie's rule is the best possible for them, in their interest, and so on. 
This requires some further elaboration. 
Consider the desire for peace. We may take the pacifist as holding an 
extreme form of this desirej namely, not only to abstain from participating 
in violent action but also the refusal to ini tiate such action, 
independently of the circumstances in which he may find himself. A less 
extreme form of the desire would be the refusal to initiate violence 
whatever the circumstances, though accepting the possi bili ty of responding 
to violent action. For most of us, however, the action that our desire for 
peace demands would depend on the particular circumstances. That is, for 
most of us our desire for peace is conditional. The form in which the 
desire can best be realised will depend on the situation we find ourselves 
in and on the desires of others. Our paCifist, on the other hand, holds an 
unconditional or categorical desire. Few of us hold many (and perhaps not 
any) desires of this categorical form. Most of our desires, and thus our 
self-interests, are conditional on how we find the world at any given 
moment. Although I dislike the analogy, it seems to me we can best express 
the difference between categorical and conditional desires/interests in 
terms of costs. A categorical desire is non-negotiable, there is no cost 
which is too high to pay in order to realise (or to maintain the attempt to 
realise) that desire (up to and including, presumably, the 'cost' of death). 
The extent to which we try to realise conditional desires, however, does 
depend upon the costs to be incurred in any given situation. Where the 
object of the conditional desire is essentially public (say, a state-
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controlled system of education) then the weighting to be given to that 
desire <ie. the lengths to which we are prepared to go to realise it) 
depends on the desires, and the strengths of those desires, of others. But 
the strength of any given desire, the degree of its conditionality, is not 
something that is given in advance, independently of context, but is 
revealed in relation to the particular situation. It is in the process of 
negotiation with others that the degree of conditionality of any given 
desire or subset of desires is revealed to us. Without participation in this 
'bargaining process', or without experience of such relevant participation, 
one cannot properly form a critical assessment not only of one's 
personalised self-interest but also of more general decisions which one 
might take to affect one's self-interest. 
These arguments from interests are not conclusive; there is still a gap 
to be bridged. The person who feels no need to identify and personalise 
their self-interest, who has no wish to pass critical judgment on matters 
in any way political, and who sees no intrinsic virtue in participation wiil 
find himself unpersuaded. There is one last over-arching argument which can 
be offered here in the attempt to persuade the determined abstentionist. 
This last argument against the idea of the Benevolent Despot returns to 
the problem of passivity. We have already commented on the essential 
passivity of the people in their position as subjects of Auntie Maggie. 
Divorced from the power to effect change, even such 'political' activities 
as they may undertake <ego the 'parliament of advisers', personal critical 
judgment) suffer a serious flaw in their nature. Stripped of that 
possibility of action, judgment loses its tone of responsibility. No weight 
is attached to the need to achieve a correct judgment. Indeed, the idea of 
'correct judgment' seems alien here. At best, any judgment will be an 
aesthetic/contemplative exercise. At worst, it takes a corrupted, debased 
form. It is not, then, simply the absence of power which is the problem in 
Auntie Maggie's queendom. Rather it is that the abdication of power (into 
the sole hands of the despot) implies the abdication of responsibility. 
And it is the absence of responsibility that forms the underlying 
ground for Mill's principle criticism of a benevolent despotism: that such 
an endemic passivity of character is morally indefensible. Mill doesn't 
spell out the argument, though he alludes to it when he points to the 
att1 tud1nal differences between the expressions "il faut de la patience" and 
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"what a shame."'6 The former expresses no more than a resigned response to 
events in the world. The latter expresses a judgment, albeit at a somewhat 
rudimentary level. The passivity which Mill decries is that which abdicates 
the responsibility for judgment within the political domain . 
•• 
The concepts of judgment and responsibility will exercise us throughout 
this work; and more will be said later on the subject. But passivity has a 
specific connotation for Mill, and the term carries an implicit 
condemnatory tone in his vocabulary. For Mill, passivity is antithetical to 
happiness, though not to contentment. Action is the stuff of happiness. 
Contentment (the passively pleasurable acceptance of the world as given) is 
but a pale shadow of the happiness that action can bring. 
But Mill's conception of happiness is far more subtle than the image of 
desire-satisfaction suggests. It is the setting of goals and the striving to 
achieve them that is the vital ingredient of happiness; that is, is the 
source of greatest pleasure. The prime value, then, is on the individual's 
realisation of himself as an autonomous agent, setting his own goals and 
striving to bring them about. There is something irreducibly romantic and 
heroic about this conception of human happiness. The emphasis on autonomous 
agency indicates that Mill is far from fully embracing eudaimonism. It is 
not the fact of the good life which is important, but the creation of, or at 
least the attempt to create, it. In his Autobiography Mill relates the tale 
of his mental crisis. Having entered a state of ennui in which he was 
'unsusceptible to enjoyment or pleasurable excitement', the following thought 
occurred to him: 
Suppose that all your objects in life were realised; that all 
the changes in institutions and opinions which you are 
looking forward to, could be completely effected at this 
very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to 
you?" And an irrepreSSible self-consiousness distinctly 
answered "No!" At this my heart sank within me: the whole 
foundation on which my life was constructed fell down. All 
my happiness was to have been found in the continual 
pursui t of this end. The end had ceased to charm, and how 
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could there ever again be any interest in the means? I 
seemed to have nothing left to live for.'7 
Mill found, eventually, his salvation in the cultivation of his sentiments, 
initially through the poetry of Coleridge and then of Wordsworth. But this 
remained for him a matter of self-cultivation. It is still a project of 
agency, but of a far more subtle kind than that of the pursuance of 'worldy' 
goals. There is something of the quest about itj the voyage of <self-) 
discoverYj of reflection upon the inescapable tragedy of one's human 
condition in which the vast majority of one's goals (and those of others) 
are doomed to failure. But the greatest pleasure is to be found in the 
striving, the expression of autonomus agency, within the context of this 
knowledge. All of which requires, and enhances, a 'sense of dignity' and a 
'nobleness of character." e Thus his famous comment that it is 'better to be 
Socrates dissatified than a fool satisfied'.' 9 But reflection and thought 
have their limitationsj for ultimately, 'The test of real and vigorous 
thinking, the thinking which ascertains truths instead of dreaming dreams, 
is successful application to practice' .20 
I do not wish hereto be drawn deeper into the controversies of Mill's 
utilitarianism. What is clear is that his conception of human flourishing, 
well-being, happiness, centres on a subtle understanding of what it is to be 
a human agent. And just as, as we saw above, a society which abandons its 
attempts at progress and settles for a placid contentment has begun (or is 
in imminent danger of beginning) its decline, so too with individuals. So to 
be content with Auntie Maggie's regime is, for Mill, to give up the struggle 
(to be fully human) and thus to abandon all hope of true happiness. Further, 
since Mill argues that happiness <in his understanding of it) is the sole 
uni versally desired ultimate end, and thus the ground of morality, there is 
an implicit moral critique in the idea of contentment: not only can we not 
be happy in Auntie Maggie's queendom, but we (morally) ought not to accept 
it. 
Whether or not one accepts the above argument will depend, to a large 
extent, on one's understanding and opinion of Mill's moral theory. I will 
not argue more strongly for my interpretation of Mill here since the 
critique from the absence of responsibility is, I think, the stronger moral 
argument to be advanced against the benevolent despot. 
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At this point we need only note the following conclusion from the tale of 
Auntie Maggie. If it is the opportunity to exercise judgment about and 
resposibility over our lives which is crucial then a limited dissemination 
of power will not serve. Nothing less than a full democracy I in which we 
are all equally responsible for and equally judgers of our lives, will 
satisfy these conditions. 
*** 
That political rule should be in the hands of the knowing, the wise, the 
good, is at the heart of Benevolent DespotlIdeal Legislator theorYi and is 
presented in perhaps its purest form in Plato's Republic.21 I shall not 
rehearse Plato's arguments in any detaili but will focus on one aspect 
deriving from them. 
Plato argues that the Just State he has described will only come about 
if philosophers become rulers. Only those who aspire to true knowledge will 
ever be able to penetrate the veil of appearances to comprehend the the 
unchanging reality which lies behind our phenomenal experience. 
Unfortunately, the capacity to gain these lofty peaks of insight is not 
given to us all. And for those blessed with this capacity I rigorous 
training, discipline and dedication is required for success. It would be 
absurd, as Plato's metaphor of the ship indicates22 , to entrust political 
power to those with neither the knowledge nor the skill to exercise it. 
Mill's objections to benevolent despotism are directed against these 
Platonic notions. We recall that Mill argues that the true measure of the 
virtue of the state is not to be found in the justice of its laws, the 
wisdom of its administration, etc, but in its promotion of the virtues 
(intellectual, active and moral) of the individual members of the state. The 
rule of the good and wise may, in certain circumstances, promote this 
development but eventually it must prove an obstruction to further 
progress, as we saw above. Mill seems to envisage a threshold point below 
which self-development, in any strong sense, is not possible. Paternalism 
may be justified if it facilitates progress to this point but no further. 
Mill's egalitarianism has its limits. We may all (or almost all) have 
the capacity for self-direction; the question is: to what extent have we 
developed it? Mill argues that in order to qualify for the suffrage, one 
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must be able to demonstrate some minimal level of self-development. Thus, 
there is a distinction between the dis-qualification of some and the not 
failure to qualify of others. The illiterate and innumerate fail to qualify 
on the grounds that they do not have the basic knowledge/competence to 
exercise political power, at however rudimentary a level. So too, those in 
receipt of 'parish relief' show themselves incapable of the first object of 
self-direction (to provide for oneself and family). Criminals and 
undischarged bankrupts, however, are disqualified on the grounds of their 
improper conduct irrespective of their initial qualification.23 
We have become accustomed to the idea of disqualification from the 
suffrage, but reject the notion of qualification. This sugests that, if 
there is a problem about fitness to vote, it is certainly not an urgent one. 
However, it becomes urgent if we consider extending the power of the 
indi vidual in poli tical decision-making, eg. by moving towards a direct 
democracy. What would be the criteria we would apply for granting a full-
blown citizenship? What level of knowledge, skill in its application, and 
virtue would we demand? If we were to take seriously the project of 
(political) self-rule then should there be an Obligatory and formal training 
in the exercise of political power? This thought seems a little odd, given 
that we don't demand any formal training or qualification from our elected 
politicians; though we do demand them from appointed administrators. 
There are a series of questions, then, which Plato's theory opens. What 
are the appropriate qualities required of those who are to exercise 
political power (in whatever form)? What is the role of 'expert' knowledge: 
of advice only or as a direct function of decision-taking? How broadly can 
poli tical skills be developed wi thin the poli tical communi ty? These 
questions will be addressed in the discussion on citizenship in Chapter 
Six. But I want to sketch here an argument which will be developed in that 
later chapter. 
It concerns whether or not political rulership is a fit subject for 
study and training for the would-be practitioner as we deem the subject 
matter of the professions to be for their practitioners. Clearly there is no 
problem about it being a proper subject for study from a detached, critical 
perspective for the non-practitioner. And, at least in contemporary 
electoral systems, there is a considerable degree of informal training and 
development of skills (in effect, an apprenticeship) involved in the 
Page 32 
Ch~pter 2 Of the Benevolent Despot 
progress from the initial selection as a candidate, campaigning, election to 
Parliament, the back-benches, junior government positions, and so on. But 
should we accept this 'amateurism '7 
I think we should. Williams, in his 'Politics and Moral Character' 
comments that 'The conception of the good which ... inherits from Plato 
invites the question of how the good could do anything at all'.2A. Williams 
is right, though he does not pursue this point. Plato's philosopher kings 
are not creative agents on the political stage. Nor are they (creative) 
interpreters of the moral law, but are its administers. Their acts as rulers 
are fully determined by their moral knowledge, they have no degrees of 
freedom. Whethe'r or not Plato's Republic is the founding work of what was 
to become the utopian tradition is not crucial here; but this it seems to 
share with that tradition: beyond the initial creative act by the utopist 
political creativity disappears from the picture. And this is precisely 
because, at least in the political utopia (there may be other species of the 
genus), the state is built upon the virtue of justice: it is the Just State 
and as such passes beyond the bounds of history. 
Yet the argument continues <and will be addressed at length in Chapter 
Seven) as to whether the utopia is in any strong sense a political state, 
since the political decisions have been incorporated in the structure of the 
state; whereas the sense of 'politics' with which we are familiar and about 
which we are concerned is precisely that in which decisions are under-
determined and require creative agency on the part of the decision-takers. 
And as Mill argues, agency is something which, beyond a threshold point, 
one can only learn and develop for oneself. Though of course, one can be 
trained in skills which enhance and direct one's agency. 
This brings us to the opposing tradition of political traineeship to 
that of Plato, the Speculum or Handbook of Princes, of which Machiavelli's 
The Prince2f; is both the best known example of the tradition and at the 
same time revolutionises that tradition. Put simply, virtue (virtu) is seen 
as the success in achieving one's goals; and for homo politicus the goal is 
to gain and/or retain (political) power. Albeit that the pursuit of power 
may be a proper goal, even within democractic politics, as Williams 
suggests26 there is something disconcerting about insisting on the formal 
training of would-be politicians in the means of gaining and retaining 
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power. They get more than enough of this, we might think, in their 
competitive participation in the process as it stands. 
And this forms the thrust of the argument: that participation in the 
decision-making process is the sole appropriate form of training for 
decision-takers. There may indeed be background requirements (of knowledge, 
general good character) that makes one person more fit to exercise power 
than another; but these remain secondary to the prime requirement of 
competence (or skill> in decision taking. A fuller account of political 
decision taking is defered until Chapter Six. 
But there is a deeper argument; one which is more difficult to cash out. 
It questions whether politics is a vDcation in the sense in which we admit 
the priesthood, medical practice, and possibly law, to be callings.27 (And 
this, after all, is the Platonic theory of rulership.) The question is at a 
deeper level than in the above discussion. I want to ask what is involved 
in making politics the central project of one's life, not just as a field of 
study or interested concern, but as a practitioner. That is the individual 
perspective. The broader social perspective questions the extent to which 
politics should be an obsessive concern within the community. 
I want to canvass two lines of reply. The first questions the extent to 
which political activity (ie. beyond heated discussions over pints of beer) 
is or may be a source of pleasure. For the occasional participant pleasure 
may be the last thing that the trip to the polling booth suggests, except, 
perhaps, for the pleasure in the feeling of duty done. But for the 
'professional' politician duty is unlikely to serve as the prime motivator 
except in very exceptional cases. That we can expect pleasure to feature 
somewhere in the motivational picture is not in itself a problem; given 
that it is largely contingent on political agency, ie. is the form of 
pleasure attendant on any expression of agency. But where politics is 
allowed to form the central life-project then the connection with pleasure 
is likely to be more intimate: that it becomes (or is seen as) the main 
source of pleasure. I am not to be construed here as committing myself to 
any given psychological theory. I will accept (though with some difficulty) 
that there is no necessary connection, that some may make of politics a 
central life-project without it becoming their main source of pleasure; but 
I think such cases both rare and unlikely. The refusal to recognise politics 
as a vocation is not itself to remove the pleasure dimension, but it does 
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serve, I suggest, to question the proper relation between the exercise of 
political power and the pleasure to be gained therefrom. But if the gaining 
of pleasure does become a dominant part of political activity then the 
activity itself becomes not only debased but also corrupted. The focus of 
desire is no longer the content of political issues, for which one's agency 
is required that they be realised, but agency itself, irrespective of 
content. Power becomes desired for its own sake and not for what can be 
achieved through its use. This is the debasement. The corruptive step is 
when it is the demonstration of power which is desired; and the resulting 
manufacture of subsidiary goals simply as a vehicle for that demonstration. 
There is a danger that this argument can be overplayed, leading one to 
adopt an unacceptably puritanical scepticism towards the political domain. 
The thrust of the argument is not that the motives of all politicians 
should be regarded as immediately suspect, only that there is something to 
be said for valuing a certain 'amateurism' in our approach to the holding of 
political power. 
This leads me on to the second line of reply. The exercise of political 
power should be regarded as a reluctant activity. That is it should be seen 
as both a burden and a duty. I shall discuss Mill's argument that the 
exercise of power cannot be a matter of right but may be a duty in Chapter 
Five. Suffice it here to say that Mill is correct in this. But even duties 
may be performed with (for others) an unc.omfortable zeal. The forgoing 
discussion has refered more to the holders of high office. Now I am 
concerned with the level of politicisation of the citizenry. The old fears 
of 'mob rule' will surface again when I come to discuss models of medial 
and maximal democracy and to propose the reflective model. These fears are 
proper, but do not consti tute a sufficient objection to seeking a more 
politicised and participatory citizenry. What they suggest is that 
participation should have attendant 'costs'. A fine balance (though hopefully 
one which is not in principle unachievable) is required here between the 
cost of participation and the (reluctant) readiness to participate. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
lUll DIAL , XED TAT, AID XAXIXAL DEXOCRACY 
But w4at is democracy? In this chapter I want to attempt to give some 
content to the concept of 'democracy', without begging too many questions. 
In particular I wish to avoid begging the question as to whether or not 
democracy is a 'good thing' and that therefore more democracy must be an 
even 'better thing'. The intuition that democracy is a good to be pursued 
formed the background to the arguments advanced against the benevolent 
despot in the previous chapter. However, those arguments concentrated more 
on the value to be accorded to political participation, and were by no 
means conclusive. The relation of participation to democracy remains open. 
As far as is possible, then, the value of democracy is not assumed in 
this chapter. The limitation on this possibility needs to be made plain, 
given the common understanding of the term: that we (mostly) do value 
democracy, do desire to live in a democratic society, and wish to believe 
that the society within which we live is indeed democratic. (The 
ethnocentricity of the 'we' is obvious and not problematic here.) Breaking 
free from these constraints is far from easy and this attempt may not 
prove altogether successful. Nor is there any guarantee that it will embrace 
all those features we tend to associate with 'democracy'. The hope is that, 
at the very least, it will help to sharpen the debate as to what constitutes 
'democracy' . 
Nor is there here a prior assumption as to the functions or purposes 
of democracy. This absence demands a brief explanation. The function that a 
particular social structure (whether a formal institution or an informal 
custom) serves might not be transparent to the participants in that 
structure; nor, if the structure has a history extending over several 
generations, will there necessarily be common agreement as to its intended 
purposes. Indeed, we can expect that a structure which survives will be 
multi-functional and succeed in satisfying different interpretations as to 
its purpose. Furthermore, we might expect that such a structure in a society 
Page 36 
Chapter 3 Minimal, Medial & Maximal Democracy 
undergoing change <in a common sense meaning of that term) will undergo 
transformations in its functions and the purposes it is perceived as 
fulfilling. Thus, to attempt to define an operative concept in terms of the 
functions and/or purposes it serves is to trap i t within a particular 
historical context. 
The requirement, then, is for a formal <ie. structural> model which 
leaves open both our evaluation of democracy and also the functions or 
purposes 'which any given application of the model may serve. However, there 
is a further and more severe proplem: that of disentangling the concept of 
democracy from other and commonly associated concepts, such as those of 
justice, equality and rights (the list is by no means exhaustive). The 
intention here is to sketch skeletal models of minimal, medial and maximal 
democracies, fleshing out the models with associated concepts where 
necessary. 
I shall begin by introducing a primitive intuition about democracy; one 
which I shall not do much at this point either to explain or to justify. 
From this primitive intuition the construction of the models begins. This 
intui tion is that the paradigmatic form of democratic rule is rule by law; 
law which is, in some pertinent sense, popularly derived. In the maximal 
case of democracy this deri vation would be immediate, each law being 
proposed, discussed and approved at large wi thin the poli tical community, 
with little or no institutionalised division of labour in the legislative 
process; that is, the process of legislation would be homogeneous and 
continuous. On the other hand, the minimal sense we can give to the notion 
of the popular derivation of law is that, whereas the legislative process in 
general takes place ei ther outside the political community, or wi thin a 
reserved section of it, some form of popular consent in advance of the 
laws's enactment is required as part of the legislative process. This 
stipulation of anterior popular consent is a necessary and not a contingent 
condition of democratic rule. For, if it were contingent then any form of 
government which won a high degree of general confidence in its 
administration (for instance, through the perceived efficacy and justice of 
its laws) would qualify for the title of democracy. Thus, a despot, at first 
loathed by her subjects and her decrees scorned, might eventually earn 
popular respect for her legislative perspicacity. Vie might want to say of 
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such a regime that it was (had become) 'popular'j but it would be offensive 
to our intuitions to describe it as democratic. 
The models, then, will represent the formal characterisation of 
democratic possibilities with respect to legislation. This is not to say 
that I do not regard democratic penetration into the fields of executive 
and administrative action as unimportant. Quite the reverse. The demo-
cratisation of executive action in particular I would regard as the most 
urgent and daunting challenge confronting the democratic theorist of today. 
However the schema I shall present will, I hope, help to stress the 
enormity of the problem. By focusing on the process of legislation alone, we 
gain a clearer vision of how much more we might seek to do. And by 
restricting our attention the schema is kept to a manageable degree of 
complexity. Furthermore, law and the process of legislation has long been 
at the heart of democratic theory. 
Also at the heart of democratic theory is the idea of consent: 'The 
'consent of the governed' is frequently presented by political scientists 
and political theorists as a central, if not the major, distinguishing 
feature of liberal democracy'.l The centrality of this idea of consent is to 
be be explained by its role as a legitimating device for government 
(specifically: for liberal democracies) and that it is taken as generating a 
set of political obligations on the consenter's part. This double function, 
of generating legitimation and obligation, has been central to the history 
of 'social contract' theories. Nonetheless, the question of the nature of 
such obligations and their generation remains far from clear, as Pateman 
admirably demonstratesj but this is a line I shall not pursue in any detail. 
Instead, I shall simply sketch an argument to the effect that consent is 
the minimal formal expression of (political) power representing anterior 
popular consentj and that it signifies the alienation of some part but not 
all of the consenter's (political) power . 
.. 
Generally we consent to others doing things to or for us, or to the actions 
of others in situations which involve us. Thus we give our consent to 
doctors in advance of an operation, to solicitors to act on our behalf, and 
to our children to leave home. Consent is given in advance. Sometimes our 
Page 38 
ChZl.pter 3 Minimal, Medial & Maximal Democracy 
consent relates to our own actions: with a gun held to my head I consent to 
hand over the key to the safe. Although I would prefer to go to Paris 
rather than Blackpool for this year's holiday, the family's preference is 
clear and so I consent: Blackpool it will be. So the circumstances in which 
consent is given, the conditions of consent (whether coerced, pressurised, 
under the force of 'necessity' or with an unlimited freedom) are crucial in 
specifying the initial degree of power available to us. This emphasis I;>n 
consent as the expression of power diverges from (but is not unrelated to) 
the liberal conception of consent as the expression of willi though it 
requires a stronger characterisation of the conditions of consent than does 
the conception grounded on will. The expression of power takes us out of 
the realm of desire and preference to focus on the world of action. Thus, 
consent, typically, signifies our voluntary alienation of some part of our 
powers of independent action. 
Our consent may be negative, a declining to exercise our power, as 
opposed to a positive alienation of that power. It may be provisional, that 
is granted for a specific time only (and is thus revocable) or restricted 
in scope to specific acts. Furthermore, our consent may be restricted in a 
different way : it may apply only to the early, preparatory and usually 
deliberative stages of some act and not through to its conclusion without 
referral back to uSi ie. without placing the completion of the act back 
within our power. The culminatory decision to act may not have been 
alienated. I shall distinguish this point of readoption of our power for the 
implementation of an act as the moment of assent. The condition in which 
our power is not alienated but is exercised throughout I shall refer to as 
one of ~rticipation. 
As will be seen from what follows, this approach shares some features 
with Lukes' analysis of the 'three dimensions of power'.2 The first 
dimension (or 'face') of power is that analysed principally by Dahl in 
terms of overt acts I typically those concerned with the resolution of 
observable conflicts. Power is fully embedded in 'concrete decisions'. This 
behaviourist analysis enables Dahl to conclude that power is dispersed 
wi thin a pluralist democracy and so differing individuals and groups are 
able to enter the political arena and express their preferences and protect 
their interests at varying times and over various issues, with no prior 
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assumption as to the likelihood of their success or failure. The situation 
remains open and fluid. 
But as Bachrach and Baratz observed, this behaviourist approach fails 
to capture the 'second face of power': the control of the political agenda 
and thus of what is allowed to become an overt source of conflict (and so a 
matter requiring 'concrete decisions') in the first place: 
All forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of 
the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the 
,suppression of others, because organisation is the 
mobilisation of bias. Some issues are organised into 
politics while others are organised out.3 
There is, then, a manipulation of the political agenda which effectively 
sifts the issues, incorporating some and excluding others (by refusing to 
regard them as issues which require action). This manipulation, or 'agenda-
setting', may be within the narrow control of party leaders; or more 
broadly a function of the specific issues addressed by interest and 
pressure groups, or the poliCies of political partiesjor may be systemic in 
that it is a function of 
a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and insti-
tutional procedures ('rules of the game') that operate 
systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain 
persons and groups at the expense of others.4 
Whatever the source of this manipulation, the resulting absence of an overt 
act or decision corresponds to a covert (or 'tacit') act or decision on the 
part of those who control the agenda. The concept of power is thus no 
longer restricted to the observable success of A in securing B's compliance 
in the face of B's protest, but captures the hidden exercise of power where 
B's protest is either unaired or not regarded seriously. This analYSis 
correctly suggests that the absence of conflict cannot be construed as 
indicating a consensual agreement on 'non-issues'. The presumption of such 
agreement can be made only where there is no control (personal or 
systemic) over the political agenda, and where there is equal access of all 
to the channels of expression of grievance, concern and preference. 
But for Lukes, this still fails to capture a third dimension of power. 
Bachrach and Baratz regard such grievances, concerns and preferences as 
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brute, needing only to gain access to debate in the political arena and to 
be regarded as legitimate in order to rectify the power imbalance: 
A may exercsie power over B by getting him to do what 
he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over 
him by influencing, shaping, or determining his very wants. 
Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get 
another or others to have the desires you want them to have 
- that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their 
thoughts and desires?5 
It is not so much the potential of thought-control systems which Huxley, 
Orwell and Skinner illustrated which Lukes has in mind here, so much as 
<though he does not use the term) the prevailing ideology: the value-system 
which determines the conceptual limits of debate and so the range of 
conflict, The 'most effecti ve and insidious use of power' is thus this 
ideological control which acts so as to 'prevent such conflict from 
emerging in the first place',s 
The problem with this third dimension of power is that, as Lukes 
himself recognises, it is dependant upon some conception of the would-be 
agent's 'real' or 'objective' interests, interests which remain not only 
unvoiced but also unrecognised by the would-be agent.? Lukes further notes 
<though in a somewhat different contextS) that this muddies the waters of 
ascribing responsibility for any act or non-act. For, both those who 
exercise power within and those who are <in effect) manipulated by this 
ideological context may share responsibility for failing to challenge the 
background assumptions and for failing to establish the likely consequences 
of their acts and non-acts. There is indeed a prima facie argument that in 
such cases responsibility is not equally shared, but that the holders of 
ostensive power must take the lion's share. Nonetheless, the implication is 
that the failure in critical judgment, ie. the failure to challenge the 
prevailing orthodoxy as to what is and what is not acceptable, devolves 
responsibility upon all parties. 
Taken to an extreme, this suggests a complicity in oppression which is 
intuitively plausible; after all, Eichmann saw himself as a decent human 
being for acting efficiently and humanely within the prevailing orthodox)".9 
Less palatably, it suggests that those oppressed and who fail to offer 
r-esistance also share responsibility for their fate. Rather than pursue this 
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theme here, I shall simply draw this point. The ascription of responsibility 
assumes the ascription of power. Problematic as the ascription of collective 
responsibility (and indeed of collective power) may be, the point holds that 
those who comply without dissent share (at least some) responsibility for 
the subsequent act or non-act. And this in turn implies that a residual 
power rests with all those who could have acted otherwise. In practice, we 
are prepared to limit and mitigate this responsibility where the power held 
over those who comply dwarfs and effectively annuls that residual power. 
But this should not be allowed to blind us to the logic of the si tuation. 
The implications of this residual power will be explored in the following 
section. 
•• 
The focus for the preparation of the models of minimal, medial and maximal 
democracy is the process of legislation. The content of law, its purpose and 
structure, are matters which will not here be considered. Yet some initial 
though far from exhaustive comment is required. As understood here, the 
background assumption in favour of rule by law is twofold: that law is 
equally applicable to all who fall within its scope, at least, that it makes 
no arbitrary distinctions and exclusions; and that, as a consequence of 
this, there is no unqualified sense of being ruled over by others. Rule by 
law, then, is seen as being essentially impersonal rule, both in its scope 
and its derivation. It is neither the product of personal whim nor is it in 
its explicit intent the vehicle for the promotion of the interests of a 
specific indi vidual, group or class. (This view of the impartiali ty and 
generality of law has, of course, been subject to much dispute. However, I 
shall assume that any failure in this respect of law as formed and 
practiced in any given state does not vitiate the centrality of the concept 
of rule by law to democratic thought.) As can thus be seen, background 
assumptions of justice, equality and autonomy are already present in our 
discussion; and will be given further attention in the following chapters. 
It is the distinction between the democratic and the (merely) popular, 
grounded solely on popular anterior consent as a necessary phase of the 
legislative process that I wish to pursue in order to outline the 
characteristics of the minimal case of democracy. 
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Consider again Auntie Maggie's queendom. There can be little doubt that her 
despotism is popular in that her people are contented with her rule. Indeed, 
I have suggested that they have come to place a high degree of trust in 
her. Thus they are in the position of tacitly consenting to her rule. The 
doctrine of tacit consent as advanced by John Locke'o is not unproblematic 
in his use of it to legitimate existing statesj but here we can apply it 
straightforwardly. Her people give no indication that they object to or 
dissent from her rule. Their actions, both in the absence of dissent and in 
their daily observance of the laws, gives rise to the reasonable expectation 
that they would formally consent to her reign were they to be given the 
opportunity to do so. Their silence speaks volumes on their behalf. 
Furthermore, we may take it that they do actually express their consent, 
albeit informally - say by cheering her whenever she appears in public. 
We can now begin to grapple with the implications of understanding 
consent as the minimum expression of power. No matter how popular her 
regime, Auntie Maggie remains a despot; she retains sole legislative (and 
executive) power. In that respect her people are clearly without power. How, 
then, could it be the case that they give consent (albeit tacitly) if 
consent implies power? We need to distinguish between three different 
interpretations of what it is to have power; interpretations which parallel 
in some respects yet significantly differ in others from our earlier 
discussion of Lukes' three dimensions of power. 
Thomas Hobbes defined power as, in the first place, the 'present means, 
to obtain some future apparent Good'." That is, my power is to be assessed 
not in terms simply of what I can now secure for myself (my ability to 
satisfy my present desires) but the extent to which I can guarantee being 
able to satisfy future desires. And that implies .being able to win out in 
the case of a dispute with others who may desire the very same goods as I 
desire. <And this, of course, mirrors the 'first face' of power.) So, there is 
a sense in which it would be true according to Hobbes that most of us, 
considered individually, have some power <though perhaps not very much) j 
the extent of that power being a factor of our desires and our security in 
being able to satisfy them. But when our 'present means to obtain some 
future apparent good' is compared with the means others have at their 
disposal then the Hobbesean conclusion is that either we have power or none 
at all: power is zero-sum. If their means outstrips ours then they have 
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power; if ours outstrips theirs then it is we who have power. In this, 
contrastive, sense Auntie Maggie has power and her people none (given that 
as despot she retains a central coercive agency at her disposal). 
Yet we should not be too quick to accept this as a final statement on 
the question. There is a difference between latent and ostensive means (ie. 
power). In so far as her resources are assembled and organised then her 
means are ostensive and, we may assume, outstrip those of her people. These 
powers need not be military and formal alone, but may embrace that control 
of the political a~enda which was identified as the 'second face' of power. 
What we do not know is the extent of any latent means her people may holdi 
eg. if they were to band together to form a revolutionary movement would 
they succeed in achieving her overthrow (their means outstripping hers?) 
Less drastically, to what extent would they be capable of succeeding 
<through civil protest and disobedience) in placing grievances and 
preferences on the political agenda? In other words, what are the forces 
which might be mobilised sufficient to be recognised as the observable 
exercise of power? This we can attempt to assess but cannot knoW' in 
advance of the outcome of any conflict. <And it is precisely this 
uncertainty which confirms Hobbesean individuals in their 'perpetual I and 
restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in death'.12) Since 
this calculation of means available can at best be only an estimate and is 
only retrospectively certain (ie. on the basis of outcome) then we cannot 
adopt the Hobbesean contrastive account for latent power. Latent power 
rests quietly with individuals, groups and communi ties, waiting to be 
realised. Thus there is a sense in which the inhabitants of the queendom 
retain the possibility of power, though only in this latent form. If we can 
accept that in any poli tical community rebellion or revolution remains a 
possibility (however remote) then that residual, latent, power is retained 
and cannot be individually or collectively alienated. This, as we have seen, 
is implicit in Lukes' analysis of the third dimension of power; though 
'latent power' here differs from that ideological power which Lukes 
examines. 
There is a third sense of power to be considered here: formal or 
institutionalised power. Again, it is clearly the case that under her 
despotism the people are granted no formal political powers. Whatever may 
or may not be the extent of their latent power, it is given no institutional 
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channels through which it may be expressed (and if it were then it would 
cease to be merely latent power and would become ostensive). In the absence 
of such institutional channels that non-alienable power may still be 
expressed: not formally but tacitly. There is something of a conundrum here. 
I have argued that there is a residual, albeit latent, power that cannot be 
alienated. Consent is to be understood as the (minimal) expression of 
power, but one which involves the alienation of some part of our powers of 
independent action. In the absence of formal (institutionalised) power we 
can consent only tacitly. What power is it, then, tha,t we are alienating in 
tacit consent? The point is that tacit consent is not actual consent, there 
are no actual consenters. Tacit consent is an interpretation of the actions 
of others. <Derivatively, it may be our interpretation of our own actions, 
but only in terms of the interpretation we might expect others to place on 
our actions.) Thus the 'consent' is hypothetical: had we explicitly asked for 
that consent we have no doubt but that it would have been granted. And this 
is not because of any moral reasons, or because of friendship, or the 
character of the other per se but because there would be something 
contradictory in refusing that consent given such behaviour. Of course, our 
construal of another's behaviour may be wrongi or at least, when we point 
out to them the interpretations we have placed upon it the other may change 
their behaviour or give their own interpretation thereby seeking to 
invalidate ours. 
If the consent is hypothetical then so too are the powers that are 
being alienated. We must read tacit consent as implying: if we had such 
powers then we would alienate them so as to achieve the formal counterpart 
of the present, informal, situation. Tacit consent is a recognition of the 
lack of formal powers and thus simultaneously the recognition of the 
possibility of having such powers. There is a further complication we must 
briefly examine before moving on. I suggested above that it might be the 
case that Auntie Maggie is cheered whenever she appears in public. I think 
we should see this as being something more than tacit consent. Here we have 
a set of public actions which do not depend on interpretation by others but 
which are explicit to both observer and agent. There is a temptation to 
term this 'popular consent'. Popular it certainly is: widespread, public and 
signifying support. But does it amount to consent? To answer that we have 
Page 45 
Chapter 3 Minimal, Medial & Maximal Democracy 
to ask another question: does it represent any difference in the alienable 
power held by her people? 
There are some fine lines to be drawn here; lines which, in the real 
world, may well escape our conceptual powers of resolution and merge into 
each other. The lines to be drawn are those between acquiescence in a 
regime, and tacit and popular consent for that regime. Acquiescence suggests 
a lack of support which fails to cash out in observable acts of dissent. 
It implies an attitude of resignation and disassociation as far as is 
possible without crossing the line into dissent. It is a condition in which, 
counterfactually, hypothetical powers would not be alienated to achieve the 
present situation. It implies the deliberate attempt to avoid such acts as 
might give rise to a construal of tacit consent. Conceptually this is 
distinct from tacit consent; though in practice, as I have suggested, the 
distinction may be too fine to draw. Tacit consent, as argued above, does 
imply the hypothetical act of alienation but the absence of any specific 
acts of expression which carry little or no ambiguity. But given that those 
expressive acts are public and popular <ie. are not performed by 
individuals in private) then it represents a partial realisation of latent 
power. But that power is perceived as being already alienated. The act of 
expression is an attempt to identify with and thus share in that power. 
A brief discussion of the concept of alienation as here employed is now 
required. We cannot alienate that which we cannot give nor that which is 
not ours to give but we can alienate that which we do not presently have 
but would have if we chose to claim it. Thus as Rousseau correctly saw we 
cannot alienate our own lives. 13 Nor can we alienate the life of another to 
someone else. The restriction here is logicical, not empirical. We can wish 
to alienate our lives to others, and believe we have done so, and even enter 
into a contract stating that we have done SOi but all these claims would be 
false. One can devote one's life to others, one can even sacrifice it, but 
it cannot be completely separated from oneself and given to another. Thus 
only those things can be alienated which are neither integral to oneself 
<ie. are contingent upon the world) nor are integral to another. Whatever 
can be alienated must already be, prior to the act of alienation, something 
which is other than self and other selves. I am not sure that this claim 
can be substantiated without reference to some further theory, most 
obviously one of natural rights; but this is a move I shall not here 
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attempt to make. If necessary I am content to offer this as a stipulation 
about the meaning of 'alienation' as employed here. Thus it is analytically 
true (though it is also substantively true) on my use of the term that one 
cannot alienate one's own life, nor one's residual and latent power. 
Nor is the act of alienating one's power a matter of giving it; for, 
paradigmatically, the initiative for the act of giving rests with the giver 
and, once given, we lose all control of the gift. We cannot impose 
conditions on the use of our gift. We are closer, I suggest, if we think in 
terms of the grant. A grant is made in response to a request (though the 
request itself need not be explicitly made) and can typically have 
restrictions applied to its use. Here, the grant is one of power. One 
conceptual advantage that this offers over and above liberal democratic 
theory is that is assumes the presence of some other body that might seek 
that grant of power; ie, the state. Thus it becomes clear that the state is 
not somehow (and mystically) merged into and made identical with the 
political community at large but is separate from and exercises power over 
it. On the one hand, this is acknowledged by liberal democratic theorists: 
unless the state were thus separated there could be no problem about the 
generation of obligations to obey the state. On the other hand, the 
reducti vism of such theories insists that the state cannot be something 
over and above identifiable individuals: in the liberal democracy, we are 
told, 1 'etat c'est nous. That the state comprises identifiable (and existing) 
individuals we might wish to grant; but that we are those individuals is a 
matter for some doubt. 
The discussion so far has made little reference to obligations, rights 
and rightful rule with respect to consent. At this point my concern is with 
conceptualising and labelling positions of political power. So, in the 
schema I am about to present, I make no initial claims as to whether any 
particular form of democracy has a greater call on our obedience <ie, our 
obligations to it are stronger), nor which is more rightful, ie. more 
legitimate. My intention is simply to sketch out the various forms 
democracy may take with respect to the power position of its citizens. In 
that respect the schema is comprehensive: it includes the basic models of 
democracy as discussed in Chapter One, organising them according to their 
modes of expression of political power. As previously explained, the schema 
addresses itself to legislative power. Its application to the fields of 
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executive, administrative and judicial powers would require further 
treatment which is not here offered. 
There are other aspects which might have concerned us which it does 
not embrace. It makes no reference to the general social and economic 
conditions under which any variant might be applicable. Held does this 
admirably in his Kodels of Democracyl A.. But my purpose is different to 
Held's. Rather than the examination of assumptions about socio-economic 
conditions underpinning any given variant, my concern is with the 
characterisation of citizenship which medial and maximal democracies might 
require. This should properly lead to a wider set of considerations, but my 
work will not travel so far. The schema is thus an ahistorical abstraction, 
designed to facilitate a broader understanding of democratic possibilities 
and not to provide. an historical explanation of the liberal democratic 
state. (On this, see MacPherson.1S ) Similarly, the schema does not encompass 
questions about the breadth of citizenship, ie. whether the political 
communi ty incorporates (and incorporates equally) the entire social 
community. More will be said on this in Chapters Fi ve and Six. If 
successful, the schema should prove neutral between differing conceptions of 
the state and should be applicable not only to overtly political 
communi ties but also to productive units, voluntary associations such as 
clubs and any community which wishes to regulate its acti vi ties by common 
rules. For all these, the schema will provide a range of power options for 
its members. 
*** 
Notwi thstanding that Auntie Maggie enjoys popular support (in the form of 
acclaim) I want to insist that this does not make her regime democratic. 
Let me develop the distinction between formal and informal modes of 
consent. By formal I mean not only that the expression of consent is 
institutionally channelled but also that it is integrated as an essential 
phase of the legislative process; that process being invalidated if the 
phase of formal consent is not duly carried out. ('Institutionally' is used 
in a loose sense here and does not necessarily imply a developed 
bureaucratic structure.) Clearly, it is formal consent which concerns us. 
Informal consent is merely an adjunct to the legislative process, remaining 
Page 48 
Chapter 3 Minim~l, Medi~l & M~xim~l DBIDOCrcKY 
a contingent nicety - useful, and perhaps preferable, in terms of the 
pragmatics of rule but not an essential element in the validation of law. 
There is, however, a grey area between the two whereby a customary though 
informal practice comes to be regarded as institutionalised through 
prolonged usage. Whilst recognising this problem we shall take formal 
consent to exclude these borderline cases. 
We have assumed that our despot enjoys popular support for her 
legislation. It may be that such support, though given, is not in any way 
sought by her. She feels no obligation to publish and invite discussion of 
her legislative propos~ls; nor, were she to perceive a withdrawal of support 
for her laws, would she feel obliged to revise them (though if this did not 
give her pause we should want to question her benevolence). Popular support, 
particularly in the form of anterior consent based on a developed sense of 
trust, is thus informal and quite incidental to the legislative process. 
This condition of rule I shall refer to as total despotism. 
She may, however, expressly seek that support; perhaps going to 
considerable lengths to obtain it: instituting a.parliament to 'advise' her, 
meeting members of interest groups, receiving petitions, and so on. It may 
even be that she is institutionally required to seek that support. 
Nonetheless, I shail term this partial despotism, since she retains 
(ultimately) sole legislati ve authori ty. Thus, despi te there being 
institutional channels for the expression of consent/dissent - and for the 
despot to continue with her legislation in the face of such dissent would 
presumably carry wider implications - that consent remains informal in as 
much as it is not fully integrated as an essential phase of the legislative 
process. 
Both total and partial despotisms, no matter that they enjoy popular 
support, seem clearly delineated from democracy. The marginal case is that 
of constitutional despotism. By this I mean that anterior consent has been 
form~lised as an essential phase of the legislative process; and that no 
legislative proposal can be validly enacted without such consent. Consider 
again the position of Auntie Maggie. How could she claim anterior popular 
consent for herself as legislator (and thus indirectly for her legislation)? 
If there were some formal procedure for her removal (for instance, a 
process of impeachment) then she might claim that the absence of any such 
move (or the failure of attempts at impeachment) could be taken as 
Page 49 
Chapter 3 Minimal, Medial & Maximal Democracy 
signifying consent. This is one step away from the last resort of removal 
by force; and in so far as it is a recognised and formal procedure, then 
the possibility of impeachment would indeed represent a step from the 
popular towards the democratic. However, it doesn't secure consent in 
advance of her legislative enactments (consent here would be essentially 
retrospective) and so does not meet the criterion advanced abovej and is 
thus insufficient to cross the divide between the popular and the 
democratic. But if she were to put herself to some form of election at the 
commencement of her reign,. or soon after, then this, with the possibility of 
removing her from office by impeachment, would perhaps be sufficient, just, 
to cross the divide and enable us to recognise her regime as minimally (and 
marginally) democratic. 
There is proper cause for hesitation here. In the first place, consent 
is implied just so long as the despot remains in place. After the initial 
act of election there is no further, formal, opportunity for the expression 
of consent, only for an ultimate act of dissent. Consent thus loses its 
positive connotations and is readily lost in a presumption in favour of the 
status quo. Consent thus merges into acquiescence. This returns us to the 
situation we saw earlier with regard to the second 'face' of power: the 
assumption that the absence of conflict indicates consensual agreement. The 
systemic manipulation here is manifested by the lack of formal procedures 
for placing dissatisfaction with her rule on the political agenda. What is 
required, if we are to mark out the boundaries between the popular and the 
democratic, is for continuing consent (or developing dissent) to be made 
formal and explicit. Thus, regular or maximum fixed-term, elections are 
required. If the occasion for (re-)election is left completely at the 
despot's 'discretion then we once more slide back towards popular rather 
than democratic support; the presumption rests again with and in favour of 
the despot (as does control of the political agenda) and not in her need to 
secure an active consent. 
The minimal act of consent represents an alienation of political power 
but to whom and on what grounds? The constitutional despot, I have argued, 
represents a marginal case of democracy. I must now attempt to sketch the 
central cases of minimal democracy. (The map of democratic possibilities at 
the end of this chapter summarises what follows.) We can begin by 
distinguishing three objects of the act of consent. First, we can l'llienate 
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our powers to a legislator. That is, we can vote for a person or persons 
who will perform the legislative tasks, and vote for them purely on the 
basis of their character, or our friendship, admiration, respect for them -
without any consideration of the legislative programme they might be likely 
to pursue. We give them a carte blanche (subject to recall) as to the 
legislation they might produce. Where we are alienating our powers to such 
statesman-like persons I shall refer to them as Deputies. In effect, they 
deputise for us in the legislative process, assuming our powers without any 
p~rticular specification as to their use (though there would normally be 
background assumptions about the need to rule justly and wisely for the 
common good). This, of course, was the position Burke argued for in his 
'Address to the electors of Bristol'. 16 
Second, and more typically in the liberal democracies, we might vote 
for what we can consider to be a compound unit, comprising legislators (the 
persons themselves) and the general legislative policies they publicly claim 
they will adopt. This is familiar to us in the person of the Representative. 
And finally, we might vote on a specific legislative programme, itemising 
the intended legislation, but do so through the device of voting for a 
person who will attempt to carry out that programme. In this case the 
character of the candidate matters not a joti they become simply a 
repository of the desires of others and have little or no powers of 
initiative of their own (as in, for instance, the members of an electoral 
college or a trade union block vote). They are mandated to act within pre-
specified limi ts and so I shall term them Delegates. Thus the grant of 
power involved in the act of consent is at its greatest when voting for 
deputies and at its least when voting for delelgates. All three I shall 
refer to collectively as legislators. 
There are important questions here about whether, in the case of 
deputies and representatives in particular, the candidature is to be 
restricted (and if so, on what grounds) or open; how nominations are to be 
generated; and which electoral system is to be employed. Similarly, in the 
case of delegates there is the problem of how a legislative programme is 
prepared and by whom. But, important as these questions are, I take it they 
do not fundamentally address the power position of the citizens. The latter 
remain in a position of having alienated their political power and thus of 
having no control over the process of transforming legislative proposals 
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into law. We can build in systems of checks and balances so as to prevent, 
or diminish the risk of, abuse of those powersj we can insist on powers of 
impeachmenti and we can stipulate the regular or maximum period without 
recall of deputies, representatives and delegates. Furthermore, we can 
develop a second-order legislative process for the revision or annulment of 
previous legislation and place restrictions on legislative content through a 
bill of rights and an independent court. Yet, vital as all these measures 
are, it is still the case that having alienated her power by voting, the 
process is formally out of the citi~en's hands. Even in the case of electing 
delegates on a mandated legislative programme they may need to be invested 
with some powers for negotiation and compromise with other mandated 
deputies <unless all are voted in on precisely the same programme). 
Of course, these matters do make some difference. Open access to the 
candidature, with little or no restrictions on nomination, and the 
utilisation of one electoral system rather than another, may give the 
citizen a better chance of having her preferences and values aired and 
acted upon in the legislative process. And this undoubtedly makes a greater 
difference to the power of organised political groupings rather than, 
directly, to the power of the individual citizen. We can properly see this 
as an enriching of citizen power; but within the institutional context it 
remains the case that the indi vidual's power is alienated to the 
legislator (s). 
Thus the· citizen's power is essentially nominal. It is recognised in 
name but is formally exercised only minimally· and that only in order to 
alienate it unless and until it is readopted by the recall of the legislator. 
Once alienated the citizen has little or no (formal) control on the exercise 
of legislative powers. This I shall term Jrfinimal Democracy. 
This form of de~ocracy is often termed 'indirect' and thus contrasted 
with 'direct' or 'classical' or 'participatory' democracy, by which is usually 
meant a system whereby the citizens themselves take the (legislative) 
decisions without alienating their powers. However I there is more than a 
little confusion herej which I shall illustrate in the following chapter 
when discussing what might commonly be thought to be obvious examples of 
'direct' democracy. That confusion, I suggest, has its source in the failure 
to identify a third form of democracy i one which occupies a position with 
respect to the alienation of legislative powers between the pZtrliamentary 
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(or 'indirect') and the 'participatory' (or 'direct') forms. That 
intermediate position I shall term Nedial Democracy. 
I suggested at the beginning of this chapter that often we alienate 
our powers to specific persons for specific tasks which form part of an 
overall act, the completion of the act requiring a final and culminatory 
exercise of our powers. Examples of this are commom: setting up a committee 
to explore an issue and report back; having a letter typed which is to be 
personally signed before being senti employing a solicitor to manage the 
conveyancing of a house before signing the final deeds. In all these cases 
there is a partial and temporary alienation of some of our powers but we 
retain an overarching power and complete the task by gi ving our final 
assent to it. 
Thus in legislative terms, we could still elect legislators to discuss 
and draft items of legislation but retain the final say on whether or not 
their proposals become law through the expression or witholding of our 
assent. This I shall take as being the central case of medial democracy. We 
can make further distinctions here based on the quality of that assent. I 
shall restrict the term to apply to that situation in which the citizenry in 
general are competent to express a critical judgment on legislative 
proposals. 'Competent' in two senses: first, that the citizenry have access 
to all the relevant information on which to ground their critical judgmenti 
and second, that they have developed their powers of critical judgment. We 
cannot guarantee that critical judgment will be exercised in any given case, 
though we might be able to specify conditions under which it is more or 
less likely :to be exercised. This we shall examine in some detail in the 
next chapter. Where critical judgment is not exercised I shall reterm this 
acclaim. Where the 'incompetence' is due to lack of access to the relevant 
information I shall describe this as a case of nominal assent. 
Both acclaim and nominal assent, I suggest, are more likely in 
conditions where there has been no citizen involvement in the preparation 
of the legislative proposals. Thus, where there is no prior election of 
Jegislators but legislative proposals are prepared by, say, a Great 
Legislator, a legislative commission, or a constitutional monarch then these 
are less than ideal conditions for the expression of critical assent. 
Nonetheless, we should still see these cases as meeting the formal 
conditions of medial democracy. 
Page 53 
Chapter 3 Minimal, Medial & Maximal Democracy 
What then of Haximal Democracy'? The distinction I have been developing is 
grounded upon the alienation of power with respect to acts of legislation. 
Clearly, then, maximal democracy involves no alienation of citizen power. 
That is, their power is exercised throughout the stages of proposal, 
discussion and drafting and final approval. This and this alone, I suggest, 
should be honoured by the term participation. Spelling out the details of 
how such a system might work, and whether it can work in a large and 
complex nation state or only in a devolved political community, is a task 
beyond this work. 
There is a crucial qualification I shall introduce here and develop in 
the discussion of the reflective model. It is not necessary that all the 
citizens all the time exercise their legislative power for it to be non-
alienated. So far, alienation as I've portrayed it is vertical in direction: 
either to those who are or will be above the body of the citizenry (the 
legislators) or in the case of final approval to those who, formally at 
least, are subordinate to the citizenry. This is substantively the case with 
assent only and not with acclaim or nominal assent. In the latter two it is 
clear that the substance differs from the appearance. (This, of course, may 
also be the case with consent and so the same tripartite classification of 
the quality of consent can be applied: 'consent' for the exercise of critical 
judgment; 'nominal consent' in the absence of the relevant information or in 
the presence of coercion; and, I suggest, 'acceptance' where the critical 
faculties are under-developed or are put in abeyance.) Contemporary consent 
theorists, in response to the problem of revealing how voting might be seen 
as imposing on voters political obligations to the state, have suggested 
that instead of vertical obligation we place ourselves under an horizontal 
obligation by votingj ie. our obligations are to our fellow citizens. Without 
pursuing the problem of obligation per 5e we can adapt the concept to 
suggest that, beyond a minimal democracy, the citizens may be engaged in an 
horizontal alienation of their legislative powers. This, I suggest, is the 
case when we ask some citizens to carry out a task to completion on behalf 
of the citizen body, a task which any member of that body would be 
qualified to perform but which either does not require the involvement of 
all or for practical reasons cannot be performed by all conjointly. This 
horizontal alienation of powers, I shall argue in Chapter Five, requires a 
condition of trust among the citizenry. Nonetheless, it still involves the 
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partial alienation of powers. Two conditions, apart from trust, are required 
to prevent horizontal alienation becoming problematic: one is that the 
powers entrusted are for a specific purpose and for a relati vley short 
period of timej the second that no distinction be made between the 
individual citizens and thus the opportunity of performing the task should 
fall equally on all. That is, citizens should be chosen not on the basis of 
election but by lot. Wherever possible, the tasks and the numbers required 
to perform them should be such as to make it likely that each citizen might 
be chosen at least once over the course of their lives. 
**** 
This chapter has had 11 ttle to say a bout Kaximal Democracy. In part, this 
is because the medial form will occupy us from hereon ini and in part 
because there is so much that can be done to increase the democratisation 
of the process of legislation in particular and the worlds of politics and 
society in general before we approach the stage of maximal democracy. With 
respect to democracy, we are babes still learning to walk: running is a 
project for the future. Nor is this simply a reflection of a background 
conservatism on my part. As the next few chapters will explore the move 
from nominal to effective ci tizen power, from democracy as consent to 
democracy as assent requires o. much deeper understanding of what it is to 
be a citizen before we decide either that such a move is desirable or 
indeed that it is possible. Being a citizen in anything beyond a minimal 
democracy may prove to be beyond our capacities, let alone our inclinations. 
Yet, it is one thing to have explored the possibilities, assessed what might 
be required of us and then to reject it, another to have failed to realise 
that there were these possibilities in the first place. 
In order to move towards the characterisation of the reflective model I 
shall first examine three theories of democracy, each of which might be 
taken to be a maximal democracy: those of Robert Paul Wolff, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and <though this is not strictly a 'theory' in the sense of the 
previous two) the democracy of classical Athens. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THREE lIODELS OF 'CLASSICAL' DEXOCR!CY: 
WOLFF, ROUSSEAU & CLASSICAL ATBEllS 
[N]othing less can be ultimately desirable than the 
admission of all to a share in the sovereign power of the 
state. But since all cannot, in a community exceeding a 
single small town, participate in any but some very minor 
portion of the public business, it follows that the ideal 
type of a perfect government must be representative. 
(J .S.Mill: Considerations1 ) 
I suggested in the previous chapter that some of the problems in our 
thinking about democracy have resulted from the failure to conceptualise a 
medial form, something more than the minimal and yet less than the maximal 
form of democracYi and that this failure in turn makes it difficult for us 
to be precise in our thinking as to what might constitute the maximal form 
of democracy. In this chapter I shall attempt to illuminate that confusion 
by examining three models in the tradition of 'direct' or 'participatory' or 
'classical' democracy2: the democratic practice of classical Athensi 
Rousseau's theory of popular sovereignty and the general willi and Robert 
Paul Wolff's theory of 'instant direct democracy'. Wolff's proposals are both 
exciting and illustrative of misconceptions about democracYi whereas 
Rousseau's theory presents not so much a misconception as a highly 
conservative theory of democracy. But neither theory, I shall argue, 
presents a model of maximal democracy, for which we shall need to turn to 
the democratic practice of classical Athens. The discussion of these models 
will highlight the role of the citizen 's critical judgment in a democracy, 
which will be crucial to our construction of the reflective model. 
* 
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Mill, in abandoning maximal democracy on the grounds of practicality, has 
given hostages to fortune. Practicalities may change, the impractical 
becoming the everyday. To be fair to Mill, he does proceed to give 
independent justifications for representative government other than that of 
best practical approximation to a maximal democracy, based on the energies 
elicited and the protection afforded by a representative democracy.3 But at 
this stage we have no basis for thinking that such justifications would not 
be met by a maximal democracy. Indeed, the whole thrust of his argument 
against benevolent despotism is towards the fullest possible citizen 
participation; and it is only in the very last sentence of Chapter III of 
the Considera.tions that he draws back from such a radical proposal and 
commits himself to the virtues of representation. 
There are good grounds for thinking that the practicalities have 
changed; to the point whereby we must now take seriously the possibility of 
some form of direct democracy. One person who has taken this prospect 
seriously is Robert Paul Wolff in his In Defense of Ana.rchism. 4 Admittedly, 
this is in ~he context of his search for a legitimate state, one compatible 
with (his Kantian-based understanding of) individual autonomy. We have no 
need here to follow the details of Wolff's argument; but simply turn to his 
proposals which he offers 'a good deal more than half in earnest'S as a 
starting point. 
Wolff himself offers only a thumbnail sketch of his proposal. However, 
what he proposes is so sweeping that it merits quoting in full: 
I propose that in order to overcome the obstacles to direct 
democracy, a system of in-the-home voting machines be set 
up.! In each dwelling, a device would be attached to the 
television set which would automatically record votes and 
transmi t them to a computer in WaShington. <Those homes 
wi thout sets would be supplied by a federal subsidy. In 
practice this would not be very expensive, since only the 
very poor and the very intelligent lack sets at present.) In 
order to avoid fraudulent voting, the device could be rigged 
to record thumbprints. In that manner, each person would be 
able to vote only once, since the computer would auto-
matically reject a duplicate vote. Each evening, at the time 
which is now devoted to news programs, there would be a 
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nationwide all-stations show devoted to debate on the 
issues before the nation. Whatever bills were "before the 
Congress" (as we would now describe it) would be debated by 
representati ves of al ternati ve points of view. There would 
be background briefings on technically complex questions, 
as well as formal debates, question periods, and so forth. 
Committees of experts would be commissioned to gather data, 
make recommendations for new measures, and do the work of 
drafting legislation. One could institute the position of 
Public Dissenter in order to guarantee that the dissident 
and unusual points of view were heard. Each Friday, after a 
week of debate and discussion, a voting session would be 
held. The measures would be put to the public, one by one, 
and the nation would record its preference instantaneously 
by means of the machines. Special arrangements might have 
to be made for those who could not be at their sets during 
the voting. (Perhaps voting sessions at various times 
during the preceding day and night). Simple majority rule 
would prevail, as is now the case in the Congress.6 
I shall assume, without further discussion, that Wolff is correct about the 
technological possibilities. However, I wish now to dispute Wolff's claim 
that the problem of democracy is 'merely technical" and that it is obvious 
that a political process based on 'instant direct democracy' would 
approximate 'the ideal of genuine democracy', 
In this context, Wolff's own comments are illuminating. These I again 
quote at some length: 
[ IJt should be obvious that a poli tical communi ty which 
conducted its business by means of an "instant direct 
democracy" would be immeasurably closer to realising the 
ideal of genuine democracy than we are in any so-called 
democratic country today. The major objection ... is that it 
would be too democratic! What chaos would ensue! What 
anarchy would prevail! The feckless masses, swung hi ther 
and yon by the winds of opinion, would quickly reduce the 
great, slow-moving, stable government of the United States 
to disorganised shambles! Bills would be passed or unpassed 
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with the same casual irresponsibility which now governs the 
length of a hemline or the populari ty of a beer. 
Meretricious arguments would delude the simple, well-meaning 
ignorant folk into voting for pie-in-the-sky giveaways; 
foreign affairs would swing between jingoistic militarism 
and craven isolationism. Gone would be the restraining hand 
of wisdom, knowledge, tradition, experience.s 
This is as damning a picture of any form of democracy as one could 
possibly wish for. And surely Wolff is dead right: this is exactly how we 
would expect such a political system to function; and these are precisely 
the sorts of objections we would want to raise against it. 
But what follows is not self-evidently Wolff's conclusion: 'The 
likelihood of responses of this sort' he says, 'indicates the shallowness of 
most modern belief in democracy. It is obvious that very few people really 
hold with government by the people ... '9 Of course, he may very well be 
right that all too few people do hold with government by the people; but 
this does not automatically follow from the rejection of his vision. It is 
rather more likely that Wolff has given us an inadequate picture of 
democracy; and it is this, not democracy per se, which we reject. 
seems to understand something of this, though his response to 
lamentably weak, when he states: 
The initial response to a system of instant direct 
democracy would be chaotic, to be sure. But very quickly, 
men would learn - what is now manifestly not true - that 
their votes made a difference in the world, an immediate, 
visible difference. There is nothing which brings on a sense 
of responsibility so fast as that awareness. 10 
Wolff 
it is 
This is mere assertion on Wolff's part. What guarantees can be furnished 
that the awareness of greater political power will not breed greater 
irresponsibility? Perhaps no guarantees as such can ever be given; but we 
can properly demand some evidence, some argument to explain why 
responsibility should increase rather than diminish under a system of 
instant direct democracy. In fact, all the arguments go against Wolff. Let 
us postpone consideration of the problems of access to information and the 
amount and availablility of time required for such high density voting 
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until our discussion of the reflective model and concentrate instead on 
more profound difficulties. 
The first of these concerns the status of those matters 'before the 
Congress'. Wolff refers to these as 'bills'j though whether this embraces all 
legislative proposals or only some (say, exclUding fiscal measures) and 
whether the net of approval is wider, including executive decisions, treaty 
ratifications and so on, Wolff gives no clues. Perhaps it does not matterj 
the point being to emphasise the principle of an instant direct democracy. 
For simplicity I shall assume that Wolff's citizens are acting as 
legislators, considering only legislative proposals. However, in his desire 
to eliminate all traces of a parliamentary process Wolff also destroys a 
valuable democratic element in that process: that legislative proposals (and 
executive policy) are generated by voter's choice. Admittedly, this choice is 
both guided and indirect; but we should not lightly dismiss the fact that 
it can be said, not improperly, that in a representative democracy the 
'people' play a significant part in the generation and adoption of 
legislative and executive policies. Rather than preserve this link, Wolff 
turns to the Millean solution of independent bodies of 'experts' who will 
monitor developments, make recommendations and draft legislation. In 
severing this link, Wolff reduces the power of the 'people' to that of a 
veto; and more crucially, effectively alienates them from the policy debate. 
The question of the irresponsible exercise of power thus becomes both less 
and more urgent. In the first place, given that their power is that of veto 
but not generation of legislative proposals (and that the generation of 
bills rests in the power of a stable, continuing and autonomous body) it is 
difficult to see how, for instance, 'foreign affairs would swing between 
jingoist militarism and craven isolationism'. Secondly, and against this 
reasssuring picture, the increased power-gap between generation and 
approvil of legislation suggests the possibility of a corresponding 
alienation on the part of the citizenry: having not been integrated in the 
pol icy de ba te, they come to it, as it were, from a standing start. It is not 
just that, in the absence of prior debate, they are unlikely to have any 
depth of background thought on the issue (important though this is) but 
also that the lack of prior integration in the process may be expected to 
induce either a lack of proper concern or an anti-establishment attitude of 
veto-for-veto's-sake. 
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But even if this element of alienation from the policy-making process could 
be overcome within the Wolffian system, the problem of irresponsibility is 
not thereby totally dissolved. Let me now rephrase the problem in terms of 
'concerned' and 'negligent' voting behaviour. The responsible exercise of 
power, here construed as concerned voting behaviour, will consist in 
something like the following set of characteristics: making an effort to 
understand the issues involved; weighing up particular arguments; viewing 
them in the light of our own values and those of friends, neighbours and 
the community at large; discussing the issues with others; and seeing the 
situation in the light of the general context, not simply as an isolated 
matter. This is a fairly weighty business of reflection, deliberation and 
judgment. These elements characterise, not the rectitude of the final 
decision (for we may be mistaken in our judgment), but the earnest desire 
to reach that right decision. As it stands, this characterisation would 
apply equally well to the argument that the vote is a vehicle for both the 
protection and the advancement of self-interest, narrowly construed though 
here the judgment required would be self-regarding). To broaden the concept 
of the responsible exercise of power so as to bring it in line with our 
intui ti ve understanding, we need to adopt something like Mill's position 
(for which I argue in the following chapter) that voting is not a right but 
a duty carrying moral burdens (since the exercise of power is always the 
exercise of power over others). Given this move, we have a full 
characterisation of concerned voting behaviour as a non-optional, 
burdensome and most likely time-consuming task. 
By contrast, negligent voting behaviour is primarily characterised by 
snap-decisions and/or self-regarding judgments. The suggestion here is that 
the desire to reach the correct judgment is imperfectly carried through 
<insufficient effort is made to understand the issues and the arguments 
ad vanced, or the wider context of the needs and values of others is 
disregarded). We may further contrast concerned and negligent voting 
behaviour with 'maverick' voting behaviour in which there is neither desire 
nor attempt to reach the correct judgment but the decision is the product 
of whim, the flip of a coin, and so on. Neither negligent nor maverick 
voting behaviour can be legislated against; but they can be encouraged or 
discouraRed. 
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The instantaneity of the Wolffian democracy would, I suggest, encourage 
neg ligent or maverick voting. In brief, it makes voting too easy, removing 
all need for effort. In particular, it disregards two crucial elements: the 
need for time to reach a mature judgment and what I shall term a 
'reflective gap', a distancing from one's own immediate concerns. Even the 
(minimally) ritualistic overtones of the walk to the polling booth is some 
help in providing both an awareness of the responsibilities involved and 
this aspect of distancing (the reflective gap) in the exercise of power. 
But what power is it that is being exercised? Wolff claims that the 
power is such as to be able to bring about change: 'their votes [would 
make] a difference in the world, an immediate, visible difference'.1 1 En 
masse, the power involved is indeed formidable, even when reduced to that 
of a veto; but from the perspective of each individual voter we must 
seriously doubt that they would have any sense of power. Wolff's voters are 
unlikely to meet the demands of concerned voting behaviour because (in 
addition to the instantaneity of the system) their power (individually) is 
negligible. Given that the 'wasted vote', the lack of power attached to the 
vote, is perceived to be a problem in constituencies of less than an 
hundred thousand, then vie might expect it to be a greater source of 
alienation and apathy in a constituency of, say, thirty million. The most 
likely options to be taken by the voter (unless extraordinarily determined 
to exhibit concerned voting behaviour) are those of negligent or maverick 
voting. To bring any real efficacy to one's vote, to convert it from a 
nominal to a real power, one would need to seek an alignment with others. 
The voter would have to find a group with whom she could identify in order 
to make voting worthwhile at all. 
The political tenor thus becomes essentially divisive, a matter of 
locating a 'we' to join and a 'them' to oppose. We do not need to be wedded 
to a non-conflictual and harmonious social ideal to view this di visi veness 
with alarm. The search for a faction is the first step in the abnegation of 
responSibility: it is the invitation to another to decide on one's own 
behalf. A faction having been found, one simply follows its line. There is 
one further option (other than not bothering at all) and that is the 
aggressive advancement of self-interest, narrowly defined. Voting becomes a 
channel for the statement of self-regarding preferences and desires. These 
are no longer media.ted and t.empered by elect.ed representatives but become 
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openly competitive. And this takes us back into factions: to have one's 
preferences adopted requires having power in alliance with others. 
Thus we have a picture of the Wolffian 'democracy' as a mixture of 
maverick and negligent <interest and faction) voting behaviour; add in a 
background of apathy, and perhaps just a little concerned voting behaviour, 
and the result is an appalling vision of the lack of responsibility Wolff 
so scornfully dismissed. Wolff, then, is woefully wide of the mark in 
claiming that the 'obstacles to direct democracy are merely technical'. It 
is indeed necessary that technology be harnasse~ to the democratic cause of 
these obstacles are to be overcomej but it is by no means sufficient. 
I shall suggest in the next chapter that something of Wolff's insight 
can be preserved and developed. There is much that is rich in his vision; 
particularly the desire to integrate the. political world into that of our 
quotidien existence. 'Politics would be on the lips of every man, woman, and 
child, day after day. As interest rose, a demand would be created for more 
and better sources of news' and 'social justice would flourish as it has 
never flourished before' .12 These are vital concerns and one feels, at a 
level of gut-reaction, that the modern technology should facilitate their 
realisation - but not quite as Wolff saw it. Underlying Wolff's claim is a 
belief in the possibility of citizenship which we can sum up as: give the 
people power and they will exercise it responsibly, justly and well. I have 
argued, not that this belief is erroneous as such, but that Wolff's instant 
direct democracy gives only an illusion of power and further, that it 
disinclines the voter to exhibit concerned voting behaviour. Thus we can 
expect little or no responsibility in the exercise of such political power 
as the Wolffian system devolves on the people. 
In his In Defense of Anarchism Wolff makes plain his personal debt to 
Rousseau. It is thus unfortunate that he fails to appreciate the caution 
with which Rousseau approaches the matter. The 'Committees of experts' 
which will have the task of recommending and drafting legislative proposals 
are cast in a role analagous to that of the benevolent (legislative) despot. 
And although Rousseau gave this role a charismatic personification (in 
contrast to Wolff's faceless mandarins), Rousseau was far more pessimistic 
about its chances of success. 
** 
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Rousseau accepts, as Wolff does not, the manifest possibility of what I have 
characterised as negligent and maverick voting. It is not sufficient to 
. change one element of the insti tutional process and leave untouched the 
rest of the social fabric. If the Legislator's project is to succeed then he 
must found a new state and 'change men to citizens'. 
The Legislator, as portrayed in his du Contrat Social':3, is not a ruler 
as is the benevolent despot in the story of Auntie Maggie. His function is 
solely that of lawgiver. Indeed, he is not a member of the state and thus, 
like Hobbes' sovereign, is not a party to the contract. The contract itself 
occupies a surprisingly small portion of that work. Rousseau's central 
concern is the founding of the legitimate state and the contract is merely 
the inaugural act of foundation. In order to maintain the state on its path 
of justice it is necessary to regulate the economy (thereby avoiding great 
disparities in wealth), to institute a proper system of government, to 
maintain allegiance to the state through a civil religion, and above all to 
regulate these and other aspects of society by a wise and just system of 
laws. But, Rousseau says: 
Who is to give [the body politic] the foresight necessary to 
formulate enactments and proclaim them in advance, and how 
is it to announce them in the hour of need [ie. at the 
inaugurating contract)? How can a blind multitude, which 
often does not know what it wants, because it seldom knows 
what is good for it, undertake by itself an enterprise as 
vast and difficul t as a system of legislation? 
Individuals see the good and reject it; the public desires 
the good but does not see it. Individuals must be obliged to 
subordinate their will to their reason; the public must be 
taught to recognise what it desires. Such public 
enlightenment would produce a union of understanding and 
will in the social body, bring the parts into perfect 
harmony and lift the whole to its fullest strength. Hence 
the necessity of a lawgiver.'4 
Why shouldn't the newly constituted body politic be able to frame its own 
system of legislation? In order to examine Rousseau's thinking here we need 
to consider the 'qualities' (to revert to Millean terminology) of the 
Legislator and the people, and the relation between them. 
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The major stumbling block to the people framing the laws for themselves is 
the presence of the social passion am our-pro pre, an intemperate and 
competitive desire for the esteem of others. Rousseau's speculations as to 
the origin and development of this conflictual passion (' am our-pro pre 
causes all the mutual damage men inflict one on another 11 5) does not 
concern us here. But given its infective presence throughout society (and 
the resonance with disease is intentional on Rousseau's part, he clearly 
regarded it as a pathological condition) individuals seek to protect and 
promote their position vis a vis the position of others. This picture of a 
competitive struggle for status is deliberately Hobbesean on Rousseau's 
part, though here it is not power per se which is desired, as Hobbes 
posits, but the esteem of others: to take as the measure of one's worth the 
praise of others. Thus property is a crucial factor in the escalation of 
this conflict: it functions as an ostensive measure of one's worth in terms 
of what one can claim as the esteem due to self by others. It is in this 
condition of a 'universal desire for reputation, honours, and advancement, 
which ... exercises and holds up to comparison our faculties and powers'16 
that the false contract takes place, legalising (though not, for Rousseau, 
legitimating) the entrenched political and civil inequalities. All attempts 
at framing, or passing critical judgment on, legislation are fundamentally 
corrupted by the presence of amour-propre: such judgments are irredeemably 
partial, focusing on the consequences for one's relative social posi tion 
rather than embracing considerations of justice. Even those who by dint of 
self-discipline may have escaped the ravages of this iniquitous passion, 
and thus might prove suitable for the role of lawgiver, will yet fall under 
the suspicion of furthering their position , notwithstanding any disclaimers 
they might make; and their social standing will be envied while they remain 
within the body politic. 
The first reqUirement of the lawgiver is thus that he should have no 
immediate stake in the society for which he is legislating. Rousseau says: 
'When Lycurgus gave laws to his country, he began by abdicating his 
monarchical functions. It was the habit of most Greek cities to confer on 
foreigners the task of framing their laws. The modern republics of Italy 
have often copied this custom'.17 Rousseau comes close to making the 
lawgi ver a mere mortal whose office demands a formal impartiality. But it 
is something and someone less mundane that Rousseau has in mind: not the 
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person who can deal with the continuing problem of drafting legislation, 
but the person <and specifically for Rousseau, the man) who can found a 
nation. And for this, the Legislator must be a near-divine: 
To discover the rules of society that are best sui ted to 
nations, there would need to exist a superior intelligence, 
who could understand the passions of men without feeling 
any of them, who had no affinity with our nature but knew 
it to the full, whose happiness was independent of ours, but 
who would nevertheless mal,re our happiness his concern, who 
would be content to wait in the fullness of time for a 
distant glory, and to labour in one age to enjoy the fruits 
in another. Gods would be needed to give men laws. 1s 
If the Legislator is prey to the consuming passion of amour-propre it is in 
the transposed form of the desire for an historical glory: to be judged 
<and lauded) not by one's contemporaries but by those in ages yet to come. 
But the divine aspect of the Legislator is more than this. In order to 
fulfil his task he must speak with a transcendent authori ty. Rousseau 
approvingly quotes :Machiavelli on this: '[T]here has never been in any 
country an extraordinary legislator who has not invoked the deity; for 
otherwise his laws would not have been accepted'. 1'3 But this reliance on the 
charismatic quality of the Legislator leads Rousseau into a problem which 
he fails to satisfactorily address. How are the people to distinguish 
between true and false prophets, between the Great Legislator and the 
imposter? 'Any man' Rousseau tells us 'can carve tablets of stone, or bribe 
an oracle, claim a secret intercourse with some divinity, train a bird to 
whisper in his ear, or discover some other vulgar means of imposing 
himself on the people'. And he continues, 'A man who can do such things may 
conceivably bring together a company of fools, but he will never establish 
an empire, and his bizarre creation will perish with him. Worthless 
authority may set up transitory bonds, but only wisdom makes lasting 
ones'.20 Only time, as they say, will tell. History is the sole judge of the 
Legislator and his works. 
Nor is the Legislator's continuing influence on the citizens merely a 
matter of the wisdom of his laws. His charismatic personality infuses the 
spirit of the civil religion. Rousseau is less than explicit here, but we 
can reconstruct the line of his thought. Of the four forms of law which he 
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adduces, three are akin <Political, Civil and Criminal)j but the fourth is of 
a quite different form and is 'the most important of all': 
[It] is inscribed neither on marble nor brass, but in the 
hearts of the citizens, a law which forms the true 
consti tution of the state, a law which gathers new strength 
every day and which, when other laws age or whither away, 
reanimates or replaces them; a law which sustains a nation 
in the spirit of its institution and imperceptibly 
substitutes the force of habit for the force of authority. I 
refer to morals, customs and, above all, belief.21 
It is this moulding of morals, custom and belief which forms the greatest 
task of the lawgiver and on which 'he bestows his secret care'. But how is 
he, the lawgiver, to do this? Rousseau is content to leave it in the realm 
of mystery; and even in the chapter on the civil religion he makes no 
explicit reference to the Legislator, leaving it in the sovereign's power to 
determine the due forms of observance. 
However, the charismatic exemplar is an obsessive theme in the 
Rousseauean corpus. In his opera The Village Soothsayer, his novel La. 
Nouvelle Heloise, here in du Contrat Social, and in his tract Emile the 
great individual alone can exercise the strength of influence to lift people 
above their immediate, amour-propre dominated, concerns.22 In Emile, we have 
three exemplars and gain some clue to the possible genesis of the lawgiver 
figure. The tutor of the young Emile is the dominant exemplar, but he in 
turn reveals the influence on him of the Savoyard Vicar, whose 'Profession 
de Foi '23 is the pivotal moment of that work. But it is the tutor's eventual 
influence on Emile which is crucial here. In the unfinished sequel Emile et 
Sophie, au les Solitaires, Emile's carefully controlled upbringing at the 
hands of the tutor seems to come to nought. After the deaths of first her 
parents and then her child, Emile takes Sophie to Paris where she 
impregnated by another man. Emile deserts her and eventually decides to 
leave France. At this point his fortunes reach their nadir and he is sold 
into slavery. But it is during this condition of servitutde that Emile 
recalls his tutor in something of a Visionary experience and from then on 
he bears his sufferings with a deep stoicism and begins to retrieve his 
position. Although remaining a slave, the sequel ends with Emile as the 
personal adviser (ie. tutor) to the dey of Algeria.24 
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These great individuals, according to Rousseau, have thus by virtue of their 
transcendent authority the ability to infuse the spirit of their 
teachingsllaws into those among whom they live. We may properly expect, 
then, that Rousseau would imagine an intimate connection between the 
Legislator's laws and the memory of the man himself; and that, given his 
quasi-divine nature, this connection would be expressed in the civil 
religion. 
This doesn't quite make clear how it is'that the Legislator's influence 
(direct and through memory and myth) can, in sum, cancel out the effects of 
am our-pro pre. So far Rousseau has given us only partial explanations and 
mystifications. The desire for historical glory, presumably, can be taken up 
by the people, though Rousseau doesn't suggest this. On the other hand, 
there is a great emphasis on civic pride. But here Rousseau specifically 
excludes a competitive spirit with regard to other nations as being a fit 
object for the Just State. Indeed, the latter, he argues, should be autarchic 
and not over-concerned with the affairs of its neighbouring states.2S The 
state should be the measure of its own success/goodness, and not assess 
itself by comparison with others. This is the aim of the 'negative 
education' devised for the young Emile26 and it represents the condition of 
orgeuil, the pro-genitor of am our-pro pre. In the Discourse on Inequality 
Rousseau speculates that human reflective self-awareness began when 'early' 
(and solitary) man first asserted his superiority of intellect over other 
animals. He compared himself, not with other humans, but with all facets of 
his environment and, ultimately, with himself, with his previous successes 
and failures. Thus 'the first time he looked into himself, he felt the first 
emotion of pride'.27 (C'est ainsi que le premier regard qu'il porta sur lui-
meme y produisit le premier mouvement d'orgeuil.28 ) Thus it is the 
instilling of orgeuil, and the prevention of its decay into am our-pro pre, 
which is the task that confronts tutor and legislator alike. But if it takes 
one man's single-minded devotion to one pupil <Emile) to secure any hope of 
success, then the Legislator's task seems impossible. Or else his mode of 
working must be radically different. And this, I suggest, is the case. The 
Legislator acts as a figurehead for the newly-founded state, he is the 
personification of it. The focus of attention for the citizen is thus not 
himself in relation to his co-citizens, but towards the transcendent figure 
of the Legislator and his values. It is by this relocation of attention, 
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this presence of personified yet transcendent values, that suppresses the 
development of a 111 our-pro pre. 
But none of this gives us any clear insight into how to discern the 
true Legislator as opposed to the mere imposter. If there are no ostensi ve 
signs, apart from his charisma, of the legislator's true worth then the 
people are thrown back on a relation based almost solely on trust. Simply, 
they have little choice but to trust the Legislator's laws. This, perhaps, 
would be all very well were it not that it seems to contradict the very 
purpose for which ,the (just) state was inaugurated by the founding 
contract. That purpose was to find a solution to the following problem: 'How 
to find a form of association ... under which each individual, while uniting 
himself with the others, obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as 
before' .29 And Rousseau's specific answer is that 'Each ... puts his person 
and all his powers under the supreme direction of the general will'. And in 
the second instance (the first being the inaugurating contract) the general 
will is expressed in the founding laws of the state, which it is the 
_Legislator's task to articulate and present to the people in his draft laws. 
But in order that each member of the body politic 'remains as free as 
before' (ie. as before the inaugurating contract) and 'obeys no one but 
himself' the people must be the direct authors of the laws, they must be 
self-legislating. And this is the rub. If the members of this new state have 
no basis for critical judgment on which to ground their acceptance or 
rejection of the Legislator's draft laws, but are already, effectively, pre-
commi tted by their trust then it is not clear how it can be said of them 
that they are self-legislating in the sense of being the authors of their 
own laws. In as much as it rests with the citizenry to vote on the 
legislati ve proposals (on the basis of whether or not they believe these 
proposals express the general will) then, formally, they have authorised the 
laws. But this hardly seems to be the strong conclusion that Rousseau wants 
wi th respect to freedom. Much depends on his use of the concept of the 
general will and this will be discussed in some detail shortly. But we can 
highlight the immediate problem by asking what would have to be the case 
for the Legislator's proposals to be rejected? For this would mean not only 
the rejection of the proposed legislation but also the rejection of the 
Legislator: in effect, a withdrawal of the trust that is the sole basis of 
the relation between people and Legislator. Acceptance of the proposals as 
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law thus represents not so much an act of assent but one of acclaim. This, 
then, is the position I outlined in the previous chapter. 
Rousseau leaves little room for an alternative account. The very 
condition in which a people might be able to form a critical assessment of 
legislative proposals, and thus escape reliance on a blind trust, is the one 
that Rousseau excludes as being unfit for the work of the Legislator, ie. 
civil society. It is not simply the pervasive presence of aJIlour-propre 
which obstructs his work, but the integration of the resultant status 
competition into the values of that society: 
Once customs are established and prejudices rooted, reform 
is a dangerous and fruitless enterprise; a people cannot 
bear to see its evils touched, even if only to be 
eradicated; it is like a stupid, pusillanimous invalid who 
trembles at the sight of a physician.30 
There is, he thinks, a point in the development of nations (the first stages 
of 'maturity') which is the most appropriate to this grand legislative 
enterprise. We may avoid the unhappy metaphor of age (though I doubt that 
for Rousseau this was merely metaphor) by referring back to his speculative 
history of human development in the Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau 
stresses that it is with the the creation of leisure that aJIlour-propre 
first becomes competitive and thus corrosive.31 Not only was leisure 'the 
first yoke [man] imposed on himself' but also 'the first source of the evils 
he prepared for his descendants' .32 It is at this point of bare surplus 
beyond immediate needs when 'in every country [there] arises a distinct 
nation, united in character and manners, not by regulations of laws, but by 
uniformity of life and food, and the common influence of climate,.:n And it 
is this social but pre-political moment in a nation's development, I 
suggest, that Rousseau has in mind as being the most suitable for the 
Legislator's work. For it is the latter's task to divert the course of 
development from that which would otherwise lead to the Hobbesean state of 
endemic conflict, and thus to the false contract as the only means of 
securing peace. But then, as Rousseau stresses, prior to the nation 
embarking on this downward spiral of conflict, 'Who is to give [the body 
politic] the foresight necessary to formulate enactments and proclaim them 
in advance?' 'Hence the necessity of the lawgiver'.34 
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Rousseau hints35 that there is one other moment suitable to the founding of 
a new state: in the aftermath of a civil war (or, perhaps, a catastrophic 
natural disaster). This is consistent with his line of thought, for it is 
intuitively plausible that protracted civil strife may result in an 
uprooting of prejudices and the destruction of 'established customs' j and it 
this which removes his theory of the ideal legislator from the realm of an 
essentially nostalgic critique and lends it its force. Quite what we can say 
about the relation between the people and the Legislator in this situation 
is unclear. The charismatic quality would seem still to be an essential 
ingredient - here the Legislator features as the (re-)uniter rather than the 
founder of the nationj and so the underlying basis of the relation remains 
one of trust. But we need not suppose that the trust would be qui te so 
total, so blindj but would retain a critical dimension to it. However, 'such 
events are ... exceptional cases', as Rousseau S ays36 j and I shall discuss it 
further when examining his theory of democracy. 
Rousseau's theory of the Ideal Legislator relies heavily on a grounding 
of trust between people and lawgiver. It would be convenient to see trust 
as a pre-political concept, appropriate in conditions where critical 
judgment (for whatever reason) is not possible. Part of the critique 
advanced above [see chapter 2] against the benevolent despot was precisely 
that it reduced her people to a dependency on trust. However, in so far as 
Rousseau's theory is specific to the founding of the (Just) state this 
ground of trust seems ineliminable. The interesting question (to which I 
shall turn in a later chapter) concerns the proper extent and role of trust 
in political society. 
*** 
Thus far I have been concerned in my treatment of Rousseau to to elucidate 
the role of the Legislator and thus to exemplify the condition of acclaim 
grounded on a relation of trust as opposed to assent grounded on critical 
judgment. I now turn to a more general consideration of Rousseau's theory of 
democracy which centres on the concept of the general will. 
I want to begin with Rousseau's treatment of what Richard Vlollheim 
calls 'the paradox of democracy' and J L Talmon 'the paradox of freedom '37 • 
I shall not pursue the various strategies employed to resolve this 
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paradox, if such it is, but turn immediately to Rousseau. Rousseau states 
the problem in bald terms: 
Apart from the original contract, the votes of the greatest 
number always bind the rest; and this is a consequence of 
the contract itself. Yet it may be asked how a man can be 
at once free and forced to conform to wills which are not 
his own. How can the opposing minori ty be both free and 
subject to laws to which they have not consented?3S 
'The question', he says, 'is badly formulated'. Put in such terms, it 
misconceives the voting process: 
When a law is proposed in the people's assembly, what is 
asked of them is not precisely whether they approve of the 
proposition or reject it, but whether it is in conformity 
with the general will which is theirs; each by giving his 
vote gives his opinion on this question, and the counting of 
votes yields a declaration of the general will. When, 
therefore, the opinion contrary to my own prevails, this 
proves only that. I have made a mistake, and that what I 
believed to be the general will was not so. If my particular 
opinion had prevailed against the general will, I should 
have done something other than what I had willed, and then 
I should not have been free.39 
The problem that bedevils interpretations of Rousseau is the 
characterisation of the general will; and on that depends, in large part, 
whether or not he is to be seen as the originator of 'totalitarian 
democracy' . 
It is conventional among those holding this view to place Rousseau in a 
Platonic tradition and to conceive of the general will as something fixed, 
immutable, eternal; in short, a Platonic Form. Thus Talmon: 
Ultimately, the general will is to Rousseau something like a 
mathematical truth or a Platonic idea. It has an objective 
existence of its own, whether perceived or not. It has 
nevertheless to be discovered by the human mind. But having 
discovered it, the human mind cannot honestly refuse to 
accept it. In this way the general will is at the same time 
outside us and within us.40 
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Talmon is right in thinking that there must be some sense in which the 
general will could be said to be objective; how else, if Rousseau is to be 
interpreted literally, could there be any question of being in error as to 
the specific content of the general will? But I shall argue that the more 
plausible interpretation reveals the general will as being quite different 
from a Platonic Form. 
There is something distinctly curious about the idea that an eternal 
verity can be established by a majority decision. Discernment and judgment 
in such matters is normally thought to be the role of experts; whether they 
be the Republic's Guardians, a scientific elite, Hume's judges of Taste or 
Mill's 'competently acquainted' assessors of Higher and Lower Pleasures. The 
notion that the Form of Justice, the sub-atomic structure, or the 
qualitative distinction between the pleasures derived from listening to the 
music of Mozart and of Beethoven should be a matter for majority decision 
amongst the laity is at best counter-intuitive. 
There are three responses which might be made here. First, that 
Rousseau posits the condition of his post-contract citizens to be such that 
they are able to discern such truths; they have a pre-civilised clarity to 
their understanding, they retain the native simplicity of the pre-lapsarian 
State of Nature and thus, uncorrupted, have powers of discernment 
inconceivable to us. I have already argued above that something of this 
sort must be the case if the founding contract is to take place; ie. the 
citizens-to-be are free of the worst ravages of amour-propre. Secondly, 
Rousseau does indeed provide us with an expert in the person of the 
Legislator. Thirdly ,i t might be argued that the sort of truths the citizens 
need to apprehend in order to express an opinion on the conformity of the 
laws to the general will are such that, whilst universal and eternal in 
their form, they are not the preserve of specialist knowledge and enquiry 
but, since they concern the nature of our quotidien existence, are 
accessible to us all. 
I shall focus initially on the 'expert' role of the Legislat:Jr. Is he 
some Platonic Guardian, acting in an advisory rather than a directly 
executi ve and legislati ve capacity? Is his relation to the people that of 
Socrates to the slave-boy in the Keno, bringing him to see the truth of 
geometrical propositions which, according to Plato, he <and we) already 
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knew without ever having realised it; in short, a very special sort of 
tutor?41 
We have already noted the parallels between the charismatic figure of 
the Legislator and the great father-figures in other works of Rousseau. 
These great men play out a unifying role; the dominant force of their 
personality and the rectitude of their character subduing and overcoming 
the corruptive influence of a11Jour-propre in others and the disputes thus 
inspired. But the Legislator is more than this. There is indeed a Platonic 
aspect to his work. The background assumption, common to much political 
philosophy, is that there is a definite form to such concepts as democracy 
and justice; such that can be instantiated. 
What is good and in conformity with order is such by the 
very nature of things and independently of human agreement 
... There is undoubtedly a universal justice which springs 
from reason alone, but if that justice is to be admitted 
among men it must be reciprocal So there must be 
covenants and positive laws to unite rights with duties and 
to direct justice to its object.42 
So in terms of the overall structure of the Just State, we might expect 
some things to be constant; and in particular, there is the form of the 
contract itself, the articles of which 'are so precisely determined that 
the slightest modification must render them null and void; they are such 
that, though perhaps never formally stated, they are everywhere the same, 
everywhere tacitly admitted and recognised'.43 There is the stipulation of a 
rough economic equality, the need for a civil religion; but beyond this we 
leave the realm of absolutes and enter one of particular judgments; ie. the 
specific content of the Just State is not pre-determined according to a 
universal form. 
We can develop this line by considering some examples of the possible 
content of the laws of the Just State. Rousseau insists that laws must 
exhibit generality of scope; particularity of person or group, time or place 
signifies its status as a governmental decree, which, if it is to be 
legi timate, must itself not violate the laws (and the citizens approve 
directly only the laws). We have seen that Rousseau identifies four branches 
of law: Political or Fundamental, Civil, Criminal, and Moral ('inscribed 
neither on marble nor brass, but in the hearts of citizens'). We know too 
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that in the best states the laws should be simple and few so that the 
citizens may know them and be straightforwardly directed by them. And 
finally, we know that 'apart from those principles which are common to all, 
each people has its own special reasons for ordering itself in a certain 
way and for having laws that are fitted to itself alone' and that 'What 
makes the constitution of a state really strong and durable is such a close 
observance of conventions that natural relations and law come to be in 
harmony on all points, so that the law ... seems only to ensure, accompany 
and correct what is natural' .44 
I shall state, without further argument, that the bulk of the 
legislative activity must take place soon after the inception of the Just 
State and under the guidance of the Legislator; that is, we are talking 
about a founding constitution. The most likely subject for a Political law 
and the strongest candidate for a Platonic Form is the type of government. 
Rousseau states clearly his view that an elective aristocracy is in itself 
the best type of government, but stresses time and again the need to find 
the most appropriate form of government for any particular nation. 'When ... 
one asks what in absolute terms is the best government, one is asking a 
question which is unanswerable because it is indeterminate' .45 
Rousseau gives a somewhat strained analysis of the criteria of 
appropriateness: in general that democracy suits small communities, 
aristocracy medium-sized states, and monarchy is most appropriate for large 
states; but there can be no hard and fast rule and it is 'the art of the 
lawgiver to know how to settle the point'.4€- Unless we are to multiply 
entities endlessly, positing a unique ideal form for each state at each 
particular moment in its development then there is little room here for 
Platonism. Indeed, the tradition of thought exemplified is that of Aristotle, 
Machiavelli, Montesquieu and contemporary political science. 
I shall pass over the content of the Civil laws and focus now on the 
Criminal laws to bring out the role of the general will and to locate it 
within what can best be described as a conservative conception of freedom. 
To do so, I shall begin with the problem of the treatment of convicted 
murderers. History provides us with a frighteningly broad range of options: 
the death penalty (from the barbaric to the 'humane'); incarceration (for 
life? in solitary confinement?); exile; slavery; medical and psychiatric 
therapy. Which would the Legislator recommend to the people and which would 
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conform to the general will? Notwithstanding the philosophical dispute over 
the theoretical justifications of punishment (retribution, deterrence, 
reformation of character I protection of society) I suggest that no single 
answer can or could be given in abstract. For, a people who held a stern 
and Judaic view of criminal justice would be unlikely to accept a lenient 
and compassionate sentencing pOlicy (say ten years in prison wi th the 
possibility of remission for good behaviour); ie. they would find it 
incompatible with their general will. True, the Legislator is given the role 
of moulding the people's charapter, of bringing about the transformation of 
men to citizens; but principally, this should be seen in terms of overcoming 
the social divisions resulting from unconstrained am our-pro pre. Beyond that, 
it is his task, we recall, to achieve harmony between 'natural relations' 
and law. Law, then, is to be the express statement of the 'natural' world-
view of the people. 
Two comments on this: in the first place, this is not the same as 
saying that whatever is is right. There may be no agreement as to what is 
the appropriate treatment of convicted murderers, or anything else. It would 
be for law to forge that agreement. And secondly, there is a difference 
between the belief that death is the 'natural' penalty for murder and that 
it should take any particular form. I am suggesting that the legislator 
would have some room for manouevre, for a degree of legislative creativity, 
but that this would need to be firmly grounded on not the existing 
practices themselves but the implicit beliefs, better, the implicit values, 
revealed by those practices. 
What would follow if this interpretation of the legislator's art is 
wrong? Well, we could be back to a Platonic universal - but I trust I have 
done enough to establish that this is not Rousseau's position. Or it could 
be that the legislator's creative act is unconstrained by any dependence on 
existing practices, conditions etc.. (And here I have in mind Burckhardt's 
thesis of the renaissance prince as artist. 4"7) Again, I have tried to show 
that this is not the case. Yet, if it were the general will would be 
synonymous with the Legislator's will. To be sure, the Legislator's charisma 
is such as to give some justification to the fears of Rousseau's liberal 
critics; especially so, given Rousseau's insistence that it is only the 
legislator's 'great soul' which 'is the true miracle which must vindicate his 
mission' and distinguishes him from false prophets. If this interpretation 
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is correct then we must empty the concept of the general will of all 
content: there can be no question of its existence prior to the arrival of 
the legislator, nor of the citizens judging any given legislative proposal 
to be incompatible with the general will. 
I shall not labour the point any further. The general will, as enshrined 
by law, is the expre~sion of the community's values, hitherto implicit in 
their practices and conventions, and modified where necessary by general 
principles of justice and mutual protection. The citizens, when assembled to 
vote on a legislative proposal, are asked to give their opinion; as to 
whether or not it (the proposal) conforms with these values. It is because 
their judgment is free from the excesses of am our-pro pre that they are able 
to express this opinion in a definitive way; ie. that they are able to make 
the transition from what they might wish the community's values to be to 
grasping what those values in fact are. 
We can now understand how a majority opinion can be so definitive of 
the general will. Indeed, that opinion defines the community itself by 
giving a clear statement of its core values. At heart, Rousseau's question 
put to the assembled citizens ('Is this law in conformity with the general 
will?') is better understood as 'Does this law properly express the sort of 
people we are?' Let me expand the above example of the punishment of 
convicted murderers. If I am asked whether I think that such persons should 
hang by the neck until dead my answer is an unequivocal 'no'. But if I am 
asked for my opinion as to the values held by the political community to 
which I belong then regretfully I must answer 'yes'. (Similar considerations 
might be applied to such problems as racism, abortion, pornography and 
nuclear weapons.) Note that I can properly answer 'yes' without sharing that 
particular value expressed by my fellow citizensj and also that I may find 
myself (in this case) pleasantly surprised: it may turn out that the 
majority opinion is 'no'. 
Some care is needed here. This is not a game of infinite mirrors, of 
trying to guess what you believe I believe your belief to be. That is, it is 
not simply a matter of everyone expressing opinions about others' opinions. 
Rather, one is being asked to decide which expression of value (here, as 
enshrined in law) best exemplifies the (not necessarily consistent) beliefs 
held by the community on a given matter. There may be an act of 
determination here. Where there is a genuine plurality or a significant 
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minority on a given issue the majority opinion still determines the law and 
thus the value to be upheld by all citizens. The sinister implications of 
this are apparent j but three reservations can be offered on Rousseau's 
behalf. In the first place, it is the Legislator's task to accurately frame 
legislation so as to reflect the dominant values of society. Secondly, as we 
have seen, Rousseau considers a customary society , united in manners and 
customs, as the most suitable for the legislator's work. And thirdly, the 
supreme value is that of membership of and identification with the 
community. To share in and uphold the community's values is of the first 
importance for the new citizens. 
However, it might be thought that there is something decidedly slippery 
in my interpretation. It is quite obvious that one's will can never be 
thwarted, even if permanently in a minority, simply because one is never 
asked to express one's own willi at least not when voting on legislative 
proposals. The good citizen simply gives an opinion - as to what he 
believes other people's values are. There is no question here of a specific 
act of consent nor of the witholding of consent to any given law. Although 
there are two procedural acts of consent required at the opening of each 
post-founding assembly ('Does it please the sovereign to maintain the 
present form of government?' and 'Does it please the people to leave the 
administration to those at present charged with it?'4E<) there is but one 
substantive act of consent: 
There is only one law which by its nature requires 
unanimous assent. This is the social pact: for the civil 
association is the most voluntary act in the world; every 
man having been born free and master of himself, no one 
else may under any pretext subject him without his 
consent:~"3 
This is fine if it so happens that your values correspond to those of your 
fellow citizens; ie. you find yourself in complete accord with the general 
will. But if your values do not so correspond <whether you were in the 
majority or minority at the legislative assembly) then surely you are, in 
some pertinent sense, subject, if not to wills then to values which are not 
your ownj and if so, how can it be the case that you remain free? The easy 
answer, though it is not one with which we should be readily satisfied, is 
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that given by Rousseau·· in his summation of the articles of association at 
the original pact: 
Each one of us puts into the community his person and all 
his powers under the supreme direction of the general will j 
and as a body we incorporate every member as an indivisible 
part of the whole.50 
Put starkly, we have already committed ourselves to adopt the values of the 
community and if we now find that we don't like it then our option is 
clear: to leave. ~assing over the problem of securing consent over 
succeeding generations, the spectre of co-ercion is raised. 
In fact, I don't think this is coercive. In the first place most if not 
all of us belong to groups, clubs, institutions not all the values of which 
we can genuinely espouse as our ownj but we stay because either we accept 
most of the core values or because the gains from membership outweigh the 
inconvenience of the mismatch in values (or both). But where that mismatch 
has become unsupportable one generally leaves. Nor is there often much room 
for internal criticism in the hope of reform where the dispute is over 
values (as opposed to personalities and strategies). 
But even if we grant that the state is a voluntary organisation, 
leaving one's home, one's country, one's nation state is of a different order 
to quitting, say, a football club. But this is not quite as Rousseau would 
have perceived it. It is not only Rousseau's own 'vagabond' existence 
(Geneva, Turin, Annecy, Chamberey, Lyons, Paris, Venice ... ) that I have in 
mind here. Du Contrat Social is prefaced by the following comment: 
This little treatise is part of a larger work which I 
undertook many years ago without thinking of the 
limitations of my powers, and have long since abandoned. 
Of the various fragments that might have been taken from 
what I wrote, this is the most considerable, and the one I 
think the least unworthy of being offered to the public. The 
rest no longer exists.s, 
That work, the Political InstitutionsS2 was in large part derived from 
Rousseau's inconclusive efforts to edit the Abbe de Saint-Pierre's thirteen 
volume Project for Everlasting Peace in Europe, an early federalist utopia. 
And it is against the background of this vision of independent though 
federated city states that the argument of Du Contrat Social is both most 
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plausible and most convincing. There is a marked difference between leaving 
Glasgow to live in Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Manchester or London and leaving to 
live in France, Russia or Japan. We might reasonably expect <and certainly 
on Rousseau's own analysis) a strong similarity in customs between the 
independent states within a federation, but each exhibiting its own 
distinctive value combination. For, for each state, the general will is 
particular to that state alone. Thus the project of finding another state 
with a more personally conducive set of values would be neither so 
formidable nor so traumatic in terms of the physical and emotional 
separation involved as would seem to us from our socio-historical 
perspective. 
A pluralism in values is thus not excluded by Rousseau, but is an 
inter-state rather than an intra-state phenomenon. Each independent state 
has its own particular general will, its own particular set of values. Thus 
the state can be seen as a stable value community; its values given 
expression and definition by its founding constitution. This constitution, 
established by an initial legislative project under the guidance of the 
Legislator, is the explicit statement of values inherent in the practices 
and conventions of that community, modified by considerations of justice. 
Rousseau's ideal state, then, is a stable value community; and we can 
sketch out the grounds of a conservative theory of freedom. One is free 
only in a community in which the values are stable and clear to all, and 
where one can act withour fear of mis-interpretation. According to this 
theory, the field of negative liberties permitted is less important than 
that the values are common to all. A dominant theme of Rousseau's 
Confessions, 
lionisation 
particularly but not exclusively 
in the Parisian sa. ions, is of his 
of the period of 
inability to act 
his 
with 
confidence when among the wits and sophisticates of society: simply, he did 
not know the rules of the 'game'. This discrepancy found at the level of 
manners and etiquette, Rousseau took to a the fundamental truth of the 
structure of society. A unity of values is the pre-condition of freedom; for 
action, if it is not to be either redundant or counter-productive, requires 
a prior confidence that it be understood, that it be interpreted according 
to the values under-pinning the agent's intention. 
The theories of neither Rousseau nor Wolff provide us with satisfactory 
models of a maximal democracy. At best, with their stress on popular 
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approval of the laws, they present us with models of medial democracy. For 
a clearer picture of what would constitute a maximal democracy I turn now 
to a brief discussion of the democratic practice of classical Athens. 
**** 
The high-point of democratic practice in classical Athens was reached in 
the mid-fifth to the late fourth centuries. Although both institutions and 
practices evolved during this period I shall largely pass over these 
changes, since I am concerned only to sketch the central features. There are 
three institutional features I shall discuss: the assembly (Ekklesia) , the 
Council of 500 (Boule) and the law courts (Dikasteria). My discussion, 
however, will focus on the scope for citizen participation which these 
institutions offered, rather than the details of their operational structure. 
Other matters concerning the Athenian democracy <including such favourite 
topics as the 'success' of Athenian democracy, its dependency on slave 
labour and its emergence) I shall largely ignore. 
Participation was extensive and varied but exclusive to adult male 
citizens. The population of Attike during this period and the size of its 
enfranchised (ie. adult male) citizenry has been the subject of much debate. 
It seems likely that by the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 the 
number of Athenian citizens (men, women and children) had reached some 
170,000 only to be much reduced by that war and plague and from which it 
probably did not recover for more than half a century. The total Attike 
population ca 431 may perhaps have reached 300,000 and included a 
substantial slave force of some 100,000 and 30,000-40,000 resident aliens 
(metics). Adult male Athenians at this time probably numbered a little 
under 45,000, at most some 15% of the total population. Generally, the 
boundaries of citizenship were jealously guarded. The Periklean reform (ca 
450) ended the practice of conferring citizen status on the offspring of 
non-Athenian mothersj though the requirement of male and female Athenian 
parentage was occasionally relaxed: intermarriage wi th Euboians was 
permitted as a consequence of the ravages of the plague and grants of 
citizenship could be conferred by the assembly on individuals or groups who 
were deemed to have performed outstanding service to the Athenian cause.53 
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The focus of citizen participation was the assembly. On reaching the age of 
18, Athenian males registered as members of their de11le or local community 
and from the age of 20 could participate in the proceedings of the 
assembly. No property or wealth qualifications were required. All other 
official posts required a minimum age of 30 and were not open to members 
of the fourth social class, the thetes, though Sinclair suggests that this 
exclusion may have become a 'legal fiction' by the middle of the fourth 
century.54 The assembly constituted the sovereign body of democratic 
Athens, holding sole legislative power and ultimate executive authority. The 
routine was for the assembly to meet 40 times a year, a main meeting being 
followed by three supplementaries. Central to the functioning of the 
assembly was the right to be heard <isegoria); though in practice this 
right may have been more readily conferred on established figures and 
renowned speakers. It was open to any enfranchised ci tizen to raise a 
matter or present a motion to the assembly; though the latter was probably 
comparatively rare, most decrees having received prior discussion and 
formulation in the Boule. 
Attendance at and composition of the assembly is a vexed question. 
Although formally open to all adult male citizens, attendance would be 
limited by three main factors. First, despite a burgeoning population growth 
in Athens and the Peiraieus in the middle of the fifth century, possibly as 
much as half the citizenry remained dispersed throughout the demes of 
Attike, though most within a few hours walk of the city. This would tend to 
disadvantage moderate landowners. Vealthy landowners would be likely to 
have a house in Athens and a hired- or slave-labour force sufficient to 
secure the necessary leisure for regular attendance. On the other hand, and 
this is the second factor, artisans were more densely concentrated in the 
city and port areas but we cannot be sure of the extent to which they too 
could find the necessary leisure for regular attendance. <The importance of 
this factor would have been much reduced by the introduction of a daily 
attendance allowance ca 395.) The formal arrangement, then, of equal access 
to the assembly would tend to favour the well-off (landowners and 
merchants) of the city. This is not to suggest that other social groupings 
did not attend, only that their regular attendance would be problematic. The 
third factor would disadvantage the younger <ie. under 30) citizens: the 
democratic period of Athens was one of near-uninterrupted war and military 
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adventuring. During this period the number of adult male citizens seems to 
have dropped from above 40,000 to its nadir of about half that by the early 
fourth century. The official quorum for the assembly was 6,000 and this 
appears to have been the seating capacity of the rebuilt Pnyx (the assembly 
would thus be quorate once all the seats were filled). There is no extant 
record of an assembly failing to reach its official quorum, though the 
continued increase in assembly allowance throughout the fourth century may 
suggest difficulties in sustaining attendance. 
More important here is the point which Finley makes (and which will be 
developed in the next chapter): 
[E]ach meeting of the Assembly was unique in its 
composition. There was no membership in the Assembly as 
such, only membership in a given Assembly on a given day. 
Perhaps the shifts were not significant from meeting to 
meeting in quiet, peaceful times when no vital issues were 
being debated. Yet even then an important element of 
predictability was lacking. When he entered the Assembly, no 
policy-maker could be qui te sure that a change in 
composition had not occurred ... ss 
Whether such changes were the result of mobilisation of support or 
opposition, or a result of circumstance (eg. a foreign campaign), or the 
quite unanticipated presence of large numbers of, say, hill-farmers a strong 
random element attached itself to meetings of the Ekklesia, much reducing 
the possibility of would-be leaders or factions establishing a body of 
consistent support. 
The Boule, or Council of 500, was by contrast a directly representative 
body. Its members were chosen by lot (sortition), 50 members (aged over 30 
and, officially, non-thetic) from each of the ten tribes; each deme sending 
a number corresponding to its population.. Office was held on a yearly 
basis, no Council member holding office for more than two years and 
(probably) not consecutively. This reveals a remarkable degree of confidence 
in the competence of the citizen body, since the work of the Boule was 
substantial. The functions of the Boule were exercised in the first instance 
by the 50 members of a given tribe working as a standing committee (the 
pryta.neis); each tribe effectively holding office for one pryta.ny, a new 
(and different) chairman being chosen by lot from among their number for 
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each day the Boule met (some 260 days each year). (The chairman would also 
preside over the assembly if it met on that day.) The Boule drafted 
legislation and referred matters to the assembly, received foreign envoys 
and campaign reports, had general responsibility for the management of 
common funds (until the emergence of the Festival Fund Committee in the 
middle of the fourth century), exercised a supervisory function over cavalry 
and navy, and it had the power to investigate and fine officials. The 
functions and powers of the Boule were thus administrative and supervisory 
and broad in scope j dealing wi th the routine, the extraordinary and 
emergencies. Yet members of the Boule were no more independent than any 
other Athenian official and remained accountable to the assembly. 
Although strictly representative with respect to de111e and tribe, the 
burden of membership of the Boule tended to discourage all but those with 
secure leisure from putting themselves forward for selection by sortition. 
Nonetheless, once chosen, any member could find himself chairing the 
p~taneis and possibly the assembly (though only for a day). The success of 
the Boule, Sinclair suggests, is due to its operational combination of four 
principles: sortition (selection of members and of daily chairmen) j 
limitation of tenure (yearly membership, held no more than twice and 
probably not consecutively) i rotation of office (each tribe for a prytany) 
and collegiality (administration, in the first instance, by the tribe 
members) . 
The third main feature of Athenian participation was the law courts, 
the Dikasteria. Perhaps no other element of the Athenian democracy has 
excited so much controversy. Universally damned for the condemnation of 
Socrates and mercilessly ridiculed by Aristophanes56 the Dikasteria are 
presented to us as the theatre of either an extreme witlessness and 
gullibility or a proto-Terror. The introduction of an allowance for jury 
attendance is conventionally seen as corruptive, but it may have been an 
attempt to broaden the social and economic range of those prepared to 
attend the courts. S ? 
Each court session required, typically, a jury of 501 citizens, chosen 
by lot from those who enrolled. The jury members could be expected to have 
to pass judgment on matters trivial and vital: on civil, criminal and 
political offences (particularly in cases of graphe para n 0111 on , of laws 
introduced and perhaps approved by the assembly which contravened pre-
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existent legislation); but the jury members, alone of all Athenian officials, 
were not required to submit themselves to scrutiny prior to serving and 
from their court there was no further appeal. The Dikasteria was thus a 
powerful institution; and as Sinclair points out, was the only avenue of 
civic duty requiring little or no active participation. (Except, that is, for 
the laying of the prosecution, which was brought and argued for by 
individual citizens.)Se And voting, unlike in the assembly, was secret. 
These three central features by no means exhaust the participatory 
scope open to the Athenian citizenj but they are the most distinctive 
elements of Athenian democractic practice. Other posts, particularly the 
military commanders (the strategoi) were elective; wealthier citizens were 
expected to fund the religious and artistic festivals (leitourgiai and 
khoregia) and to pay and be responsible for a vessel in the fleet of 
triremes. And finally, there was the duty of military service. 
There are two points to be stressed from this brief discussion. The 
exercise of power by the Athenian citizen was highly differentiated, there 
being a range of posts to be filled: some elective on personal qualities, 
some by sortition, and some by sortition according to representative 
criteria. Secondly, that this degree of differentiation among the posts to 
be filled served both to broaden the citizen's knowledge of and competence 
of judgment in a range of matters, and to locate identifiable responsibility 
on the individual citizen. 
***** 
Thus the models of 'classical' democracy presented by both Wolff and 
Rousseau are medial and not maximal democracies. They embrace the principle 
of popular approval of the laws, but do not extend to the generation of 
legislative proposals. Nor do they provide a range of differentiated roles 
for citizen activity or locate identifiable responsibility on individual 
citizens. They thus fail to provide conditions conducive to the exercise and 
development of critical judgment on the part of the citizen. In response to 
this I shall now propose the reflective model. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TIm REFLECTIVE XODEL OF 1!EDIAL DE!OCRACY: 
DE](OCRACY AS POPULAR ASSEiT 
I want now to propose the reflective model of medial democracy: one 
grounded in and developing the themes we have so far examined. I stress 
again that the function of this model is to provide a foil against which we 
may deepen our reflections upon what we understand by the term 'democracy'; 
and indeed, what we may want from and, conversely, find ourselves unable to 
accept in a democracy. Unlike Robert Paul Wolff, I find myself as yet unable 
to put forward this model 'a good deal more than half in earnest' as a 
programme for reform. Those deepened reflections generate conflicting 
implications which demonstrate the tensions latent within a general theory 
of democracy. Nonetheless, I take the clarification of those tensions and 
the reflection upon them to be not without value . 
• 
The model takes as given Wolff's contention that the technology now exists 
for some form of direct democracy. However, this one is explicitly medial 
in form. Furthermore, it is nei ther 'instantaneous' nor conducted as a 
system of weekly referenda. With these comments I move to the first sketch 
of the model. 
I assume some form of elected legislature. Bills would be generated, 
debated and approved in parliament much as at present. But instead of bills 
becoming law either solely on parliamentary aut~Qrity or (as in the U.K.) 
being presented to the sovereign for royal assent they would be presented 
to the people for popular assent. Only those items of legislation which had 
been approved for parliament would thus be presented for popular assent; 
and they would become adopted as law only by means of popular assent. For 
this to be possible, I assume that two television channels (and perhaps 
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radio channels also) are given over to the permanent and continuous live 
broadcast of parliamentary proceedings (assuming a bicameral assembly). 
This goes some way to meeting an initial objection with regard to access to 
relevant information. 
Voting, as in Wolff's model, would utilise modern communications 
technology but would take place in public rather than the home and within, 
say, a week of a bill completing its parliamentary progress. On reaching 
the set age, or on satisfying given qualifying criteria (a matter to be 
discussed later in this chapter) the citizen would be issued with a card 
similar to the 'cash cards' currently used in electronic banking. This card 
would carry a randomly-generated voting number, each one unique to each 
citizen, as well as a specimen signature. This would also be a 'smart' card, 
electronically storing a record of all 'transactions' on a magnetic strip on 
the back of the card. All elections (local and general) as well as approval 
of legislation could thus be carried out using this card. Voting booths, 
similar to present 'cash dispensers' could be established as permanent 
fixtures (say, at town halls and public libraries) within each constituency. 
The method of voting would be as follows: on entering the card into the 
electronic register, the screen would display the name and voting number of 
the voter and ask for confirmation; on receiving this confirmation, the 
screen would then display details of the election (specifically the 
candidates and their party) or of the legislative proposal to be voted uponj 
the voter would enter her vote and, if so desired, receive a print-out 
showing the voting record, the voter's name and number and the time and 
place of voting. This print-out could be kept as a check against the 
possibility of any manipulation of the record: at any time the voter would 
be able to repeat the process and call up the computer-stored record, 
comparing it against the record stored on the card and the retained print-
out. It would be open to any citizen to report to an ombudsman any 
discrepancy between these three records. If this is thought to be an 
insufficient safeguard against the doctoring of the record, then I shall 
simply assert, for the purposes of the model, that suitable safeguards can 
be developed compatible with this system. (And we may note that Mill felt 
it necessary to counter parallel arguments against the use of voting papers 
in elections. 1 ) Votes would be counted electronically at either regional or 
central computers. 
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There are now two major problems to be confronted and which will lead to a 
substantial refinement of Wolff's model. The critique of that model centred 
on the question of the responsible exercise of political power and the 
likelihood of negligent or maverick voting behaviouri and that in turn, I 
argued, was a result of the failure to convert nominal power into effective 
power. By giving the final say on matters of legislation eq~ally to all of 
the citizens all of the time Wolff enshrines the principle of democratic 
equalitYi but the price paid for this is the reduction in the power of any 
given individual to the absolute mimimum: the only other power position 
below this would be one of no power at all. Thus , although this does not 
preclude the possibility of concerned voting behaviour, it would be 
hopelessly naive of us to expect it to become the norm. This I take to be a 
central problem in democratic theory: to confer effective power on 
individual citizens is to give some more power than others, which breaches 
the principle of democratic equalitYi to uphold that principle involves 
giving power equally to all, and this in turn suggests making that power 
merely nominal. 
However, I suggest we can escape this apparent impasse by placing the 
power (and thus the responsibility) for the final approval of legislation in 
the hands of what we might see as a sub-committee of the people, chosen at 
random. Such citizens thus chosen would serve for a limited period of time 
(or for a limited number of items of prospective legislation) such that all 
citizens would be eligible to serve and, ideally, the numbers chosen would 
be such as to give all citizens a chance of serving at least once in their 
life-time (this would be a minimal stipulation required by considerations 
of equality). This I shall refer to as sub-set voting and it will be the 
major argument of this chapter that not only is sub-set voting a useful 
device in situations of practical limitations but that it is central to a 
correct understanding of the democratic structure. 
There are two background insights for this proposal. The first is 
provided by the institutions and practice of classical Athens and its 
exemplification of Aristotle's argument that the virtue of the citizen is to 
understand the requirements and to perform the duties of ruling and being 
ruled in turn.2 We saw in the previous chapter that in democratic Athens 
all adult male citizens (though this class was highly exclusive) held the 
unqualified right of attendance at the Ekklesia and the right to be heard 
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(isegoria) within the assembly. More importantly in this context, on 
reaching the age of 30, these ci tizens could accept nomination for the 
central administrative body, the Boule, for which membership was determined 
by sortition amongst those put forward by the tribes, office being held for 
a maximum of two, non-consecutive years. Membership of the Dikasteria was 
also by lot amongst those enrolling. The principle of equal access to but 
not simultaneous exercise of power by all citizens was thus well-
established in Athenian democracy. A large number of <though by no means 
all) Athenia~ citizens would have personally experienced ruling and being 
ruled by in turn. In the reflective model, the power of assent remains 
within and is not alienated from the citizen body but would not be 
exercised by all simUltaneously. In so far as approving legislative 
proposals constitutes ruling, then, under the reflective model of medial 
democracy, they too would rule over and be ruled by their fellow citizens in 
turn. 
The second background insight is provided by the example of jury 
service. In general, we expect members of the community, irrespective of 
social and personal characteristics and values, to be prepared to give up 
their time when called upon to do so and to reach a judgment in cases 
where, we may reasonably assume, the majority of serving jurors have 
neither technical knowledge nor interest. Furthermore, we expect jurors to 
form their judgments impartially, responSibly and on behalf of the wider 
community. Against this it will be objected that jurors are asked only to 
reach a decision on the facts of the matter as laid before them and that 
the approval of laws is as much a question of value as of fact. 
Furthermore, the juror deals with the particularity of the case before her 
whereas law deals in generalities. This represents not merely a difference 
in scale but also in power and in the weight of responsibility for the 
consequences of a wrong decision. Thus, whilst the conviction of an 
innocent person is a tragedy it nonetheless remains a personal one, 
restricted in scope to those directly involved; t!:le wrong judgment on a 
proposed law, however, affects all in the community and this, then, is 
properly a task for experts. 
Taking the last point first, it is by no means obvious that we do 
insist that the power of judgment on legislative proposals be held by 
experts. This is likely to be the case only if we elect delegates as opposed 
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to representatives or deputies. However, by electing legislators (of 
whatever specific role) we both exercise some scrutiny over their 
suitability for the task assigned to them and place them in the position 
whereby they can give their full and undivided attention to matters of 
legislation so that, if not experts to begin with, we may expect them to 
become so during their parliamentary service. Thus parliaments come to 
embody a legislative expertise independent of the pre-membership skills, 
capacities and experience of any given member. This expertise, we may 
assume, is not to be found among the citizenry at large. 
This objection, I suggest, can be met on two counts. The reflective 
model combines an expert role (in the drafting, debating and provisional 
approval of legislative proposals) with a lay role in giving final judgment 
on those proposals. And the citizen's power, it should be stressed, is 
effectively that of a veto. There is no suggestion here of giving direct 
powers of legislative generation, debate and revision to the citizen sub-
committees (that would be to take a further step towards maximal 
democracy). Their role is analogous to that of the juror: to follow the 
arguments advanced and to reach a judgment. And just as it is up to the 
barristers to present the facts of the case (under the supervision of the 
judge) so it would be up to the legislators to do likewise, under the 
supervision of the Speaker. Thus the debates in legislative asssemblies 
would be directed as much towards explaining and attempting to justify 
proposed legislation to the citizen body as much as to winning a vote in 
parliament. However, we shall have more to say about this below. 
Whilst it is true that jurors in cases of criminal and civil law are 
required to reach a judgment (one that is beyond all reasonable doubt) on 
matters of fact this would not be the case in giving or wi tholding popular 
assent to items of legislation. Fact may indeed come into it but it would 
not be solely a question of fact. Would the ineliminable element of value 
lead to corrupt and biased judgments by the citizens? 
As with our criticisms of Wolff, I suggest that no guarantees can be 
givenj however there are various considerations which suggest that this is 
not as problematic as it may at first seem. The most obvious objection is 
that citizen voting would be partisan. Here we need to offer a further 
refinement of the model. 
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The citizens, I suggested, are to be chosen at random; but would it not be 
better to employ the sophisticated techniques developed by opinion poll 
companies to choose (with some random element) a representative sample? 
And representation here could be according to geography, class, ethnic 
background, creed, occupation or special interest. Thus, for example, a bill 
on educational reform might have a jury <and let us call it that) composed 
of teachers and parents; one on the City would call for a jury of bankers 
and stockbrokers; one on the Scottish legal system would be voted upon by a 
jury of Scots and barristers and solicitors, and so on. There are several 
objections to be advanced against such a system. In the first place, it 
legitimises partiality in the voting. The jurors would inevitably see 
themsel ves as representing specific partial interests. A teacher would see 
herself as voting on behalf of all teachers, a miner on behalf of all 
miners, a black person on behalf of all black people and so on. But, and I 
shall argue for this in more detail later, it is vital here to encourage 
jurors to divest themselves so far is possible of their particularity and 
partiality in forming their critical judgment. Vie need not take this as a 
counsel of perfection in order to hesitate at introducing partiality to the 
heart of the process. 
Furthermore, if we are to introduce proportionality along with 
representation then we enter a world of interminable disputes as to the due 
extent of proportionality in any given case. Vlhat percentage of any given 
constituency primarily affected by a bill is to comprise the jury? Should it 
vary according to the content of the proposed legislation? If, say, 
occupation were to be a major factor in selection then should we not also 
take account of party loyal ties, class background, ethnic origin (to name 
but some of the variants) so as to achieve an accurate representation of 
all possible views and interests? I shall not attempt to answer such 
claims, but merely assert that this is to place not only partiality but also 
irresolvable dispute at the heart of the process. By contrast with this 
approach, the model posits the expression of views, interests and values in 
the election of legislators but not in the formation of critical judgment. 
Partisanship in particular and partiality in general is to be characterised 
as negligent voting behaviour. What is required is that those jurors chosen 
at random represent not some particular interest group but the citizen body 
as a whole. To that extent a considerable degree of disinterest is required. 
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For the question we must ask the jurors to consider in reaching their 
decision, indeed the only question we would want them to consider, must be 
along the lines of that posed by Rousseau: 'Is this law in conformity with 
the general will?' Only such a general question could be acceptable to those 
not chosen for any given jury. Were we to acknowledge that either formally 
or as customary practice the jurors appealed not to some sense of common 
interest but to their particular interests then I think it is quite clear 
that we would all want to express our opinions on the matter. Thus the 
model places trust between members of the citizen body as a central value. 
On this too we shall have more to say later. 
Nonetheless, trust requires some solid foundation if it is not to prove 
worthless. At this stage I shall take the major obstacle to the formation 
of critical judgment to be that of party allegiances. Having been selected 
as a juror could one reasonably be expected to vote, let us say, against a 
bill proposed by a party one had initially voted for? I suggest that this 
would not be all that unlikely, though my argument does not depend on it. 
Party supporters of whatever hue may often find themselves at odds with 
specific items of legislation without thereby exposing their over-arching 
loyalty to doubt. This becomes an acute problem only where any expression 
of doubt and dissent threatens the power status quo. So, given that a 
government would not be obliged to resign if parts of its legislative 
programme were rejected by the jurors then one, strong, impulse to 
partisanship would be much reduced. 
But I doubt that that is enough by itself. A more serious problem is 
that of the narrowness of political self-identification encouraged by such 
systems as that presently adopted by the U.K.: the system of 'first-past-
the-post' election of legislators. Against this, a system utilising single-
transferable-votes (STV) in multi-member constituencies would encourage a 
less static and more elaborate conception of one's political identity. Under 
such a system, one would need to determine not simply which party to 
support but the extent to which one was in sympathy with broad areas of 
party policy and thus party 'wings'. Consider the following example." The 
city of Bristol currently returns six Members of Parliament from separate 
constituencies. Under the multi-member system, Bristol would continue to 
return six legislators, but these would stand for the same constituency. The 
voters, employing STV, would now be voting for six candidates ranking their 
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choices in order of preference. Cross-party voting now becomes a serious 
option. Let us say that the Labour Party fields six candidates, covering the 
spectrum of views within that party. A would-be Labour voter identifying 
herself as being on the right wing of the party might prefer to vote for, 
say, four right wing and centrist Labour candidates and then for S.L.D. or 
'wet' Conservative candidates rather than for left-wing Labour candidates. 
As soon as this refinement in political identity takes place and citizens 
have the chance to vote for more than one party at the same election then 
the problem of partisan voting .amongst the jurors is reduced. Furthermore, 
given that the jurors are chosen at random from the citizen body it becomes 
crucial that the composition of the legislative assembly accurately reflects 
the range of views and values within the political community if its 
legislative programme is to prove acceptable. The two points reinforce each 
other. 
At one level, then, I suggest that partisanship need not be as great a 
problem as might be feared. Nonetheless, this does not embrace the wider 
objection about the role of value judgments. Here I shall simply assert that 
value is central to political judgment. The discussion of Rousseau's theory 
of popular sovereignty in the previous chapter stressed this centrality. For 
the question our legislative jurors must ask themselves is not qUite 
Rousseau's formulation ('Is this law in conformity with the general will?') 
but the reconstructed version: Does this law, through the values it 
espouses, express the sort of people we are? And this is not a matter of 
personal value but of assigning weight to the competing value claims within 
society: which values are more central to our way of life than others? 
However, it should be noted that this does not commi t us to a narrow 
identity between law and morality. It may do so; but it may also be that 
the values expressed are second-order rather than first-order: they allow 
for a general structure wi thin which individuals are free to pursue and 
express their own values (their own particular conception of the good), 
subject to their not harming others. Thus, independently of our own 
particular (ie. first-order) values if we saw our society as being tolerant 
and freedom-loving we would be inclined to reject laws which sought to 
impose particular values on all. 
** 
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So, the model as it now stands is this. Legislators would be elected by STY 
in multi-member constituencies, parliamentary debates would be broadcast 
live on television (and perhaps radio), bills gaining parliamentary assent 
would then be voted upon by the randomly chosen sub-set of the citizen 
body and would become law only on gaining popular assent so construed. 
I have stressed the analogy between jury service in courts of law and 
the role of the citizen in expressing judgment on legislative proposals. 
There is one further and crucial difference to be explained. The juror 
divests herself of her particularity on entering the jury boxj such at least 
is our trust. The act of physical distancing from one's daily concerns 
combined with the ritual elements of the court of law help to create a 
reflective gap which aids the formation of critical judgment. One is no 
longer oneself (daughter, manager, miner, professor, lover) but a juror: one 
assumes a new social role with a specific physical location (the court), 
complete with a new set of duties and responsibilities. A similar act of 
physical distancing and delineation from quotidien existence is not 
suggested for the citizen-jury. It is not the impracticality that is crucial 
here but the need for the assent to be firmly grounded within the 
community. The citizens vote on behalf of the community but do so by 
remaining fully part of that community. Their decision is reached 
independently of each other but not independently of their family, friends, 
colleagues etc.. The model envisages the opportunity for voters to discuss 
the issues raised within their social circle, to canvass opinions - but for 
the judgment ultimately to be their own. 
This again raises a number of points. To begin with, there is the 
matter of political education. The model has an internal dynamic which 
encourages a growth in political knowledge, and more generally, political 
understanding. Even those not directly involved (those not chosen this time 
round) become drawn into the discussion if members of their family or 
friends etc, are empanelled. The net of involvement is wider than the 
numbers specifically chosen. As more citizens take part directly and 
indirectly in the legislati ve process so the arcane rites of the 
parliamentary process become more generally grasped within the community; 
point is given to the formal teaching of constitutional studies at the level 
of secondary educationj and, if legislative proposals were to become widely 
discussed within the community, we might reasonably expect that political 
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argument, of a fairly developed kind, would become asssimilated to the heart 
of the culture. 
A major problem must now be confronted. My presentation of the model 
has tacitly assumed that the names of those chosen for these legislative 
juries would be made public. This I would see as essential to the wider 
involvement discussed above. But should jurors act in a public and 
identifiable way, or should they be protected by anonymity? The issue not 
only has profound implications for our understanding of what it is to be a 
citizen but also strikes deep at the heart of liberal democratic theory. 
According to that theory, the vote is a right and in one sense is the 
property of the individual voter. Voting is conducted in secret not only on 
the instrumental and pragmatic grounds of protecting the voter from the 
possibility of intimidation but also because the vote is adjudged to be the 
concern of the voter and of no-one else. The voter has the discretion to 
reveal the content of her vote should she so wish, but she alone has that 
discretion. Beyond meeting formal requirements, the disposal of the vote is 
a matter for the individual. 
John Stuart Mill argued forcefully against this conception of the vote 
as a right and a matter of self-interest on several but related grounds. 
Mill accepts <though by so doing he strains his consistency) that we are 
not required to sacrifice our self-interest in voting, but correctly draws 
the distinction between narrow and broad, short-term and long-term 
# 
conceptions of self-interest. Thus it may be in my immediate (narrow, 
short-term) self-interest to vote for lower taxes; yet this may be counter 
to my wider, more long-term self-interest if it leads to a decline in social 
cohesion so that, for instance, it becomes unsafe for me to walk the 
streets at night. The thrust of all Mill's political, social and ethical 
thought is that of an appeal to our wider and more long-term interests. 
More importantly, Mill attacks the conception of the vote as a right. The 
vote, he insists, is an exercise of power over others (or at least, it 
constitutes the attempt to do so) ane this can never be a matter solely of 
right and self-interest. In voting, the citizen takes on a specific political 
role (one which involves the exercise of power) and is thus strictly 
analogous to any other public office: its power is to be exercised on behalf 
of the community at large and not for the purpose of advancing one's self-
interest and thus it is to be exercised as a duty: 
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The suffrage is indeed due to [the voter], among other reasons, 
as a means to his own protection, but only against treatment 
from which he is equally bound, so far as depends on his vote, 
to protect everyone of his fellow-citizens. His vote is not a 
thing in which he has an option ; it has no more to do with his 
personal wishes than the verdict of a juryman. It is strictly a 
matter of duty; he is bound to give it according to his best and 
most conscientious opinion of the public good. 4 
And like all such public duties, they should be exercised under conditions 
of scrutiny and public accountability. Thus it follows that one's vote is a 
matter of concern to others and that it should be cast in public: 
In any political election ... the voter is under an absolute 
moral obliga.lion to consider the interest of the public, not his 
private advantage, and give his vote, to the best of his 
judgment, exactly as he would be bound to do if he were the sole 
voter, and the election depended upon him alone. This being 
admitted, it is at least a prima facie consequence that the duty 
of voting, like any other public duty. should be performed under 
the eye and criticism of the public; everyone of whom has not 
only an interest in its performance, but a good title to 
consider himself wronged if it is performed otherwise than 
honestly and carefully.s 
I suggest that Mill is correct in arguing that the vote is not a right -
though it smacks of heresy to so claim. If there is a right involved here 
(and I stress that I am not hereby committing myself to a doctrine of 
rights) then it would be a general right to self-determination by means of 
the fullest possible political participation; but any given form such 
participation may take is as a social role which defines the form and scope 
of the proper exercise of power in terms of duties. The 'vote I is a 
technical arrangement for the expression of power within this (presumed) 
right of participation - and it is patently absurd to ascribe a substantive 
right to something merely technical (in contrast to its being merely a 
statutory right). If this position is correct and the vote is not a right 
but a duty, performed wi thin the context of a public office, then scrutiny 
and publicity are implied. 
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In point of fact, Mill was prepared to accept that where the risks of 
intimidation and corruption were great then it would be more expedient to 
employ the secret ballot. And to be sure, one might well argue that, given 
universal adult suffrage, then first, the individualised pursuits of self-
interests will have a tendency to cancel outj and second, since there is a 
formal equality amongst all the voters, the problem of accountability is not 
so acute. However, that is clearly not the case with respect to the 
reflective model. Here, the formal equality is temporarily breached to give 
substantive powers to a randomly chosen few who thereby assume the duties 
of public office. Theoretical considerations commit us to scrutiny through 
publicity. But it may be that, like Mill, we must accept that protection in 
law for the legislative jurors <protection from harassment and intimidation 
from the press, from organised lobbying and unsolicited opinions by mail, 
telephone and door-step callers) will prove inadequate. Undoubtedly, there 
is something that to us must seem to be at the same time romantic and 
stoic in Mill's vision of the citizen being prepared to argue the case for 
her vote in public and to all and sundry. There is a background assumption 
of toleration and desire for something approaching the common good which 
for Mill would be the qualities of civic virtue <which he expresses in 
terms of patriotism). This is a subject we shall pursue further in the 
chapter on citizenship. So, I leave it open for further debate as to 
whether or not in practice lists of those chosen to serve on the 
legislative juries would be published <perhaps copies would be available in 
local libraries etc.). 
Liberal democratic theory in resisting this conception of voting as a 
duty rather than a right also resists the conception that there is an 
obligation on the individual to cast their vote. While voting continues to 
be seen as a right then it rests with the individual to choose whether or 
not to vote. This has led to theoretical problems as to the extent of any 
poli tical obligation on the individual who does vote as opposed to those 
who do not. That voting takes place is taken to generate an obligation to 
obey the government and its laws which result from this, the 'democratic 
process'. Thus it is the free exercise of the so-called 'right to vote' which 
generates a self-assumed obligation, analogous to that generated by 
promising. But if voting is a duty, then the individual no longer has the 
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choice as to whether or not to vote, but is committed by a prior 
obligation. Thus voting as a duty could not generate political obligation. 
I shall not pursue these problems in any depth here except to note that 
doubt is now being cast on this theory of a voluntary (ie. self-assumed) 
poli tical obligationG • However, we can make some brief comments. In so far 
as the presumption is that the suffrage is to be bestowed automatically and 
equally on all (some being dis-qualified on various grounds) then the duty 
of voting is common to all. 'Were it the case that one had to qualify for 
the suffrage (say, as on Mill's theory7 by demonstrating literacy and 
numeracy) then the duty would be specific to those who had so qualified. In 
the former case, where suffrage is presumed unless there are grounds for 
disqualification, then, I suggest, it is a matter for common agreement as to 
whether the performance of this duty is left to the discretion of the 
individual or is insisted upon (perhaps with the backing of legal 
sanctions). However, where there is no presumption but the suffrage is 
conditional on satisfying certain requirements then it may be that there 
can be no question of choice: the duty is not common but is specific to 
those chosen, which is to say, those qualifying. 
More would need to be done to maintain this distinction. Nonetheless, it 
is clear that voting on the legislative jury is not only a duty but one 
which would be enforceable by legal sanction. This raises the question of 
dissent. There are two main reasons why we would not wish those who 
dissent from the prevailing political system to sit on the legislative 
juries. In the first place, it is not clear how we might expect dissenters 
to exercise their critical judgment. That is, their critical judgment is 
already committed to opposition to not just the specific item of proposed 
legislation but to the legislative system in its entirety. Secondly, the 
dissenter, if she shares the liberal democratic view that participation 
generates obligation, will want to avoid such actions, and specifically 
voting, which might be taken as implying consent to the legislative system. 
So, there are two problems to confront: independently of the satisfaction of 
any criteria we might insist upon for eligibility to serve on the 
legislative juries, do we give citizens the choice as to whether or not they 
wish to be considered for this form of public servicej and/or do we provide 
a dissenting option ("vote witheld") for the jurors? 
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As to the first problem, I suggest there is a clear presumption in favour 
of voluntary registration, from which lists sortition would be used to 
decide who serves on any given legislative jury. The advantages of 
voluntary registration are many. It discourages <though it doesn't of itself 
prevent) dissenters from participating. It removes an element of coercion 
from the process by allowing those who, for whatever reason, are content to 
remain unengaged in the political process to continue undisturbed in their 
chosen life-style. Those who might feel anxious or unconfident of 
themselves, or those who simply would not wish to devote the time and 
effort involved in the exercise of such power would also be able to thus 
exempt themselves from this part of the process. If registration is not a 
once-and-for-all act, but remains open for citizens to register and de-
register themselves according to their circumstances, or is made a 
specific act for each parliament then this form of participation would be 
highly voluntary. (As with contemporary jury-service in courts of law, last 
minute exemption on grounds of ill-health, business commitments and holiday 
arrangements would be allowed.) Such voluntary and flexible arrangements 
for registration, by effectively reducing the numbers of those registered, 
would increase the chances of those with a high degree of civic commitment 
being called upon. However, it would also increase the chance of being 
called upon for political 'activists' <of whatever persuasion), those 
concerned with high-profile issues, and those for whom legislative policy 
will have particular consequences. 
It is not clear how we should regard such possibilities. Partly it 
depends on the numbers involved as to whether this would be a peripheral 
or central element. At a deeper level we might want to view with alarm the 
sudden and dis-proportionate intrusion of those pre-committed to particular 
positions or interests <though such pre-commitment may fail under scrutiny 
of the arguments). At the same time, I do not think we should want to 
exclude those whose engagement in the political process is (initially) 
temporary and specific, for such provisional engagement might lead to 
something more permanent developing. One move we might make would be to 
hold two lists, one for life and one temporary for each parliament, with a 
bias towards selecting members from the former list. Thus those with 
particular concerns which suddenly come to prominence are not excluded but 
would be unable to constitute a sizeable proportion of any given legislative 
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jury. <And there is no guarantee, of course, that they would be chosen to 
scrutinise a bill which especially concerned them.) 
But just as a deeper commitment might develop, so might greater dis-
illusionment. It is not inconceivable that members of a legislative jury, 
initially feeling themselves well-satisfied with the existing system, find 
themselves increasingly dissatisfied as a result of their close scrutiny of 
the legislative process, to the point of active dissent. Provision for this 
<independently of the possibility of confirmed dissenters on the panel 
lists) should be made. Thus, there should be four voting options: "for", 
"against", "undecided" and "vote witheld". The presence of these options 
ensures that the duty of voting may be legally enforced on all those who 
register. 
.. .... 
Voluntary registration <whether life-long or temporary) may result in a 
systematic distortion of the representativeness of the legislative juries by 
favouring those with the leisure to devote to such a time-consuming and 
effort-demanding activity; that is, and assuming no further qualifying 
requirement such as property or literacy (though these matters are 
discussed below), the retired, the unemployed and the more-than-moderately 
well-off. The one clear advantage of universal and compulsory registration 
(ie. of all enfranchised citizens) for legislative juries is that the burden 
is thus incumbent on all without further distinction. Yet it must be asked 
whether the citizen body would be prepared to accept such an onerous task, 
in terms of both the time and the effort required; for if not, then the 
likelihood of negligent and maverick voting is much increased. 
There is no avoiding the fact that citizen participation on the 
legislative juries would (for the period empanelled) be onerous. Yet I do 
not think we should see this as a major objection. In the first place, I 
argued in Chapter Two that political participation should be a reluctant 
activity, that it should involve these sorts of 'costs'. Secondly, it can be 
argued that we expect at least as much as this from those selected for 
juries in the civil and criminal courts where cases may in some cases last 
weeks. Furthermore, it may not be necessary for members of the legislative 
jury to set aside their routine concerns, the way a juror in the criminal 
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courts must. For, although I have suggested that the model requires 
continuous live broadcasting of parliamentary proceedings, it does not 
follow that the member of a legislative jury needs to watch live nor follow 
every moment in the passage of a bill. 
That proceedings on the floor of both Houses be broadcast live and 
continuously is a vital component of the model, enhancing the general 
development of citizen awareness of procedures, issues and arguments. It is 
important that the chances of any citizen coming 'cold' to the duties of 
legislative jury service, ie. without any prior familiarity with the 
parliamentary process, be reduced. Thus ready access to that process is 
required in order to generate such background familiarity. However, we 
cannot force anyone to watch and follow any or all debates. We can do no 
more than encourage and provide access. This is as true for the member of a 
legislative jury as it is for the ordinary citizen. Furthermore, with respect 
to the U.K. system, the broadcasting of proceedings on the floor of the 
House of Commons would miss the Committee stages of bills, during which 
most of the detailed debate and amendments take place. And since it is not 
unknown for the Standing Committees to which bills are referred to sit 
contemporaneously, simultaneous broadcast would be impossible, unless we 
wantonly multiply the number of television and radio channels dedicated to 
coverage. The solution would be to use the dedicated channels at the 
weekends when neither House sits to broadcast edited, though still 
extensive, coverage of each bill in passage (both in committee and on the 
floor of the House) that week. This would allow the legislative juror to 
follow the main arguments with a minimum of disruption to their normal 
routine. 
Edited coverage of parliamentary proceedings is, rightly, a sensitive 
issue. For some, only comprehensive (ie. live, continuous) coverage can 
avoid the evils of selectivity and bias. Yet it is not without its draw-
backs. Apart from the problem of covering (again, in the U.K.) Standing and 
Select Committee work, comprehensive coverage invites selectivity and bias 
on the part of the viewer. Given an excess of non-predigested <ie, non-
edited) material, few viewers could be expected to follow a debate in its 
entirety. It is far more likely that the average viewer would watch, at 
most, the initial and wind-up speeches, along with such high-profile 
occasions as questions to the Prime Minister. There is then, I suggest, less 
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chance of the full range of arguments being followed by the viewer if 
comprehensive coverage is all that is made available. But edited coverage, 
against a background of comprehensive coverage, whilst not escaping all 
problems of selectivity and bias, minimises the risks involved and makes 
accessible to a wide public the meat of parliamentary business. Edited 
coverage of these main points of each day's business could be shown late in 
the evening on the main (non-dedicated) channels, supplemented by the 
weekend broadcasts dedicated to coverage of the passage of bills. 
Given such wide-ranging edited coverage, do we after all need 
comprehensive coverage of parliamentary proceedings? There are three points 
here. The first I have already alluded to: that the exercise of final 
legislative approval by the citizen body requires that they be as fully 
conversant as possible not simply with arguments and issues but with 
procedures and matters of principle. This requires unrestricted access. 
Secondly, the background comprehensive coverage salves fears and minimises 
risks of selectivity and bias <and a parliamentary ombudsman or committee 
of grievance could be appointed to investigate such complaints from both 
Members and the public). And thirdly, the proposal for continuous live 
public broadcasting of parliamentary proceedings has wider implications 
which must now be considered. 
One of the great and apparently perduring struggles of democratic 
practice is that between the executive and the legislature. We saw in the 
previous chapter how the democracy of classical Athens largely avoided this 
problem by having no clearly defined and autonomous executive body and by 
making all officials accountable to the Ekklesia. In contemporary times, 
many states have sought to avoid this problem by instituting a clear 
separation of powers, with varying degrees of success. In the United 
Kingdom, however, there has been a growing apprehension that the 
legislature has suffered a steady erosion of its powers of scrutiny and 
control over the executive; a development most memorably captured in Lord 
Hailsham's warnings against the trend towards an 'elective dictatorship' ,'-
This situation, of a legislature which sees itself as increasingly impotent 
in the face of an executive backed by a large parliamentary majority, was 
explicitly appealed to in the proposing speech in the House of Commons 
debate <February 19889 ) which resulted in approval of the motion to 
initiate an 'experiment' in the public broadcasting of parliamentary 
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proceedings. The general public, it was argued in that speech, would aid the 
legislature in its tasks of scrutiny and control by bringing to bear the 
indirect but effective pressure of public opinion. There is surely much 
truth in this; and it is a strong argument for the unedited broadcasting of 
the principal elements of parliamentary scrutiny: ministerial and 
departmental question times and motions of censure and no-confidence. But 
to give preferential treatment to such moments incorporates a bias of a 
different yet equally pernicious type. Ministerial (or shadow ministerial) 
success or failing in one matter is to be set against inability or 
competence in a range of others. The fullest possible picture needs to be 
shown if public opinion is not to be fraudulently enlisted. 
Nightly and weekly edited coverage, featuring the main points of daily 
business and the passage of legislation, against a background of continuous 
comprehensive coverage is thus required. Membership of a legislative jury 
would be thereby no less of an onerous task; but not, I think, one beyond 
the capacity of the citizen. However, the televising of parliamentary 
proceedings as part of the reflective model of democracy as popular assent 
gi ves rise to a further implication regarding the grounds of proposed 
legislation and to which I now turn. 
I have argued in this chapter that members of the legislative juries 
would be required to address themselves to the Rousseauean question: Does 
this law express the sort of people we are? I now want to modify this. In 
discussing Rousseau's theory in the previous chapter, I argued that the laws 
proposed by the Legislator were to be the expression of the values implicit 
within the community's customs and practices modified by the constraints of 
justice. Justice is also a central concern of the reflective model. 
In his A Theory of Justice John Rawls argues for a conception of 
justice as fairness: that is, a system of just distribution of social 
primary goods such as we would choose in a position of political equality, 
each rationally self-interested yet mutually disinterested, and divested of 
all knowledge of our particularities (self, society, social position etc .. ) In 
this original position, behind the 'veil of ignorance', the structural 
arrangements for the distribution of social primary goods would be fair 
<and thus just) if they were such that we would all agree to them <while 
still behind this veil of ignorance). It is not Rawls' theory as such that 
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concerns us here so much as his device of the veil of ignorance as a means 
to deriving principles of justice. 10 
The reflective model proposes a radical transformation of the purposes 
of parliamentary debate on items of legislation. As I have argued, the role 
of the legislators is no longer simply that of securing support within 
parliament but now, given the comprehensive broadcasting of parliamentary 
proceedings, involves explaining and justifying (or criticising) bills to 
the public in general and to the legislati ve jurors in particular. What 
would be the ~ain grounds for such criticism and justifications? The 
National Interest, of course, could be advanced; and we may take this as 
involving the maintenance and advancement of the community's values, as 
understood by the legislators. But beyond this? No doubt many different 
grounds could be offered, but one specific ground of justification or 
criticism would not be available: that of self-interest narrowly conceived. 
For, with respect to the composition of each legislative jury, the 
legislators would effectively find themselves behind a veil of ignorance. 
Chosen randomly, we would expect few if any such juries to present a 
precise cross-section of the social, political, economic and geographic 
composi tion of society. Some broad guesses could be made but could not be 
relied upon for an appeal to the self-interest of the legislative jurors. 
Of course, we can darken the picture by imagining the legislators 
having access to computer records and thus being able to generate a precise 
assessment of the composition of each jury. So I shall add to the model an 
independent body with the role of supervising all electoral procedures (the 
generating of the jury lists, the counting of votes, etc.) and a constit-
utional restraint on the legislators' access to such information; and claim 
that this will suffice, for the purposes of the model, to keep the 
legislators behind this particular veil of ignorance. 
In the absence of the appeal to self-interest, justice forms the central 
ground of legislative proposals. Since the legislators do not know which 
particular interests and sections of the community will comprise any given 
jury, it needs to be shown in the parliamentary debates that the proposed 
legislation would be in the interests of all: that it would be both in line 
wi th the general perception of the community's values (whether first- or 
second-order) and that it would be just. And here, I suggest, something like 
Rawls' general conception of justice would apply: 
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All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income and 
wealth, and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed 
equally unless an unequal distribution o~ any or all of those 
goods is to the advantage of the least favored. 11 
(Whether or not Rawls' special conception of justice would be adopted is a 
more contentious matter and one I shall not pursue here.) 
That the legislators remain behind this veil of ignorance assumes that 
they have no firm knowledge about the composition of any given legislative 
jury in relation to the social composition of society, at large; ie. that the 
legislators cannot safely ignore ('safely' with respect to gaining assent 
for their legislative proposals) any particular section or set of interests 
wi thin society. However this further assumes that no section of society is 
precluded from service on the juries. This reveals a tension which we must 
now explore. 
.. ...... 
If we were to set criteria for eligibility to the legislative juries then 
this substantial requirement of citizen equality (as well as a formal 
requirement of democratic equality) would be breached; unless the criteria 
were such as to avoid systematic discrimination against identifiable 
sectors of society. Arguably, criteria addressed to questions of sanity and 
criminal record avoid such systematic discrimination. However, we cannot be 
so confident with respect to criteria addressed to questions of, for 
instance, educational standards and the receipt of state relief. Yet these 
are criteria we might expect to insist upon if we are to trust others 
chosen at random to exercise power on our behalf. 
Although arguing ~for universal suffrage, Mill also argued for a category 
of exclusions, none of which were to be permanent, and all of which were 
addressed to the capacity of the particular citizen to exercise his or her 
vote responsibly. These exclusions have generally been treated as an 
example of Mill's (supposed) elitism or even of his attempt to so doctor 
his theory as to ensure a middle-class majority in parliament. Thus the 
exclusions tend to be dismissed with 1i ttle further thought given to them. 
In fact, I think Mill was generally correct. He was mistaken only in 
believing that the suffrage conferred effective (as opposed to nominal) 
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power on the citizens. It is only where the power conferred is effective, as 
it is with the legislative juries, that the question of the citizen's 
capacities becomes crucial. I shall look at the three main exclusions Mill 
proposes: illiteracy and innumeracy; the receipt of state relief (as in 
social security payments); and non-payment or non-qualification for payment 
of taxes. 12 
In brief I Mill argued that one should not be dependent on the hearsay 
of others in order to decide how to vote but should be able to inform 
oneself fully and independently of others. Thus the ability to read reports 
in the press, political pamphlets etc. becomes crucial. Even though these 
are not exactly neutral sources of information they nonetheless represent a 
degree of independence in comparison to reliance on hearsay. Numeracy, Mill 
argued (surely correctly) I was essential if economic questions were to be 
understood. Furthermore, Mill claimed, perhaps somewhat naively, that 
literacy and numeracy are within the reach of all, given the educational 
resources; and thus this exclusion supported his advocacy of a system of 
national education.' To qualify for the suffrage the citizen would be 
required only to read a short passage, copy out a few lines and complete 
some simple sums. Given a such system of free national education, Mill can 
surely be forgiven for not seeing this as representing a systematic 
preclusion from the suffrage. 
First reflections suggest that for the legislative juries we would want 
to insist on at least this minimal proof of literacy and numeracy, the 
televised broadcast of the legislative debates not withstanding. What 
worries me is that we might want to insist on more than this. Given that 
the legislative juries would be voting to give or withold assent to the 
laws we might argue that the jurors should be able to read the draft 
legislation, white and green papers and so on. More than basic numeracy 
would be required to understand the elements of economic theories. These 
requirements are essential if the jurors are to retain a critical grasp of 
the legislative debates rather than come under the sway of the legislators. 
<Though keeping the jurors grounded within the community reduces the 
possibility of this.) 
However, this is not to claim that the central element in the formation 
of critical judgment is in any simple sense one of intellect. I have already 
suggested that value is a crucial element; and this theme will be developed 
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later. Nonetheless, at this stage we will hold, with some reservations, to 
Xill's minimal requirements. 
Exclusions on the grounds of receipt of social security and on non-
payment of tax are more problematic. There are two different arguments 
here. As to whether service on the legislative juries should be restricted 
to tax payers the central argument is grounded in concerns of justice: it is 
unjust for those who are making no contribution to the state to have a 
major say over how the states resources are distributed. Whilst there is, I 
think, something to this argument it is far from conclusive. Although those 
exempt from paying tax make no direct financial contribution, they 
contribute nonetheless if there is a system of indirect taxation. Further, 
it is an unacceptably narrow view of the matter to insist on assessing an 
individual's contribution to the state solely or mainly in financial terms. 
We might want to argue that only tax-payers should be invited to serve on 
legislative juries dealing with fiscal policy; but the wider consideration of 
the need to maintain democratic equality wherever possible overrides this 
narrow consideration of financial justice. 
A different argument is presented to justify exclusion on the grounds 
of being in receipt of social security. This is what Mill has to say on the 
matter: 
He who cannot by his labour suffice for his own support has no 
claim to the privilege of helping himself to the money of 
others. By becoming dependent on the remaining members of the 
community for actual subsistence, he abdicates his claim to 
equal rights with them in other respects. Those to whom he is 
indebted for the continuance of his very existence may justly 
claim the exclusi ve management of those common concerns to 
which he now brings nothing, or less than he takes away.13 
Although Mill brings in financial considerations, I take the main point to 
be that a condition of independence is a precondition of citizenship; and 
that there are two grounds for this. The first is that the failure to 
provide adequately for self and family is prima facie evidence of a lack of 
prudence, of practical wisdom. This may indeed be the case in conditions of 
(relatively) full employment; but where unemployment is high and 
significantly outstrips the work available then dependence on state 
benefits would provide no substantive evidence of a lack of prudence. 
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However, I shall not pursue that argument since there is a deeper one which 
Mill does not refer to: that the condition of need disqualifies individuals 
from achieving the levels of disinterest necessary for the exercise of 
critical judgment on legislative proposals. Of course, this might not be the 
case. Some may indeed prove themselves capable of abstracting from the 
press of daily concerns; but it would be naive of us to expect this to be 
the norm. Rather, where the quality of existence is at best precarious we 
would expect the first concern to be one of a narrowly-conceived self-
interest. Political judgment would be irredeemably partial in the vast 
majority of cases. 
Clearly, these considerations move us increasingly towards an 
Aristotelean conception of restricted 
<relatively) well-educated tax-payers. 
citizenship: one confined to the 
In effect it creates a two tier 
structure of citizenship: a basic class in which everyone (unless 
disqualified) has the nominal power of voting for legislators and a special 
class of those who- must qualify for the legislative juries by achieving a 
given educational standard (however rudimentary) and satisfying a minimal 
requirement of tax-paying. However unpalatable such a move may seem <and it 
is one I would wish to resist if at all possible) we cannot simply side-
step this conclusion. 
I have two arguments, neither of which I find sufficiently persuasive, 
to offer against adoption of this restricted conception of citizenship. The 
first places priority on democratic equality against what we might term 
'democratic utility'.14 Thus we would either reject an increase in citizen 
power if this involved a differentiation in citizenship or insist that we 
risk some lack of critical judgment for the sake of maintaining equality in 
power. The second argument develops from this latter alternative: that the 
structure of the model is such as to make the question of qualification a 
perfectionist concern. Ideally, we would want to be sure that all those 
eligible to serve on the legislative juries were the best of all possible 
persons, or at least those most likely to exercise their power responsibly. 
But we may doubt the extent to which any number of qualifying criteria can 
guarantee us this. We can multiply without limit the criteria employed 
(education, wealth, social standing, house-ownership, share-ownership, 
occupation, religion, blood-line) without ever guaranteeing the responsible 
exercise of political power. Furthermore, since the model requires random 
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selection from the citizen body the possibility that a legislative jury 
comprising mostly those we might otherwise exclude from a restricted 
citizenship is tolerably small. We must assume that a degree of what we 
have already characterised as negligent and maverick voting is ultimately 
non-eliminable. 
To protect against a legislative programme being wrecked by what I 
shall term a 'bastard jury', one composed to an unacceptable degree of 
individuals from a particular sector of society, we may introduce a further 
refinement to the model: that a legislative proposal, having been refuseq. 
popular assent, may be quickly reintroduced to the legislative assembly 
(given the legislators' assent) with a larger legislative jury, say double 
the normal size, so as to gain a second opinion. Should this second 
presentation of the bill be refused popular assent then its reintroduction 
during the lifetime of that particular assembly would be prohibited. 
Ultimately, however, we must simply trust our fellow citizens to act 
responsibly. Here I shall attempt to sketch the first of two arguments 
which, I hope, will establish the primacy of the principle of democratic 
equality over that of democratic utility, and thus undercut the objections 
to an undifferentiated citizenship. The first concerns this condition of 
trust. 
H J N Horsburgh, in a sensitive and perceptive article entitled 'The 
Ethics of Trust', distinguished between three species of trust: innocent, 
guilty and therapeutic. 1s The first 'arises out of a combination of 
inexperience and lack of duplicity'. Such trust may elicit an appropriate 
response from some, but '[iJts effects upon the truly malignant tend to be 
far less satisfactory; for there are some who delight in destroying 
innocence'. Guilty trust is grounded in 'some morally objectionable element' 
such as 'carelessness, greed, or malice' in the character of the person 
exhibiting this form of trust. Founded in self-concern, it invites an 
equivalent response of manipulation or exploitation. Therapeutic trust is 
significantly different from these other forms in that its express regard 
is for the other person. It seeks to encourage the development of moral 
character. Such trust is placed with the full awareness of the possibility 
of disappointment (unlike innocent trust) yet is given in the hope that the 
other will respond to it as a 'moral opportunity' <and is thus unlike guilty 
trust). Therapeutic trust typically carries risk and the possibility of loss 
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on the part of one giving such trustj and it is precisely this which gives 
it its full moral character: the trustee is placed in a position where it 
matters that they demonstrate their trustworthiness. Horsburgh identifies 
two forms of therapeutic trust. The first is a derivative phenomenon, 
dependent upon a prior relationship of 'loyalty and affection or of personal 
attraction'. Such trustworthiness as is thus elicited tends to be specific 
to those engaged in the prior relationship. 
The second and purer form is, Horsburgh argues, more general in scope 
and thus of more weight: 
[It] makes a purely moral appeal to the person in whom it is 
reposed and aims at bringing into being a relationship of moral 
support rather than one based upon regard for personal 
qualities. Open prisons, the more successful reform schools, and 
even such organisations as Alcoholics Anonymous all testify to 
the power of this kind of trust.'6 
By appealing to the individual qua moral agent, and not with regard to the 
particular qualities of the individual, therapeutic trust in its pure form 
presents a challenge to the moral character of the individual. 
But more importantly <and problematically for my argument) therapeutic 
trust, if it is not to be an empty gesture, requires some element of 
discrimination: this person is to be placed in this position of trust. the 
arguments for the need to locate power and responsibility with specific and 
identifiable individuals applies equally with respect to therapeutic trust. 
By placing our fellow citizens in positions of power and responsibility 
(here, on the legislative juries) and especially under conditions of 
publicity and scrutiny, we fulfil the principal conditions of therapeutic 
trust. And this, I suggest, constitutes a major advance in thinking about 
democracy and citizenship. The condition of a fully developed citizenship is 
one of mutual (therapeutic) trust. The demonstration of that trust is 
precisely that power is not exercised by all simultaneously or permanently 
by some, but that each is asked to to take their turn in exercising power 
on behalf of the others. The reflective model of medial democracy, with its 
utilisation of sub-set voting on legislative proposals, incorporates at its 
heart this demand for mutual trust between members of the citizen body. 
Yet the problem remains: are the conditions of (therapeutic) trust 
satisfied by placing specific individuals in positions of identifiable power 
Page ill 
Chapter 5 Democracy as Popular Assent 
and responsibility, but without further discrimination between individuals 
as to those more deserving of that trust or less likely to betray it? For 
although therapeutic trust carries an acceptance of the risks involved it is 
not blind in its desire to be rewarded: it is not to be given carelessly 
and so not any and all risks are to be embraced. 
There is one further point I shall offer here in support of a 
comprehensive citizenship. The background insight to the reflective model 
came from the correction to Wolff's theory: the need to create conditions 
conducive to the responsible exercise of power by restricting the numbers 
assigned that power at anyone time. This, I suggested, marked a 
significant advance over Wolff's theory, where the power was conferred 
equally upon all so that, reduced to a minimum, the power carried no weight 
of responsibility. What then should be the size of the legislative juries so 
as to give this perception of a 'weight' of responsibility? 
I offer no more than some brief considerations. The basis of the 
critique of the Wolffian theory was that power is spread so thin as to lack 
<individualised) efficacy and thus carries no weight of responsibility. 
However, if the power is over-concentrated, is spread amongst too few, then 
the responsibility for forming a correct judgment will become too great, 
leading to a paralysis in judgment and the attempt to escape into a 
condition of Sartrean 'bad faith' - precisely a denial of responsibility. The 
problem is thus one of identifying the mean between these two poles of 
responsibility; a condition conducive to the free exercise of political 
responsibility. As an intuitive estimate, I suggest a jury size of twenty 
thousand. And we might note that this was roughly the size of attendance at 
the Ekklesia of classical Athens.1? Also, assuming a voting population in 
the U.K. of ca thirty-five million and a legislative burden of perhaps as 
many as fifty bills each year, this would provide for roughly a million 
voters each year, with each citizen thus having a reasonable expectation of 
serving at least once during their lifetime, thereby satisfying a 
requirement of formal democratic equality. 
Given a legislative jury of twenty thousand could we then accept a 
comprehensive citizenship, one that makes no distinctions on grounds of 
education, prudence and freedom from extreme need? As I have already 
suggested I remain uncertain. But what is clear, and what the reflective 
model serves to emphasise, is the tension generated by the attempt to 
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satisfy the twin demands of democratic utility and democratic equality. The 
dilemma seems to be this: the demand of democratic equality can only be 
satisfied by a nominal citizenship, one in which the individual citizen has 
li ttle or no opportunity to exercise effecti ve political power. If, however I 
we wish such power to be concentrated in the hands of the citizens, though 
exercised only by specified indi viduals on specific occasions, then the 
competence of the citizen is called into question and thus we want some 
assurance (if not a guarantee> that they are fit to exercise that power. 
The attempt to resolve this dilemma will be the subject of the 
conclusion to the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ON CITIZENSHIP 
This work has been concerned throughout with the development of the 
argument for a citizenship-based conception of democracYi and in particular, 
with the characterisation of citizenship as the responsible exercise of 
effective political power. Having explored this conception through the 
device of the reflective model of medial democracy that argument is now in 
danger of foundering. The tension between the competing demands of 
democratic utility and democratic equality (founded on the therapeutic form 
of trust) has yet to be resolved. 
Citizenship in the Liberal Democratic State has been a relatively 
uncontroversial matter; in general, disputes have been confined to the 
question of the status of resident aliens, and of foreign nationals within 
the ambit of an imperium. But within the category of citizenship, little or 
no distinction has been made between citizens as to their power, rights and 
privileges qua citizen. Generally, what one may do qua citizen all may do. 
There are exceptions, but these may safely be ignored in this context. 
However, the price of this democratic equality has been to institute a 
nominal citizenship: one in which the individual citizen has no effective 
political power. Nominal citizenship emphasises equal status and rights but 
not substantive powers and duties. There is, as we have seen, good reason 
for this, independently of historical development. The reflective model of 
medial democracy posits a significant increase <albeit only a first step) 
in the citizen's effective political power and attendant duties; but in so 
doing, raises the question as to whether all citi:::ens should be asked to 
exercise such power; or whether we require that (in some way, according to 
some set of criteria) they establish their fitness to be placed in such a 
position of trust, thereby instituting a two- or multi-tier model of 
citizenship. The attempt to resolve this tension requires that I now 
characterise more fully what I shall call a 'rich' conception of citizenship. 
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In presenting this characterisation, I shall not make any explicit appeal to 
a doctrine of the common good, to a teleological or essentialist theory of 
human nature, or to considerations of social and political justice. Rather, I 
offer this 'rich' characterisation of citizenship as a first attempt to 
supply a lack in the literature advocating a 'participatory democracy': the 
failure to spell out the scope and nature of that participation. Moreover, 
the question of motivation, of why anyone should want to be a citizen in 
this sense, needs to be confronted. <Though we may note that this is a more 
pressing problem where the principle of democratic equality is not 
breeched: if we admit a two- or multi-tier model of citizenship, then 
rewards in terms of elevated status and additional privileges may accrue, 
thereby providing an independent source of motivation.) The approach 
adopted here will be to sketch the broad outlines of what is required for 
citizenship to be valued for its own sake as a worthwhile activity, without 
reference to conceptions of duty or the common good as sources of primary 
motivation. In effect, the question I address is this: What would need to be 
the case for citizenship <construed as the responsible exercise of 
effective political power) to be justified as a pleasurable activity? 
This approach will seem at first glance to be at odds with idealist and 
collectivist traditions of citizenship. However, any apparent incompatibility 
is not, I think, ultimately irresolvable; the individualistic premises 
adopted serve only to facilitate the characterisation of the rich conception 
of citizenship. For that characterisation, I shall once more draw on the 
political and ethical theory of John Stuart Mill. 
* 
It would be a mistake, derivable only from the most blinkered reading of On 
Liberty', to view Mill as the advocate of a minimalist, night-watchman 
state. Quite the reverse: the burdens of political duty which the citizen 
would carry in the Millean state are substantial; and I sball refer to this, 
Mill's view, as a rich conception of citizenship. 
I'm not sure that it would be coherent to think of the members of any 
political community, especially one which retains a vestigial notion of 
poli tical equality, as escaping completely the burdens of duty; even if 
these amount to little more than paying one's premium to a protection 
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agency and observing a general duty to respect the rights of others as in 
the Nozickean vision2 • But there is clearly a great gulf between this, 
'thin', and the Millean 'rich' conceptions of what is involved in being a 
citizen. 
The broad issue I shall attempt to confront is what should constitute 
the proper relation between political activity and pleasure. The question of 
the pleasures enjoyed by those exercising political power qua leaders or 
rulers <whether or not elected) is not one which will concern me. Rather, 
my concern is with what we may call the pleasures of poli tical 
participation - if, indeed, there can be any such pleasures - which the 
ordinary citizen-in-the-street might experience. 
The narrow issue focuses on Mill's account, for Mill seems to slip back 
and forth between rival theories. In his Benthamite and hedonistic mode he 
appears to be saying that political participation is a pleasure, and a 
higher one at that, and thus contributes directly to our balance of pleasure 
over pain, ie. to our happiness. In his more eudaimonistic, Aristotelian, 
mode his argument seems to be that participation is to be valued for 
itself, as a matter of virtue, regardless of any pleasure it mayor may not 
bring in its wake; and often he attempts to coalesce <reconcile would be 
too strong a term) the two positions. At other times, the justification 
offered is that political participation is crucial to the full development 
of the individual and is thus to be valued for its intrinsic benefits. 
The problem is twofold. If we talk in terms of citizenship, we imply 
that there are non-optional duties to be performed. This might be a general 
duty, for instance, to vote in elections, which is not coercively imposed 
but which needs to be carried out dutifully by sufficient numbers to 
maintain the system of elections; or it might be a specific and enforceable 
duty, such as jury service. In either case we need to justify the imposition 
of the burdens or 'costs' of citizenship. However I 'political participation' 
implies something much broader: from the execution of specific duties to 
membership of political parties or pressure groupsj even such personal 
matters as keeping au fait with the machinations of government, refelcting 
upon social issues and discussion with friends in the pub of an evening, 
might plausibly be includedj though these latter are more properly seen as 
constituting a separate sphere of political involvement. I shall argue that 
proponents of a rich conception of citizenship such ~s Mill incorpor~te the 
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formal duties, the general participation and personal involvement in their 
description of citizenship. The second problem, then, is one of giving an 
account of why the individual should concern herself, should become 
politically involved, in the first place. This could take the form of an 
appeal to self-interest, in the sense of self-protection or self-
advancement, as with Bentham and Mill pere. But such arguments, considered 
alone, will generate only a thin conception of citizenship: formal duties, 
participation and involvement are justified only in so far as they are 
strictly necessary to secure the narrow ends of self-interest. Of course, we' 
might attempt to argue that only a full-blown conception of what it is to 
be a citizen will guarantee the narrow ends of self-interest; that only by 
paying high taxes, let us say, can we be sure of the social peace and 
stability necessary to live by the fruits of our own industry. 
Unfortunately, this argument will appeal to those already convinced of its 
truth and leave untouched those whom we might wish to persuade. We need, 
then, a separate account of political motivation if we are to ground a rich 
conception of citizenship. 
What might seem curious is that Mill does not make appeal to the most 
obvious argument to justify the burdens of citizenship: that it promotes the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number. There are two reasons why he 
should have been reluctant to do so. In the first place there is a fatal 
ambivalence between his romantic individualism, focused firmly on self-
developing individuals, and his more diffident regard for the 
undifferentiated masses. In endorsing De Tocqueville's caveat about the 
dangers of a 'tyranny of the majority' Mill precluded any appeal to 
unqualified mass-participation as the promoter of the greatest happiness. 
Limited participation could be argued forj but the justification for 
restricting the scope of participatory involvement was the present short-
comings in the qualities of the individuals comprising the state. To be a 
citizen, in Mill's sense, one needs to have a certain sort of character, or, 
as I shall put it later, to be capable of playing that specific role. If the 
appropriate citizen-qualities are not given to us but need to be learned or 
acquired, then we need to justify to the individual why he should make the 
effort to acquire them. And this takes us back to the problem of generating 
an appropriate form of political motivation. 
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Secondly, it is not obvious that making citizenship a (utilitarian) moral 
duty will work for Mill. That happiness is the ultimate criterion against 
which human action is to be morally assessed does not imply, Mill argues, 
that it is the immediate aim of our actions. Rather we must be content to 
follow the intermediate principles which we value for themselves and assess 
these norms of conduct against the happiness principle. Rarely are we in 
the position to make happiness the direct aim. So it needs to be shown not 
only that being a Millean citizen would contribute to the maximisation of 
happiness but also that it would be valued for itself by each citizen, 
without reference to the more general end. Before exploring these issues 
further, I must now sketch Mill's rich conception of citizenship. 
** 
As we saw in Chapter Two Mill argues that the appropriate form of 
government is that which is most conducive to the development of the 
individuals who comprise the state, given their level of civilisation. He 
adduces three criteria for assessing the appropriateness of the form of 
government: 
The people ... must be willing to accept it; or at least not 
so unwilling as to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to its 
establishment. They must be willing and able to do what is 
necessary to keep it standing. And they must be willing and 
able to do what it requires of them to enable it to fulfil 
its purposes.:3 
The harsh yoke of strong government may be necessary to drag a people, 
screaming and kicking, into the warmth of civilisation. Thus, 'of the 
barbarians who overran the Roman Empire' Mill says, 'It required centuries 
of time and an entire change of circumstances, to discipline them into 
regular obedience even to their own leaders'.4 In certain though rare 
circumstances, a benign despotism (and Mill must have had his own East 
India Company in mind here) can be of advantage to a people <gently leading 
them up the path of progress). But always, it is the wishes and qualities 
of the people and their collective place on the path of progress which is 
the key determinant of their due form of government. 
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The first criterion, that of acceptance or acquiescence, is tolerably 
straightforward. The exact distinction between the next two criteria, 
between preservation and fulfilment of purposes is less than lucid. As Mill 
expresses it, it appears to be that between 'nominal existence' 5 and a full 
flourishing, between a mere institutional form and an animating ethic or 
spirit. 
Thus a people may prefer a free government, but if, from 
indolence, or carelessness, or cowardice, or want of public 
spirit, they are, unequal to the exertions necessary for 
preserving it; they will not fight for it when it is 
attacked; if they can be deluded by the artifices used to 
cheat them out of it; if by momentary discouragement, or 
temporary panic, or a fit of enthusiasm for an individual, 
they can be induced to lay their liberties at the feet even 
of a great man, or trust him with powers which enable him 
to subvert the purposes of their institutions; in all these 
cases they are more or less unfit for liberty: and though it 
may be for their good to have had it even for a short time, 
they are unlikely long to enjoy it.Eo 
The notion of fighting or not fighting for one's country (or for one's 
government?) clearly falls under the preservation criterion. The others are 
perhaps not quite so clear. The fulfilment criterion seems best expressed 
by Mill in this passage: 
[RJepresentative institutions are of little value, and may be 
a mere instrument of tyranny or intrigue, when the 
generality of electors are not sufficiently interested in 
their own government to give their vote, or, if they vote at 
all, do not bestow their suffrages on public grounds, but 
sell them for money, or vote at the beck of some one who 
has control over them, or whom for private reasons they 
desire to propitiate. Popular election thus practised, 
instead of a security against misgovernment, is but an 
additional wheel in its machinery.7 
It is not just, say, the mere following of the law or the perfunctory act of 
voting that counts but being prepared to uphold the law by testifying 
against one's friends or going beyond one's narrow concerns in deciding how 
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to cast one's vote; not the outward form (the 'nominal existence') but the 
adherence to the institutional requirements; not merely the letter but the 
spirit. Whereas the emphasis of the first criterion is on restraint rather 
than committed action, and of the second is on doing the minimum necessary 
for the continued existence of the form of government, the emphasis of the 
third criterion is very much on the need for a positive commitment. 
The purpose of government, we saw above, is progress; ie. advancing the 
condition or the qualities <intellectual, active and moral, as Mill puts it) 
of the members of society. To a certain extent, this can pe done by the 
civilising influence of government, but ultimately it is a matter for 
personal endeavour - as Mill's own life bore witness. Whilst he vaguely 
hints that some condition of socialism may be the ultimate state ('For my 
own part, not believing in universal selfishness, I have no difficulty in 
admitting that Communism would even now be practicable among the elite of 
mankind, and may become so among the rest'S) it is in a democracy that the 
emphasis on encouraging and facilitating self-development as the purpose of 
government reaches its height. It is here that we see the individual as a 
political agent - as a citizen. Self-development and participation, for Mill, 
march hand in hand. The stress, then, is on the duties of participation. One 
must participate, fully and properly, if the goal of self-development is to 
be fulfilled. Participate, that is, not solely when it further's one's 
immediate interests, but when the system requires it. Participation is a 
duty. 
One may doubt whether the degree of participation which Mill outlines 
is sufficient to generate and sustain the level of self-development which is 
the goal; indeed, whether any system of representative government can 
provide such levels of participation. This is a matter I shall return to. 
Mill doesn't provide us with a comprehensive and exhaustive list of the 
citizen's duties, but we may glean the main activities. Apart from voting 
and standing as candidates at local and general elections, the good citizen 
should be prepared to hold non-elective local offices and serve on juries. 
This doesn't sound very much to us. Of course, the crucial feature is the 
suffrage - and not just in terms of its extension to encompass women. Vie 
know that Mill advocated qualifications to be satisfied in order to gain 
the vote. Elementary literacy and numeracy was to be a minimum condition; 
there should be a poll tax ('representation should be co-extensive with 
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taxation l9 )j and that those in receipt of parish relief, undischarged 
bankrupts and those witholding their taxes should be (temporarily) excluded 
from the franchise. These days we tend to look with scorn on any 
suggestion of limitation on the suffrage (with respect to the poll tax, Ryan 
comments that this lis not one of MillIs more attractive pieces of 
argument 1.10) I have already argued <in Chapter Five) that there is more 
substance to MillIs thought here than modern commentators realise. Mill 
regarded none of these exclusions as permanent obstacles to enfranchisement 
and possibly (if somewhat naIvely) saw them as a spur to self-improvement. 
There is little doubt that he saw them as placing additional value on 
obtaining the vote. 
The picture that Mill builds up and sustains throughout Considerations 
is not so much that of participation in any direct sense but of 
involvement. The citizen is he or she who is concerned about the business 
of government, knows about it, and will discourse freely on it. (And here 
the picture is sustained by Mill's On Liberty.) But thinking and discussion 
alone is insufficient to produce good citizens. At most they gain a 
'dilettante knowledge'. 1 1 IA person must have a very unusual taste for 
intellectual exercise in and for itself, who will put himself to the trouble 
of thought when it is to have no outward effect, or qualify himself for 
functions which he has no chance of being allowed to exercise fl 2 and the 
'test of real and vigorous thinking, the thinking which ascertains truths 
instead of dreaming dreams, is successful application to practice'.l:3 
Participation grounded upon and mutually supporting involvement is thus the 
stuff of citizenship. 
Yet the focus of participation remains the vote. The crucial point, as 
we saw in Chapter Five, is Mill's argument that voting is not a right but 
a duty. Mill, I think, should have forced a distinction here between the 
right to have one's 
political decision 
representation) and 
opinion heard and considered in the melting pot of 
making (and thus his emphasis on minority 
the formal exercise of political power, Voting, on his 
terms, ought not to be <merely) an expression of the voice of opinion and 
self-protection. Here he parts company from his father and Bentham, for 
both of whom voting was a defensive act. At heart, Mill is right in seeing 
the ballot as a matter of duty, but the distinction would rest more easily 
if there were other channels for the voicing of <protective) opinion. 
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Perhaps this is the function of discussion, of the press, and even of 
elected members. Nonetheless, the position remains hazy; and perhaps the 
best we can say is that the vote carries both rights and duties (or duties 
constrained by the right of self-protection). Thus the voter can be called 
upon to explain and justify his or her vote. Mill thought that in part this 
would be an answer to corruption (the buying of votes); but it needs no 
great effort of imagination to picture the potential horrors of the 
situation. 
Mill aqcepted that expediency might dictate the overriding of this 
stipulation; but what interests me is the principle and the picture of 
society in which such commitment to duty might be possible. One in which 
considerable (though, in Mill's picture, not harmful) pressure might be put 
on errant voters. Moreover, this is not a society exerting the pressure of 
tradition, as we can see from On Liberty, but one in which freedom of 
thought and political belief is tolerated. The rest of society, Mill seems to 
be saying, are concerned only to satisfy themselves that there were good 
grounds for this particular vote, albeit misguided; and not to mete out any 
corrective punishment. 
Let us grant his optimistic confidence. The courage and determination 
required on the part of the individual to openly vote 'according to his best 
and most conscientious opinion', where his opinion differs from the 
consensus, is of awesome proportions. And this is why I refer to Mill's 
theory as a 'rich' conception of citizenship. It places great stress on 
discussion and knowledge, on participation, on the obligations of political 
agency, and on the lengths to which duty must be taken. No distinction is 
allowed between the public and the private dimensions of political 
involvement: citizenship is a seamless web. This is a rather different 
matter from a 'thin' conception of citizenship which might hold that we are 
all political equals with a right to self-protection through the ballot 
<should we choose to use it.) 
ttl 
Before discussing the relationship, if any, between this rich conception of 
citizenship and pleasure I must first make some extensive but incomplete 
observations on Mill's supposed hedonism. 
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First let me suggest a move which Mill could make, though it is a weak 
move and would serve as something of a last resort to be called upon if all 
else fails. It could be that, having become Millean citizens, though there be 
little if any pleasure in it, to give up that role or to fail to perform it 
conscientiously would be a pain to us. This, he argues, is the case with 
virtue: 
Those who desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either 
because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because 
the consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for both 
reasons united.' 4. 
Doubtless this is very true of many of our life-styles, customs and habitsj 
but it provides no argument for becoming a citizen (or a person of virtue, 
or a miser, etc.) in the first place. Nonetheless, we should keep in mind 
this negative argument (the minimisation of pain) as well as the positive 
one (the -maximisation of pleasure) in what follows. 
Mill claims to adopt the postulate of psychological hedonsim, that we 
each desire above all else our own happiness (whether or not we desire the 
happiness of others is a moot point)j but he advances this claim with such 
qualifications as to make us doubt the consistency of his account. There 
are many issues here, and I cannot touch upon them allj and can only 
scratch the surface of those germane to my enquiry. Mill, in his 'proof' of 
utility, attempts to demonstrate that: 'happiness is desirable, and the only 
thing desirable, as an endj all other things being only desirable as means 
to that end' and 'not only that people desire happiness, but that they never 
desire anything else'.'5 Since happiness is defined as the balance of 
pleasure over pain, he proceeds in good Benthamite fashion to equate the 
desire for happiness with the desire for pleasure and the aversion to pain. 
But his developed account is not so straightforward. Although, ultimately, 
we all desire happiness, it is not something which we can make the object 
of our desires. This was the great revelation which came to him during the 
period of his 'mental crisis' j and it is worth quoting his response to 
Carlyle's 'anti-self-consciousness' theory: 
I now thought that [happiness] was only to be attained by 
not making it the direct end. Those only are happy ... who 
have their minds fixed on some object other than their own 
happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement 
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of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a 
means, but as an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, 
they find happiness by the way. The enjoyments of life ... 
are sufficient to make ita pleasant thing, when they are 
taken en passant, without being made a principle object. 
Once make them so, and they are immediately felt to be 
insufficient. They will not bear a scrutinizing examination. 
Ask yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to be so. 
The only chance is to treat, not happiness, but some end 
external to it, as the purpose of life. Let your self-
consciousness, your scrutiny, your self-interrogation, 
exhaust themselves on that; and if otherwise fortunately 
circumstanced you will inhale happiness with the air- you 
breathe ... 16 
This, along with his new-found devotion to the cultivation of the 'passive 
susceptibilities', and the need to maintain 'a due balance among the 
facul ties 11 7, formed the heart of. his modified hedonism. Happiness is still 
seen as the balance of pleasure over pain, but is not to be achieved by the 
mere aggregation of pleasures, as if adding pebbles to a pile, the mere 
collecting of pleasant experiences; for then each experience would need to 
be justifiable in terms of itself as a unique item of experience - in which 
case it would be 'immediately felt to be insufficient'. Happiness is to be 
found in the pursuit of, the devotion to, 'ideal ends'. A balance of pleasure 
over pain is a necessary, but no longer a sufficient, condition of 
happiness. 
For further illumination of this, we can turn to the well-known 
apparent paradox which Mill offers us in his Utilitarianism: that it is 
'better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied'.' 8 In his 
disbelieving reaction to the Delphic pronouncement that there was no-one 
wiser than he, Socrates embarked upon 'a sort of pilgrimage undertaken to 
establish the truth of the oracle'. His 'Herculean labours I took the form of 
examining all those who might make some claim <whether or not explicit) to 
wisdom, in order that he might disprove the 'divine authority'. The result, 
of course, was that he could find none who could substantiate their claims 
to be wise. 'That is why I still go about seeking and searching in 
obedience to the divine command I.' '3 The imagery here is that of the quest: 
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the voyage of self-discovery, encountering numerous perils and temptations 
yet overcoming all and refusing to be swayed from one's chosen goal. The 
pleasure is in the striving: identifying one's goal and then showing the 
resolution to do all that may be necessary to achieve it. The goals may 
vary, as may their intrinsic pleasure content; but not the structure of the 
overall pleasure. 
The romanticism of this emphasis on the heroic struggle, the refusal to 
be satisfied with oneself and one's world, is only partially tempered by 
Mill's stoicism and the stress on 'nobleness of character':2o 
For nothing except that [conscious ability to do without 
happiness] can raise a person above the chances of life, by 
making him feel that, let fate and fortune do their worst, 
they have not the power to subdue him: which, once felt, 
frees him from excess of anxiety concerning the evils of 
life, and enables him, like many a Stoic in the worst times 
of the Roman Empire, to cultivate in tranquility the sources 
of satisfaction accessible to him, without concerning 
himself about the uncertainty of their duration, any more 
than about their inevitable end.21 
The intrinsic pleasures of agency, the stri ving to realise one's goals, 
tempered by a stoic fortitude: this is the picture Mill gives us of the 
'permanent and steady flame' of happiness. It is not to be found in 'a life 
of rapture; but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and 
transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance 
of the active over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, 
not to expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing' .22 This 
emphasis on the need for a predominance of active over passive pleasures, 
for a life of resolution and agency, as essential ingredients of happiness, 
provides a clear insight into his qualitative distinction between higher and 
lower pleasures. 
However, I am not here going to pursue the problem of the exact nature 
of Mill's distinction, but focus on the characterisation of those pleasures 
which we might value more highly simply as pleasures. Already, we have 
sketched a broad outline of those characteristics; but before providing more 
detail, we should note this point. I shall argue that most experiences can 
come to be regarded as the source of pleasure. There is, however, a crucial 
Page 125 
Chapter 6 
difference between those experiences sought solely for their intrinsic 
pleasure content <and which would thus prove counter-producti ve in terms 
of happiness) and both those which are intrinsically pleasurable but are 
sought for further purposes and those which have no intrinsic pleasure 
content but which, as it were, bring pleasure in their wake. I shall argue 
not that citizenship is to be sought for any intrinsic pleasure but that to 
be a citizen might indeed bring pleasure in its wake. 
By 'pleasure' I mean the composite experience which includes both the 
source and the subjective moment which is the awareness of pleasure. Thus 
pleasure, according to my usage, may have a public dimension. "We can carry 
out some preliminary sorting amongst these composite experiences. I shall 
group them as isolated moments, personal traditions, and institutions; all 
of which inter-penetrate the others. By 'isolated moments' I mean those 
which are non-repeatable, be they a first visit to Paris, winning a race of 
particular importance, a favourite view seen under a special light, that 
moment of 'love at first sight', and so on. It is not these that I shall be 
discussing here. However, such moments may become incorporated into 
personal traditions: a particular race always gives special pleasure, win or 
lose, a particular person always sets our hearts aflame, Paris is the city 
loved more than all others. The point about such traditions is that at any 
given moment they can fail us in terms of immediate pleasure (it didn't 
stop raining the last time I was in Paris) but the pleasure dimension 
remains in tact. It is no longer particular moments regarded in isolation 
but their place in the general history, the tradition, of pleasure which 
such experiences afford and which we value. Repeated failure in terms of 
pleasure may eventually lead us to abandon it, or to continue out of habit 
or because of the associations (the memories) it holds. "Whilst such 
personal traditions of pleasure are of some relevance here, it is the 
institutional pleasures which will form the focus of my discussion. For it 
is only with these latter that we can be tolerably certain of escaping 
personal preferences and can grasp an 'objective' dimension as to what 
counts as a pleasure. For instance, I'm unsure as to how we would 
characterise the difference between the very great pleasure I get from 
being in Paris from the very moderate pleasure it gives you. One move we 
might make is to look at the sorts of things that 'being in Paris' involves: 
the typical activities, the range of experiences available, and so on, and 
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try to build a complex picture which transcends the personal experience. I 
am not suggesting that all personal traditions of pleasure are amenable to 
this treatment; though I think that a great many are. The model for these 
'insti tutional complexes', incorporating personal tradi tions, is to be found 
in games. 
I shall discuss shortly the dimensions along which pleasure is 
available to us from games. First I want to show how it is that the games 
model extends to those experiences we would not normally think of as games. 
The principle point is that a game is essentially a public property. <I 
shall ignore the possibility of personal and private games.) There are rules 
to be learned, various skills to be developed, strategies to be adopted, 
codes of conduct to be observed, conventions to be followed, roles to be 
played, and so on. Understanding these varying facets of a game, and 
familiarity with the players and their histories, is central to the full 
development of the pleasures of spectating. And spectating may have its own 
conventions: one does not applaud each movement of a symphony, though one 
may applaud an operatic aria; football supporters wear the colours of their 
team; the Dax bands are the hallmark of support for the French national 
Rugby Union side. Games, then, have their own (public) traditions, 
exemplars, criteria of success and excellence, etc .. That is, games provide 
channelled routes to pleasure: we know what to look for I what counts as 
relevant, as a pleasure within a game. We know the sorts of pleasures any 
given game affords (though the capacity for surprise remains). In so far as 
this is the case then we have the basis for transcending the limitations of 
personal experience. Of course this is not a perfect basis. The judgment of 
any given individual may be influenced by elements from their personal 
history, or simply by a marked preference for some particular aspect of any 
given game. But we are in the position to make some general comments about 
(the composite experience of) such pleasures. 
Elements such as the development of skills, knowledge of rules and 
traditions, codes of conduct etc. apply to life-areas ot~~r than games. 
Indeed, the game might well be seen as a general metaphor for life. Most 
obviously, perhaps, there is one's work (even being a student involves 
successfully playing the 'academic game') j and also the arts, a whole range 
of hobbies (from train-spotting, to stamp-collecting) and, though more 
loosely I such life-roles as being a parent or a spouse, a neighbour, a 
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friend, and so on. Generally, we have to learn what such relations and 
activities involve, what counts as acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, 
what roles we can adopt, and so on. I shall argue towards the end of this 
paper that 'being-a-ci tizen', in Mill's sense, also takes this form. 
Whatever the similarities between games and other activities, they 
differ in two crucial respects. The point about games as institutional 
complexes of pleasure is that, in the first place, they are intrinsically 
pleasurable; and secondly, we take part on a voluntary basis. The account I 
shall give suggests that, under appropriate circumstances, any experience 
may come to be regarded as a pleasure. The term 'pleasure' as used to 
discriminate between experiences is in danger of becoming empty of content. 
Some non-games <in the strict sense) may be intrinsically pleasurable, 
whether the pleasure is brute (being a parent, having sex) or acquired (the 
taste for malt whisky) i though we can only advance this claim in general 
terms. Many, alas, find no pleasure at all in either parenthood or sexual 
encounters. What we can say is that where such pleasure is found, it is 
intrinsic to the experience (and not due to reference to ends, etc.). Yet 
identifying experiences where there is no possibility of intrinsic pleasure 
is far from easy. There are those involving pain (having one's teeth 
drilled, for example). But apart from such cases, the best we can say is 
that some institutional complexes provide more possibilities for intrinsic 
pleasure than others. For instance, I take it that some coal miners enjoy 
the claustrophobic conditions of their work; that mountain climbers enjoy 
not only the challenge (the call upon their powers of agency) but also the 
sheer experience - the isolation, the height, the 'elements'. Even the most 
humdrum factory production line work may prove intrinsically pleasurable if 
one simply enjoys the rhythmic throb of machinery. But these make appeal to 
a narrow set of predilections, such that the context will prove pleasurable 
to some people and not to others. Such contexts are limited in their 
pleasure span. Thus, what we normally refer to as 'pleasures I are those 
which we would expect to appeal to most people, either because the 
composite experience is somehow general to us (feeling 'tipsy' after a few 
glasses of wine) or because it offers a variety of 'pleasure options I: eg. 
one's pleasure in opera might be the lavishness of the productions, or the 
interplay of singer and orchestra, or the dramatic potential for song that 
opera provides. 
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Thus, our common usage of 'pleasure' is normative: we expect people to find 
intrinsic pleasure in the experience and to value it as a pleasure. It would 
be distinctly odd for someone to describe production line work of the most 
mundane sort as a pleasure, even accepting that they might find pleasure in 
it. Similarly, we would be extremely reluctant to accept the claim that a 
slave's life is one of intrinsic pleasure, even if it were the case that all 
slaves were well treated. And this is precisely because what counts, 
normatively, as a pleasure is that the experience be an expression of our 
autonomous agency. Even in coerci ve situations we can choose to find 
pleasure in the mere fact of our agency: acting for no other reason than to 
prove to ourselves our powers of agency. But this is an unstable and short-
term condition. A life of devotion, on the other hand, whether to a person 
or to a cause, is one of continued re-affirmation of a choice: the refusal 
of other options is the continued expression of autonomous agency. The life 
of the slave, or of the factory worker where effectively there are no other 
options, lack this dimension. 'When, as adults having left the coercive 
environment of school, we play games or take up hobbies we do so 
voluntarily. Often, in areas other than games, we are not in position to 
make express choices. One mayor may not have chosen to be a parenti 
nonetheless, one is able to choose from a variety of roles (being stern and 
a disciplinarian, or tolerant, taking a stand on violent films, and so on); 
not arbitrarily, but as an expression of our values. The parent game with 
its general aim of the present and future well-being of one's offspring is 
open to a range of personal interpretations, styles, emphases and specific 
goals. 
... ........ 
For the following part of my discussion, I shall take it that a rich 
conception of citizenship exhibits the features of institutions as I have 
described them; that is, as requir:ng an3.ppreciation of code~, of conduct, 
learning and development of skills and the setting of specific goals within 
the context of a general aim. I shall conclude with a final comment as to 
whether, specifically, Mill's conception can be so construed. First, I must 
consider the question of whether or not citizenship gives rise to 
institutional pleasures. 
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I suggested above that, typically in games but in other life-areas as well, 
we find channelled routes to pleasure. I want now to say a little more on 
this i and to suggest an elementary but serviceable way of distinguishing 
between these channels, and to do so in the context of citizenship. To begin 
with, we can identify certain sorts of experiences as being intrinsically 
pleasurable; other experiences are pleasurable only in relation to their 
ends; others are so by virtue of associated ideas; for other experiences, 
the pleasure is solely in our agency; and· finally there are the affective 
pleasures of love, friendship and sociability. This list may not be 
exhaustive, but I think it covers most caseSj and frequently one or more of 
these facets are interwoven. 
That citizenship is intrinsically pleasurable seems to be counter-
intuitive. Citizenship does not seem to be a brute pleasure, one which does 
not depend on institutional contexts for our understanding of it. It 
requires no explanation <though we can provide one) for us to understand 
that coming into the warm from a cold and wet night is a pleasure. However, 
to understand that, say, playing chess is a pleasure we need not only to 
learn the rules of the game, but to come to appreciate the strategies 
involved, the cut and thrust; and to appreciate them in this context rather 
than, say, in the context of fencing. It is not, then, a straightforward 
matter to judge of the intrinsic pleasurability of institutional contexts. 
We might want to say that they should, nonetheless, exhibit some immediate 
appeal or charm. I shall return to this. 
It seems more likely that the pleasures, if any, of citizenship are to 
be found in relation to their ends. Spelling out the precise ends of 
citizenship as desired by each and every citizen is a far from easy task: 
citizenship constitutes a core of common actions which admits of several 
distinct though related ends: for instance, not being ruled over by others; 
being free in the sense of living under laws one has given to oneself; 
working towards or maintaining political equalitYi feeling oneself to be a 
valuable member of the communitYi or simply the desire to do one's duty 
<and accept restraints on permissible conduct). Moreover, it is likely that 
the possible ends of citizenship, theoretically distinguishable, might in 
practice be seen as some loose amalgam by the individual citizen: one may 
simply see citizenship as a means to some general good. The role of citizen, 
then, involves a core of common actions directed towards a cluster of 
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related goals. In the majority of cases, the actions required will coincide 
independently of the precise ends; conflicts over the specific content of 
duty in any given case being possible. However, these ends are not given to 
us in advance; that is, it will be a matter of empirical enquiry as to 
whether these ends (and which ones precisely) are in fact desired by the 
generality of a community, and also the extent to which they are desired. 
They may form marginal desires acceptable if the costs of achievement are 
low, but not otherwise. 
Mill, of course, can accept this. The point of insisting that the form 
of government must be appropriate to the condition of the populus, judged 
against his three criteria, is that where such desires are absent or only 
marginal then a poli ty predicated on the role of the citizen would be 
inappropriate. If the desire for the ends of citizenship is absent then it 
is not to be artificially stimulated. My worry is that I'm not sure that the 
'ends of citizenship' can function as a specific object of desire. We saw 
above that Mill dilutes the specific content of his concept of happiness so 
that, properly understood, it cannot serve as one of our goals. To pursue it 
is to lose it. The best we can do is to pursue ends we desire for 
themsel ves. Yet such ends as those of virtue or 'a community of citizens', 
presented in the abstract, are in one sense, analagous to that of happiness: 
they are too indefinite to serve as the specific object of desire. 
Where the ends of virtue and of citizenship differ from the end of 
happiness is that we can desire to be virtuous or to be a citizen: and to 
play the appropriate role is, given that general desire, to be successful in 
being virtuous or being a citizen. But to want to be happy and to play the 
part of being happy is not the same as being happy. To value the end for 
itself, where that end depends on our actions, is to value playing the part 
for its own sake'; with only a distant and corrective desire for the more 
general end. That is, the end is not external to the individual but is 
internal: it is not some future state of affairs to be created, but is a 
disposition to act in a certain way; and to act in that way is precisely to 
begin, to maintain or to reinforce that disposition. The end is immediate. 
However, this succeeds only in pushing the problem one stage further 
back. Given that we can adequately define the role of the citizen, then why 
should we wish to adopt it, to develop the appropriate dispositions? Is it 
a pleasurable thing to do? 
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Might it be the case that the pleasures are those derived from the 
association of ideas? Doubtless much can be done within a culture to 
reinforce other aspects of pleasure <such as the desirability of performing 
one's duties) j and clearly Mill has an implicit argument to the effect that 
cultivation of the higher pleasures (bringing with it that nobleness of 
character) encourages the develpoment of the appropriate dispositions for 
citizenship. But there is a difference between cultural reinforcement of 
desires and dispositions and 'conditioning'; and if we are to fall back on 
this and this alone to overcome the 'costs' of citizenship then the degree 
of social conditioning involved is Orwellian in its nightmarish 
implications and rests uneasily with Mill's emphasis on personal liberty 
and the stress on the pleasures of autonomous agency. That ci tizenshi p 
might be desired because of its status associations is a different matter. 
However, this assumes the privation of a status which others enjoy, ie. that 
citizenship, in the sense which interests us bere, already exists; whereas 
our present concern is the search for a persuasive argument for launching 
that institution of citizenship. 
Political participation in general certainly has the capacity to elicit 
affective pleasures perhaps too much so. The dangers of populist 
participation are in no small measure due to the pleasures of intense 
identification with and loyalty to a particular political unit be it leader, 
class, party, faction or nation. Although there is a range of problems here, 
I shall briefly comment on just one: the level of individual power and 
responsibility. The pleasures of populist participation depend on the 
collective power of an identifiable group, devolving little or no individual 
responsibility for matters outwith that group. The need, as I see it, for a 
rich conception of citizenship is for a degree of abstraction from specific 
loyal ties in the power accorded to the individual citizen jointly with 
explicit responsibility for the exercise of that power. It is no accident 
that the ritual and actual separation of the citizen from his community of 
interest has proved reasonably successful in jury service. This is not to 
pretend that such abstraction can ever be perfect, nor would we want it to 
be - only that some reflective distance from one's political and social 
context be achieved in the exercise of civic duties. 
The most likely source of pleasure within the institution of citizenship 
is to be found in the exercise of political power. The delights of agency 
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are manyfold. Sometimes these are confined to a sense of exhilaration in 
our (physical and intellectual) prowessj but more commonly they will 
include our pleasure in the fineness of our discrimination (in choosing 
between means, or between ends, or simply in matters of taste) and some 
consideration of elegance and style. If citizenship is to embrace any of 
these latter elements, then it will need to display that institutional 
complexity which characterises games: a differentiation of roles (each with 
its particular skills, traditions and exemplars) within a common structure. 
Failing this, the delight in the exercise, of power per se becomes dominant. 
The point is crucial. This differentiation of roles mediates and diverts 
the risk of excessi ve pleasure in the exercise of autonomous agency. And 
this is the crux of the matter. The key to this discussion on the possible 
pleasures of citizenship is the role of autonomous agency; whether in the 
context of achieving external or internal (dispositional) goals, or in the 
delight in the expression of agency. Citizenship seems to hold little or no 
intrinsic pleasure in the way that games do; but as an institution the 
background assumption has been that it does provide scope for the pleasures 
of autonomous agency. But does it? I have argued that Mill works with a 
rich conception of citizenship in that he collapses the distinction between 
taking an interest in political matters <learning, discussion), involvement 
(joining a political party, a pressure group) and formal participation 
(performing the duties of a citizen). However, I also suggested that his 
account might prove inadequate. Carole Pateman, in Participation and 
Democratic Theor~3 suggests a three-fold classification of levels of 
participation: pseudo, partial and full. Pseudo-participation is a mere 
shadow of the real thing, amounting to little more than advance notice of 
decisions, but with no effective scope for challenge on the part of the 
would-be participants. Partial-participation allows for a degree of 
influence in the decision-making process, but control remains restricted. 
Only full participation involves the exercise of power. Mill's account rests 
somewhere between partial and full participation. :t amounts to :30mething 
more than influence but does not amount to effective decision taking. But 
without such powers the pleasures of autonomous agency are witheld from 
the would-be citizens. They are not in the position to set (in liaison with 
others) goals to be met, nor do they have sufficient power for them to take 
delight in their own agency. 
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Mill's answer is to turn to local government to supplement the scope of 
participation, We can agree that it increases the opportunities for 
participation, but it does not extend the possibilities of decision-making, 
Indeed, as Mill makes clear, the function of citizen-involvement in local 
government is not directly the dissemination of power but 'the public 
education of the citizens',24 If anything, the power of citizens at local 
government level is less than that at the national level. 
The problem, as we have seen, is Mill's advocacy of representative 
government. It secures a level of interest and devolves nominal power ~o 
the citizenry; but this is insufficient to generate the good effects which 
form the basis of Mill's argument. Although Mill's argument centres on self-
cultivation I have chosen to discuss it in relation to his theory of 
pleasure, largely because it sharpens the discussion and because I do not 
think there is much that that escapes the pleasurability of political 
participation which discussion of self-cultivation captures. 
One last comment here: I suggested that being a citizen was not 
obviously a source of intrinsic pleasure. This, I suggest, is because we 
have at best Mill's diluted 'rich' <and at worst, the Bentham/Mill senior 
'thin ') conception of citizenship as part of our conceptual baggage. Whether 
or not a truly rich practice of citizenship would be pleasurable must 
ultimately (as Mill would insist) be a matter for experience. However, I 
hope I have said enough to indicate that there are grounds for thinking 
that it would be close to a Millean conception of a higher pleasure. Our 
initial scepticism was misplaced. The point about institutional pleasures is 
that, though we can analyse the various strands of pleasure (as I've 
attempted) in practice they form a complex and interwoven whole. To say 
that an institutional practice is a source of pleasure is, generally and 
normatively, to refuse to separate the strands and to regard it as 
intrinsically pleasurable. 
***** 
The rich conception of citizenship envisages a politically aware, active and 
concerned citizenry. The three facets of being interested by, becoming 
invol ved in, and exercising effective power wi thin the political domain 
become fused. At its most developed, this rich conception of citizenship 
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would function analogously to an institution of pleasure, providing a series 
of roles each involving an appreciation of codes of conduct, learning and 
development of skills, and the setting of specific goals within the context 
of a general aim. 
If this approach, centring on a rich conception of citizenship, is 
correct it may provide us with a basis to to tackle some outstanding 
problems. However, it needs to be stressed again that this approach differs 
fundamentally from (though it is not utlimately incompatible with the 
metaphysical premises of) the idealist tradition of citizenship. That 
tradition emphasises 'the moral vocation of citizenship'. Thus, Vincent and 
Plant comment that 'Any conception of citizenship is going to be developed 
against a background of other notions such as community, common good, 
common interest, and welfare' .25 Citizenship thus conceived is an avenue for 
the development of an al truistic virtue through the practice of 
'disinterested social service' .2E. The focus is one of aid and concern for 
fellow-citizens rather than one of the explicit exercise of political power. 
As such, it is not (or, at best is only marginally) a politica.l conception 
of citizenship. To adopt Pateman's analysis27 it is located within the 
sphere of the horizontal relations of the state (citizen-to-citizen) and 
leaves <largely) untouched the vertical relation of citizen-state-citizen. 
(Though this is not to under-value its role in preparing the way for state 
welfarism. ) 
Against this, the approach argued for here has been expressly political: 
ignoring the question of mutual aid within the political community and in 
the context of a vertical power relation with a (relatively) autonomous 
state mechanism, but seeking to dissolve that vertical power structure by 
embedding the power relations wi thin a horizontal context of citizenship 
conceived as the mutual <though not simultaneous) exercise of effective 
poli tical power. This ci tizen-based conception of democracy thus eschews 
the moralisation in favour of the poli ticisation of the citizen. It is not 
the moral status of the citizen (with its concern for equal rights and the 
corresponding duties of protecting and reinforcing those rights) which has 
been the subject of my argument, but the citizen's political status with its 
concern for the exercise of effective political power and the attendant duty 
to exercise that power responsibly under conditions of therapeutic trust. 
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The latter neither negates nor displaces the former but complements and 
develops the moral conception. 
Yet, this rich <and politicised) conception of citizenship must overcome 
two outstanding problems if it is to succeed. The reflective model focused 
on a single and occasional act: that of serving on a legislative jury. As 
such this would be insufficient to ground a rich practice of citizenship. It 
would not provide that variety of roles within a coherent tradition with 
its own exemplars and open to a range of personal interpretations, styles 
and emphasesj and involving, an appreciation of codes of conduct, learning 
and development of skills and the setting of specific goals within the 
context of a general aim. The legislative jury, in terms of citizenship, 
assumes a wider context of political participation. Part of this would be 
given by the increased levels of interest and discussion - important 
elements, to be sure, but still insufficient to ground the rich practice. 
This rich practice, then, assumes a maximal democracy as characterised in 
Chapter Three: one in which the people not only give their assent to 
legislative proposals but generate, debate and revise those proposals 
themselves. It further assumes the exercise of effective political power by 
the citizenry in a range of other 'political' areas, though I shall not here 
pursue this but rather maintain the focus on the process of legislation. 
We saw that part of the source of value of an institutional complex of 
pleasure is precisely that it enables different individuals to locate 
themselves within a common structure by pursuing, expressing and developing 
their own particular range of skills and pleasures in concert with others. 
We might, then, have grounds for thinking that such a multi-faceted 
practice of effective citizenship in a maximal democracy would solve the 
problem of the tension between the demands of democratic equality and 
democratic utility. Given a broad range of roles to be fulfilled, citizens 
would be enlisted to do that for which they were suitably qu.alified 
(according to whatever criteria would be appropriate) and for which they 
had volunteered. This would no longer imply a clear ranking of roles such 
as to develop into a two- or multi-tier structure of citizenship. Different 
roles would undoubtedly carry different weights of responsibility, but the 
rich conception of citizenship envisages the individual undertaking a 
plurality of roles none of which would be definitive, singly or in 
conjunction, of a particular status. Given this, would it matter, to return 
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to the reflective model, that some might be excluded from serving on the 
legislative juries? 
Random sub-set voting as employed in the model of legislative juries 
embodies the principle that equal power does not demand the simultaneous 
exercise of that power by all who hold it, but rather the equal chance of 
each (at least, the equal chance of all those appropriately qualified) to be 
asked to exercise that power on behalf of all. It might be thought that the 
plurality of offices in a maximal democracy would embody the same 
principle, given a range of offices such that all would be able to hold 
some, but perhaps not all, of those offices. Thus, democratic equality would 
be maintained by ensuring that citizens are given the opportunity to 
perform a number of tasks, each of which would be seen to carry effective 
political power; and democratic utility would be maintained by ensuring that 
the range of tasks any given citizen carries out is that fitted to her 
particular abilities. 
There is, I think, no difficulty in accepting that certain tasks require 
expertise and background skills; and that such offices should thus be 
subject to appointment or election amongst those satisfying set qualifying 
criteria. It may be the case that the framing and revising of legislation is 
such a specialist task; but whether the generation and discussion of 
legislative proposals and the confering or witholding of popular assent are 
specialist tasks is more debatable. We can represent legislative action in 
more general terms and then ask which if any of those stages requires 
expertise: (a) the identification of ends to be realised; (b) the choice of 
appropriate means, compatible with the chosen ends; (c) the formulation of 
detailed proposals for action; (d) the culminatory decision to put the 
proposals into effect. In our personal and everyday experience these stages 
will only rarely present themselves to us as separate and identifiable 
elements. Within institutional contexts (a) may frequently be assumed 
without debate, or only implicitly revealed through the choices made under 
<b) and (c). My argument is that only stages (b) and c:), the choice of 
appropriate -means and the formulation of detailed proposals, require 
developed levels of expertise (and the latter more so than the former); and 
that whilst (a) and (d) do not require expertise as such, there persists a 
crucial difference between them. 
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We might attempt to characterise this difference as that between on the one 
hand, deliberation on the competing ends and strategies available, and the 
culminatory decision to act upon a particular choice; and, on the other 
hand, judgment upon the resultant action and upon the adequacy and accuracy 
of the preceding decision-111aking process. The first pair are essentially 
prospective, the second pair retrospective. The distinction quickly blurs, 
however. Action, deliberative and culminatory, takes place in the context 
of judgment upon previous actions and thus contains a retrospective 
element. Retrospective judgment also implies the possibility of (corrective) 
action in the case of that judgment proving condemnatory and thus contains 
a prospective element. 
Despite this blurring, the distinction is useful. It points us to 
Aristotle's tripartite division between political, forensic and ceremonial 
rhetoric.::;;:'''' The first is directed towards the future, the second to the past 
and the third is concerned with the present. The latter is not here a 
matter of concern for us; though we may note that in so far as there is no 
debate as to ends and only a statement of existing values is required then 
ceremonial rhetoric would be the appropriate form. 
The model for forensic rhetoric is legal judgment. There are thus four 
central features of forensic rhetoric which we should note. First, it is 
concerned with providing both a factual narrative and a causal and/or 
psychological explanation of the events under consideration. Secondly, it 
deals with the particulars of specific events and not directly with 
generalities and values. Thirdly, those asked to form a judgment on the 
matter are (typically) disinterested and are thus in the position of 
spectators rather than participants. And finally, the form of the judgEent 
is limited to assent to or dissent from the proposed judgment, with the 
options of being undecided and <possibly) of refusing to form a judgment. 
<In legal cases, the question of punishment is prospective and thus not 
properly forensic; though as I have suggested above, this distinction is 
somewhat artificial, the one implying the corrective e:ement of the other.) 
By contrast, the model Aristotle adopts for political rhetoric is that 
of deliberation in the assembly. Given that the judgment to be formed 
concerns action to be taken it does not call for a factual narrative, other 
than to account <retrospectively) for the present situation; though there is 
a role for psychological and/or causal explanations in identifying possible 
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outcomes. Such judgments mediate between particulars <of the given 
situation) and generalities and values. Those concerned to reach a judgment 
<typically) have their own interests at stake and are thus participants 
rather than spectators. And to complete the contrast, the form of judgment 
is indeterminate: the broad strategy and subsequent detailed proposals 
decided upon are chosen from a nominally open field, constrained by the 
ends desired and, crucially, the dictates of practical wisdom. 
It is indeed the case that all have interests at stake in setting the 
desir~d ends of political action and that all have a pri11la facie claim to 
be participants, in Aristotle's sense. <Conventionally, exception is made for 
the young and the insane, though even this may be debatable.) Where the 
choice is principally one between competing values, or indeed, is a matter 
of the reaffirmation of values held, then no specific expertise can be 
required, though an ability for reflection and the sympathetic under-
standing of the position of others marks the mature participant. But where 
these values are not at issue, and given that the action to be taken is 
compatible with the value-set, then it is not clear that all need 
participate. For, in this context, the model of deliberation in the assembly 
is misleading. It fuses the analytically distinct phases of the legislative 
process. The participation of all is vital to establish the values or the 
broad goal of policy where these may not safely be assumed as given. But 
this is only the first phase in the process - and a redundant one if such 
assumptions can be made. <Though the ceremonial aspect of reaffirmation may 
serve the important yet distinct function of social integration.) 
It would seem, then, that in a customary society in which the value-set 
is given and largely constant there would normally be little or no need for 
full participation at the initial stage; whereas, in a pluralist society such 
participation would be vital. 
Clearly, the second and third stages of the legislative process (choice 
of strategy and drafting of detailed proposals) correspond most closely to 
the deliberative aspect of Aristotle's conception of political judgment; and 
I shall not attempt a fuller characterisation of it here. There is, I think, 
a clear need for a degree of expertise at this stage, given the central role 
of practical wisdom; whereas, it is not clear that all those potentially 
affected by the decision need be involved, given that the strategies adopted 
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and their corresponding detailed proposals are compatible with and serve to 
achieve the identified ends. 
This culminatory decision, the final approval of the detailed plans and 
the decision to put them into effect, strongly exhibits elements of all 
three forms of judgment. It requires an understanding of the aims and 
corresponding values to be realised; an appreciation of the strategic 
options available and assessment of the suitability of the one chosen in 
terms of its probability of success; and a judgment upon both the 
compati bili ty of the proposed strategy with the aims and values to be 
realised, and upon the adequacy of the deliberative process. Furthermore, 
the form of judgment is limited to that of assent and dissent (with the 
extended options of being undecided and a refused judgment). Those judging 
are in the position of both participants with interests at stake and 
spectators, passing judgment on the <deliberative) actions of others. 
I have argued that where the legislative process is not fused (as it 
was in the Athenian Ekklesia, ignoring for these purposes the role of the 
Boule) then sub-set voting for the culminatory decision is not only 
acceptable but preferable. I have also argued that the culminatory decision 
should be grounded on critical judgment if it is to express assent and thus 
constitute formal democratic practice; rather than be grounded on trust, 
thereby expressing acclaim and constituting informal democratic practice. I 
have further argued that this critical judgment is significantly different 
(with repsect to the legislative process) both from the identification of 
aims and values to be realised, and from the application of practical 
wisdom to choose from among the competing strategies available and to 
prepare detailed proposals for action. Where aims and values are in dispute 
and cannot be assumed, then all must participate to ensure that their 
interests are taken into account and, so far as is possible, protected. The 
application of practical wisdom requires some developed level of expertise; 
though the degree of exclusivity of this expertise is a matter I have 
chosen not to debate. The final question remains that of whether those 
empanelled on the legislative juries to express the critical judgment which 
constitutes the culminatory decision in the legislative process should be 
chosen (by sortition) from the citizenry without further qualification, or 
whether some degree of competence needs to be demonstrated. 
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I can offer no final conclusion to this debate. The argument drives me to 
accepting that some degree of competence needs to be demonstrated, 
sufficient that we can accept with quiet confidence that those empanelled 
are likely to be able to arrive at a critical judgment: 'likely', that is, 
since we can never guarantee this, nor can we guarantee that those chosen 
will exhibit concerned voting behaviour, and the principle of therapeutic 
trust underpins the decision to draw the net of those eligible broadly 
rather than narrowly. The argument pushes towards Mill's conclusions. The 
responsible exercise of effective political power requires that the citizen 
be in the position to exercise that power responsibly: that they can 
demonstrate a basic capacity to understand the issues involved; that they 
are not in a position of extreme need and dependency such that would 
vitiate all attempts to take on the role of spectator rather than 
participant, ie. such that would all but eliminate the possibility of 
achieving a reflective distance from the issues concerned. 
And yet, I am reluctant to accept this conclusion and to sacrifice the 
principle of democratic equality for that of democratic utility. Thus I 
remain uncommitted. And this is properly so. For in the last instance, this 
is not a decision for an individual to make. It is not a matter which 
admits of finality in argument or in practice. It is for a community to 
decide to which of these, and perhaps other, competing values it gives its 
assent and thus to define itself. What is important is that the issues 
should be explored and that the gains and losses implied by giving priority 
to one principle above the other should be made plain for all to see. This 
alone is the role of political philosophy. 
If the presentation of the reflective model of medial democracy, of 
democracy as popular assent, has aided the exploration and clarification of 
these isssues then, however imperfect this debate has been, it has served 
its purpose. 
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CHAPTER SEVEI 
UTOPIA 
I wish to argue that my work, particularly the reflective model of medial 
democracy and the attempt to sketch a rich conception of citizenship, has a 
utopian dimension to it; furthermore, that to claim this is not to invite a 
dismissive response. Rather, it is to begin an argument for the re-
integration of utopian thought into main-stream liberal political thought, 
as an internal source of criticism of the liberal democratic state. 
The argument for the re-integration of utopian thought has three 
strands to it. First, that the utopia emerges with the rise of the bourgeois 
world and functions as a critical mirror to it. That is, its concern is with 
the forms and possibilities of the nation state. Second, that the utopia 
shares most, though by no means all, of the central assumptions of liberal 
political thought <and shares the same intellectual ancestry); and thus 
represents an internal rather than external challenge to the latter. In 
particular, utopia accepts that the solution to socio-poli tical problems 
must be of a humanistic form; ie. within the domain of human agency with, 
at most, only a partial appeal to mysterious, magical and deus ex 111achina 
solutions. Third, that the focus of the utopia is simultaneously broader and 
narrower than that of liberal political thought. There is no paradox here. 
Its span is broader in that it refuses to restrict the 'political' to a 
separate and autonomous sphere of human existence; and narrower in that it 
takes as a particular focus the question of citizenship: of the rich 
possibilities and potentialities for the quality of life in the political 
community. This concern with the political, social and economic conditions 
for the Good Life has resulted in utopia occupying a position which is the 
polar opposite of contemporary liberalism; one in which it is not rights 
and liberties, but duty and virtue which is central. The argument as 
developed in this work can thus be seen to have a utopian dimension. 
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(D The Definitional Problem.; Utopia and Other Places 
Definitional questions concerning utopia too easily become obsessive and 
serve merely to distract from more central matters, producing increasingly 
marginal gains for the effort expended. Rather than review the entire field 
of definitional speculation, I shall initially restrict the discussion to two 
recent and particularly fruitful approaches: those of J C Davis and of the 
Professors Manuel. 
The publication of the Manuels' Utopian Thought in the Western World 
marks something of a watershed in utopian studies. Published in 1979 it is 
the summation of a life's work by the authors on the problem of utopia. It 
is remarkable not only for its encyclopaedic quality but in that it brings 
a final respectability to utopian studies, a movement, both political and 
academic, gathering momentum over the last twenty years. 
The Manuels eschew any formal definition of utopia. They assert, 
following Nietzsche, that 'only that which has no history can be defined 11 
and utopia certainly has a history. Their thesis is that both the form and 
content of utopia has changed over time. The location of the ideal has 
moved on from that of More's original neologism, u-topos and eu-topos, no-
place and good-place, to euchronia <good-time) and eupsychia <good-mind, or 
good mental state). Sir Philip Sydney's original characterisation of the 
utopia as a rhetorical device, a persuasive 'speaking picture with this end 
to teach and delight '2 becomes obsolescent as utopians drop the fictional 
conceits and become more directly discursive and argumentary. Similarly, 
from small enclosed societies the utopist's scope has broadened to 
encompass both poles: the universal society and the individual psychic 
world. And finally, from the portayal of the blessed, the ideal, utopia 
moved on to paint the horrors latent within human social development: the 
dystopia. 
Thus, utopia, they say, 'has been shrouded in am bigu i ty, and no latter-
day scholars should presume to dispel the fog, polluting utopia's natural 
environment with an excess of clarity and definition'.3 They operate with 
what they describe as a 'latitudinarian and ecumenical conception of 
utopia' .4 Nonetheless, utopia must be accorded some bounds if the concept is 
not to be so elastic as to become devoid of all meaning: utopias should 
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exhibit 'some measure of generality, if not universality' so as to exclude 
'the personal daydream with its idiosyncratiC fixations',s 
For their working definition, the envisaged change that utopia 
represents should be radical, should 'strike at the roots of existence'.6 
Mere futurology, a projection of present and discernible tendencies, is 
distinguished from 'the leap into a new state of being in which 
contemporary values in at least one area - the critical one for the utopian 
- are totally transformed or turned ups ide down'. 7 This, I think I is correct, 
Though I shall argue that the Manuels have failed to grasp the nature of 
that transformation of values; as in their interpretation of Kore's utopia 
as simply a response to corruption and greed, symbolised in his inversion 
of the value of gold <used for chamber pots), 
Eschewing defini tions and typologies, the Manuels have attempted to 
'identify historical constellations of utopias with well marked time-space 
perimeters and common elements that are striking enough to permit framing 
generalisations, while still respecting the concreteness of the individual 
experience',a There is a problem here. The Manuels insist on grounding 
utopia in personal psychology, This opens the way to twentieth century 
liberal critiques that to utopianise is to manifest a totalitarian mentality. 
Though the utopian be unaware of it, the creation of a utopia, so the 
critics argue, demonstrates a will to impose one's own perpsective, one's 
own values on the world. Undoubtedly, utopias, like all artefacts, reveal 
much about their creators; but in political theory our concern is primarily 
with the theory itself, not the psychology thereby revealed. In so far as 
utopias present us with arguments then it must be these that concern us. 
Nor, I suggest, should we wander off into the side-streams of such 
questions as whether or not utopias express a collective sub-conscious 
yearning in their employment of images and symbols, 
However, the Manuels suggest that there have been 'particularly rich 
utopian moments'9 associated with revolutions and the ensuing 
dictatorships. Thus, in their study of the history of utopias the Manuels 
adopt a 'constellar' approach, grouping utopian speculations according to 
their historical proximity, This particular point I shall return to when 
discussing Sir Thomas More; but I leave the question firmly planted as to 
whether some circumstances <political, social, economic, whatever) are both 
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more appropriate for the writing of utopias and also more conducive to 
their receiving an audience. 
In sum, the Manuels are concerned to avoid definition and 
categorisation. Form, content and meaning have developed, multiplied, 
reiterated; utopias diverge and reconverge. In capturing this immense 
richness of thought the Xanuels seek no more than to illustrate what they 
call, borrowing from James, a utopian propensity. 
* 
However, the definitional latidunarianism adopted by the Manuels, whilst 
conducive to a project designed to capture the rich variety of utopian 
thought, provides little analytical purchase since not all places and 
societies which can be seen to constitute some form of ideal can properly 
be described as utopias. By way of example, we can focus on a problem area 
in the definition of utopia and contrast the Manuels' approach with that 
provided byJ C Davis. 
The problem is presented by Rousseau's du Contrat SociaP 0 and whether 
or not it can properly be described as utopian. One of the perennial 
sources of fascination in Rousseau is the various images of the ideal which 
he portrays throughout his work. His depiction of the State of Nature in 
the Discours sur 1 'inegalite is a secular version of the earthly paradise. 
Each soli tary is an Adam or an Eve unto him/herself. Content with the 
immediacy of their own existence, uncorrupted by insatiate desires, at one 
with their own capabilities and their environment, not yet bound by the 
need to labour, and, crucially, unblemished by the social passions derived 
from amour-propre, the obsessive self-love: this surely is a high order of 
the paradisaical. In the Rousseauean history the fall from this state of 
grace does not lead directly to a condition of 'sin', but to another ideal: a 
veritable Golden Age. In this Arcadian existence the primitive social 
passions, developing from orgueil (a proper esteem of one's own capacities 
and achievements) foster familial ties, and we see a burgeoning of simple 
and harmonious agricul tural communi ties. The decline and fall of human 
civilisation commences with the emergence of amour-propre and the desire 
for status in the eyes of others. From here on in Rousseau's ideal states of 
existence , given his pessimistic history, can only be temporary disruptions 
Page 145 
Chapter 7 Utopia 
in or seclusions from the course of history. Thus we see his most 
persistent ideal, the rural idyll and pastoral, surfacing in much the same 
form at Clarens in la Nouvelle Heloise, in the tutoring of Emile and Emile 
and Sophie's early married life (Emile), in his opera and his ballet. The 
ultimate escape from actual into ideal existence which Rousseau presents us 
with is that of the reveriej experienced in a peculiarly heightened form 
during his period of exile at the Lac du Biennej though it is a familiar 
motif throughout his life, as evidenced by his Confessions. 
Two other ideals appear in Rousseau's oeuvres. His earlier fascination 
with the heroic ideal and military gloire finds expression in his Discours 
sur les Arts et Sciences and, though more subdued, in the Spartan tenor of 
the Discours sur 1 ':sconomie Politique. And finally, of course, there is his 
depiction of the ideal political state. 
Whilst I would argue that it is only here that the utopian dimension 
comes into question, the Manuel's 
utopian mode. Indeed, they view 
see all of this work as being in the 
the whole of what we may term the 
'Rousseau ian project' as being essentially utopian. Rousseau's secular Garden 
of Eden is referred to as 'Jean-Jacque's return-to-nature utopia'j'l the 
Golden Age, we are told, might be considered his 'preferred utopia' j 1 :2 
Clarens is yet another.':3 There is no question here of a detailed analysis 
of the structure and content of any of these 'utopias'. Instead, the Manuels 
present an over-arching argument for this approach; viz. that Rousseau was 
'the fabricator of a eupsychia, an optimum state of . consciousness'. 1 4 It is 
this desire of Rousseau to create, if only in his fantasy, a 'monde ideal' ,'5 
a state of harmony with oneself and others, characterised particularly by 
the absence of conflicts of will and desire, which, they argue, gives to all 
his work a utopian tone. They continue: 
To appreciate Rousseau's eupsychia the usual mechanics of 
utopias have to be filtered out. The institutional 
arrangements for achieving and perpetuating the eupsychia 
are subsidiary exercises that have bedevilled political 
scientists for two centuries. Those who dwell upon 
Rousseau's rationalist arguments can, by trimming a few 
rough edges, produce a reasonably consistent political 
philosophy, but only at the sacrifice of its essence. 16 
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Thus, his works are to be read as (and, for the Manuels, have their central 
value in) an attempt to elaborate this general, eupsychic theme in various 
situations and against the background of differing personal, social and 
political. problems. 
There can be little doubt that the Manuels here provide an illuminating 
insight to our study of Rousseau; but the strength and ultimate value of 
this all-embracing approach is questionable. Although the term serves its 
purpose in allowing them to trace out a development in what they see as 
utopian modes of thought from the Morean model of eutopia (good place), 
through eupsychia (good state of mind) to euchronia (good time), the 
concept of eupsychia as here employed collapses the distinction between the 
author's state of mind during the composition of the work and the state of 
mind to be enjoyed by those projected as living in the utopian creation. 
ff 
The specific for the Manuel's excessive catholicity in approach is to be 
found in the work of J C Davis. In his Utopia & The Ideal Society Davis 
notes the absence of a tradition of utopian writing as such. 'Its 
practitioners' he tells us, 'are not always aware of those utopian writers 
who have preceeded them. In fact such awareness is very rare indeed. Until 
very recently utopians have not seen themselves as transmitting, extending 
or transforming a tradition of thought'.17 Without such a tradition, he 
argues, a definition of utopianism becomes problematic. To be sure, one can 
select the most likely texts as candidates and search for common features; 
but as Davis recognises, this is to open the lock gates to the floods of 
prejudice in both the selection and the characterisation of the deemed 
commonality. To counter this, he adopts a quite different approach. 
Davis begins by posing two questions: What is it that particular 
authors are trying to do when they produce their particular visions of the 
ideal society? And how is it that, given there is no discernible and 
continuous tradition, we find 'certain consistencies of internal structure in 
the resultant blueprints?1l6 Davis adopts the premise that all ideal society 
literature is concerned with solving the 'collective problem' of the 
overcoming of deficiencies in the supply of particular satisfactions in a 
way which ensures that 'social cohesion and the common good are not 
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imperilled by individual appetite'.19 Each attempt to solve <imaginatively) 
this collective problem will need to make, he argues, certain assumptions 
about 'the nature of man, and of man in society, and of the relationship 
between men, the natural world and time'.20 It is the character of such 
background assumptions made by any given author, together with the 
particular supply-satisfaction problems they choose to address which 
determines the mode of social idealisation they adopt. Davis identifies five 
such modes: 
Cockaygnej 
Arcadiaj 
Perfect Moral Commonwealthj 
Millenniumj and 
Utopia. 
Each of these modes of the ideal encapsulate a different approach to the 
collecti ve problem of the harmonisation of needs and desires and their 
satisfaction. In Cockaygne even the most gross of desires find their 
satisfaction. In Arcadia nature is magnificently super-abundant whilst 
human desires are taken to be moderate. The Perfect Moral Commonwealth 
appeals to a moral reformation within the breast of each and alL The 
Millennium heralds the complete and apocalyptic transformation of human 
existence, thereby eliminating the problem of need/want satisfaction. Only 
in utopias do we find an expressly political solution. 
Davis (borrowing from Marcuse) sees a basic division in the scarcities 
which underlie the problem of the supply of satisfactions: material and 
sociological scarcity. Material scarcity may be found when there is 
insufficient land or food to meet demands, or in so far as there is just so 
many beautiful women in the world. In the first case we have a desire for 
morej that is, wants quantitatively outstrip the supply of satisfactions. In 
the second case, there is a qualitative deficiency: there is a desire for 
better or different. Sociological scarcity also takes two forms, though both 
are derived from dissatisfaction with the social arrangements for the 
distribution of goods. These goods may be either material or 'specific 
socially derived satisfactions (there are only so many places on the 
committee, only a limited number of holders of a certain title of honour) ,::;: 1 
We might usefully note here that the first two dimensions of scarcity 
(quantitative and qualitative) are brute: there is a perceived lack common 
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to alli whereas the second two dimensions of scarcity are contrastive: the 
problem is one of access to the existing supply of material and socially 
deri veq. goods and the degree of scarci ty is a factor of the holdings of 
others. Thus we shall not be surprised to find that it is the contrastive 
rather than the brute scarcities which require the expressly political 
solution of utopia. 
We are now able to examine more closely Davis' typology of modes of 
social idealisation.22 Cockaygne literature flourished in late medieval 
Europe. In the Land of Cockaygne we find the fullest possible satisfaction 
of gross sensual desires. Appetites are unlimited yet never unfulfilled. The 
roasted swan on the platter sings of its desire to· be eaten; the roasted 
lark flies, in full song, down open throats; sexuality is unconstrained. 
Given this spontaneous satisfaction of material needs, there is no work in 
Cockaygne. There is some social and political comment with the inversion of 
the prevailing hierarchy: entry is free for peasants, the nobility having to 
wade chin-deep through farmyard mire; the Lord of Mis-Rule may preside 
over the feast. 
In Arcadia, by contrast, man's desires are deemed to be simple and 
moderate. Man lives in harmony with a benign and super-abundant nature and 
with his fellow man. Work is light, mainly agricultural and wonderfully 
frui tful. With the resolution of problems of material scarcity, sociological 
scarcity and resultant conflict disappears. Arcadian literature is typically 
nostalgic, harking back to an original golden age; this was certainly the 
case in classical mythology and the Eden myth may be seen as a variant of 
Arcadia. However, the arcadian influence can also be traced in related modes 
of social idealisation such as the pastoral, and in the contemporary Green 
Movement. 
Both Cockaygne and Arcadia assume radical changes in the supply of 
satisfactions but differ markedly with respect to how these satisfactions 
are supplied. They differ further with respect to the structure of hUman 
desires. Whereas Cockaygne literature takes human desires as given (or at 
least, generalises from a recognisable set of desire characteristics) 
Arcadian modes of idealisation posit a transformation of the structure of 
desires. The extent of this transformation varies. In Hesiod, the man of the 
Golden Age is more divine than human; in the American transcendentalists 
such as Emerson and, in some moods, Thoreau man exists in a mystical and 
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harmonious relation with the natural world, he becomes embued with the 
spirit of peaceful nature. In the related modes of the pastoral and the 
rural idyll, this transformation of the structure of desires (the desire-
profile) is less radical. Harmony is the product of the release from anxiety 
and social neuroses: nature is the remedy for the ills of civilisation. Here 
there is a more intentional element: under the influence of nature, man has 
a desire to achieve peace and understanding with his fellow man, and is 
prepared to act according to that desire. The emphasis is on an intentional 
moderation of desires (made possible by the resolution of the problem of 
material scarcities) rather than on a spontaneous conversion of appetetive 
desires. 
The transformation of the desire profile is yet more radical in the 
next two modes of social idealisation identified by Davis: the Millennium 
and the Perfect Moral Commonwealth. The latter envisages no changes in the 
supply of material and sociological satisfactions, but rather a change in 
the moral character of each' and every individual: the structure of society 
remains in tact, it is man who changes himself (ie, the character of his 
desires) to suit his station in life and <typically) in accordance with 
Christian principles. As Davis points out, the Perfect Moral Commonwealth 
can be seen as a development from late medieval and renaissance works 
presenting guides for the perfect prince (the Mirror-of-Princes tradition). 
The solution of the collective problem is here seen to rely no longer on 
the virtue of a governor or governing class ('... for from the prince, as 
from a perpetual well-spring, cometh among the people the flood of all that 
is good and evil' as the fictional More puts it in Utopia2 3 ) but on the free 
choice by all of the virtuous life. 
The political thrust of the Perfect Moral Commonwealth is inherently 
conservative; that of the Millennium is revolutionary. Although the 
tradition is complex in its forms,24 central to the millennial vision is the 
total transformation of man and society resul ting from the final, 
apocalyptic battle in which the forces of evil on earth are vanquished for 
all time. With the Second Coming of Christ man returns to the pre-Iapsarian 
condition (though the demands of piety tended to inhibit millennarians from 
gi ving precise details of this blessed condition.) Crucially, this trans-
formation is brought about not by an act of will by each and all (as in the 
Perfect Moral Commonwealth) but by an external and transcendent agency, ie. 
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by divine intervention. The result is not so much a solution of the problem 
of the supply of satisfactions as a dissolution of those problems. Of the 
two main strands of millennarian thought, one, the pre-millennarians, accord 
some role to human agency in hastening the onset of the final battle; the 
other strand, the post-millennarians, is resigned to waiting for the moment 
of the Second Coming and only then would battle commence. For both, the 
outcome is the perfect state of human existence on earth, to be succeeded 
only by the final assumption into heaven. The resonance with Marxian 
eschatology will be pursued later. 
The utopia, in Davis' view, is fundamentally different from the previous 
four modes of social idealisation. There is no radical transformation of the 
desire profile, nor is there any super-natural answer to the problem of 
material scarcity: 'Utopia ... accepts recalcitrant nature and assumes sinful 
man'. Material and sociolgical scarci ty are problems to be tackled, though 
not necessarily solved, by human agency and ingenuity: 'The utopian's 
concern is rather to control the social problems that the collective 
problem can lead to crime, instability, poverty, rioting, war, 
exploitation, and vice'.2S Utopias are thus seen by Davis as holding 
operations, sets of strategies designed to contain and control rather than 
solve the collective problem. This 'solution' represents, Davis claims, the 
idealisation of organisation; it is achieved ' ... by the reorganisation of 
society and its institutions, by education, by laws and by sanctions. [The 
utopian's] prime aim is not happiness, that private mystery, but order, that 
social necess i ty , .26 
Before going on to consider Davis' characterisation of utopia I want to 
argue that whilst his typology of ideal societies is fruitful and has the 
virtue of elegance, it is incomplete. This is particularly important since 
Davis will proceed to argue that the utopist's 'rage for order'27 is the 
germ which grows into the dystopic nightmare. 
Davis alludes to but does not develop the division, noted above, between 
the simple or brute and the contrastive desires and their attendant 
dissatisfactions which give rise to the 'collective problem '. It is crucial 
for theorists such as More and Rousseau that the second, contrastive, group 
of desires be controlled, eliminated, or their effects ameliorated. Thus the 
key role which the twin concepts of pride and a111our-propre respectively 
play in their theories. 
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Similarly, Davis alludes to but does not develop the difference between the 
various agencies and mechanisms of solution. I suggest we employ a three-
fold division: transcendent, naturalistic and humanistic. HU111anistic 
solutions are those within the compass of human agency, requiring a 
particular act of will (as in the transformation needed to bring about the 
Perfect Moral Commonwealth) or a sustained and enduring act of will such 
as that needed to create and support social institutions. Naturalistic 
solutions are external to human agency yet make appeal to the causal 
interaction of man with forces or qualities deemed to be present in our 
'natural' world. However, the transcendent solution makes appeal to forces 
beyond the boundaries of our everyday ('natural') universe. This 
classification according to the agencies and mechanisms of solution is not 
without some degree of ambiguity. Arcadia, for instance, might be seen as 
either a transcendent or a naturalistic solution, depending on whether it is 
seen as involving some (semi-) mystical union with and transformation by 
'nature' or as simply the product of a certain sort of life-style. But this 
is a gain in precision, rather than a loss; for both versions exist and 
should properly be distinguished. The boundary between them is present, 
though ultimately not razor-edged. Rousseau's pastorals (the first 
communities of Discours sur 1 'inegalite, the early married life of Emile and 
Sophie) are thoroughly naturalistic in this sense; the romantic appeal to 
the transforming quality of nature is transcendent. Similarly, if the act of 
will reqUired to bring about the Perfect Moral Commonwealth is seen as the 
opening of one's heart to the Grace of God, and it is this alone which 
sustains the transformation, then the solution is ultimately transcendent. 
That it may not be immediately obvious in any given author which 
transforming agency (humanistic, naturalistic, transcendent) is being 
appealed to, or that more than one type of agency seems to have been 
assumed, is directive rather than obstructive to our analysis: it delineates 
the ground for debate. We need to interrogate any social idealisation as to 
the precise form of its agengy of transformation. 
The move from humanistic though naturalistic to transcendent agencies 
represents a move from the active to the passive. Man is passive in the 
face of transcendent agencies, though he may be able to bring about their 
intervention (by summoning spirits, by hastening the onset of the 
apocalyptic battle); man is a participant in the process of transformation 
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brought about by naturalistic agencies; but man alone has the causal 
efficacy to bring about the humanistic transformation. The reason for 
labouring this point about the agencies of transformation is to highlight 
, 
the distinctive quality of utopia as a humanistic solution to the collective 
problem. 
I have three further points to make regarding Davis' analysis. Yet 
again, he alludes to but fails to develop the variation in changes in the 
desire-profile. Thus both the Millennium and the Perfect Moral Commonwealth 
posit a radical transformation in ;the desire-profile; in Arcadia the desire-
profile is modified <desires become moderate and harmonious); and in the 
Land of Cockaygne and utopia (or so Davis claims) desires are (more or 
less) as given. Again there may be ground for debate here. <It is not 
immediately obvious that the desire-profile remains unchanged in utopian 
speculation.) Secondly, Davis' typology needs completion by consideration of 
idealisations which posit the complete absence of all desires, ego heaven. 
So Davis' typology requires clarification and extension according to the 
structure of the desire profile, the agency of transformation and the 
domain and nature of satisfactions (material/sociological; simple/ 
contrastive). Here, Davis makes a serious omission. A crucial domain of 
satisfactions is that of social goods: justice, peace, education, medical 
care, and so on. Dissatisfaction over the supply of social goods may be 
quantitative or qualitative, simple or contrastive. Thirdly, there is the 
question of the aim of a work of social idealisation. There are two 
elements to this: What is the fundamental aim of the society portrayed in 
the idealisation? and what is it that the author hopes to achieve by the 
work? As to the former, we have already noted that Davis sees the utopist's 
concern as being order rather than happiness. This I shall dispute in my 
discussion of More; and will later discuss the latter question of what the 
author hopes to achieve by way of his social idealisation. 
So, a more complete typology of social idealisations can be presented. 
The following typology is ordered first according to changes in the desire-
profile and second according to the particular domain of satisfactions to 
be met. 
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A: Reformulation of the Desire-Profile 
B: 
No Desires 
1 Heaven [t] 
Radical Transformation of the Desire-Profile 
2 Millennium [tJ 
3 Perfect Moral Commonwealth [nit?] 
4 Charismatic exemplars [nit?] 
Modification of the Desire-Profile 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Arcadia [n?/t?) 
Anarchism en) 
Psycho-sexual liberation en) 
Pansophism/Enlightnement [h/t?J 
Utopia [hJ 
Desire-Profile as Given 
Satisfaction of Quantitative Desires [simple] 1 
10 Cockaygne [t] 
11 Technology [h] 
Satisfaction of Qualitative Desires [siDlple] 
12 Culture of self-development [h] 
13 Crafting/self-sufficiency movements [h] 
14 Life of vocational devotion [h] 
Utopia 
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Satisfaction of Distribution of Material Goods [contrastive] 
15 Planned economy [hJ 
16 Communism [hJ 
17 Free market [hJ 
18 Welfarism [hJ 
Satisfaction of the Distribution of Socially Derived Goods 
[contrastive] 
19 Caste society [hJ 
20 Class society [hJ 
21 Meritocracy [hJ 
22 Egalitarianism [hJ 
Satisfaction of the Supply of Social Goods 
[si1IIple &- contrastive] 
23 Eunomia [hJ 
Repression of Desires and Discontent 
24 Dystopia [hJ 
No Attempt at the Solution of the 'Collective Problem' 
25 Cacotopia [hJ 
[hJ = humanistic 
[nJ = naturalistic 
[tJ = transcendent 
Utopia 
As Davis comments, some of these idealisations are not mutually exclusive. 
though we may expect some tensions where different idealisations are fused. 
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Some further comments are in order. In the first place, I have included 
what at first glance may seem somewhat idiosyncratic candidates as social 
idealisations. Mostly these appear as naturalistic answers to the specific 
problem of satisfying contrastive desires (both material and socially-
derived) where there is no change in the desire-profile. As such, one might 
argue that these do not present social idealisations per se but merely 
political and economic structures available to the utopist to incorporate in 
his idealisation. I find myself sympathetic to this view (and it should be 
noted that in the typology, a system of distribution of material goods does 
not imply a given political system. Similarly, a particular distribution of 
socially-derived goods implies no given economic .system.) Clearly the 
problem, hitherto ignored, is one of what is to count as a social 
idealisation. There are three criteria we might look at here: 
(a) The idealisation offers something radically other than what is 
given. 
(b) The 'totality of the change envisaged'. 
(c) Changes in the desire-profile. 
(a) That the idealisation provides a view of society radically other than 
what is: that it offers a radical alternative to existent systems (here) of 
distribution (of both material and socially-derived goods.) Adherence to 
this view imposes a historical and ethnocentric constraint. What is 
alternati ve one year may become the norm the next. Similarly, what is the 
norm in one culture may be a radical alternative for another. So the best 
we can say, given that we want our typology to be as exhaustive as 
possible, is that the alternatives should be radical with respect to each 
other and not in the context of any given existing social structure. 
(b) The 'totality of the change envisaged': Davis offers this as one of 
his three criteria characteristic of utopias.28 As it stands, this is highly 
impressionistic. However, we can sharpen this somewhat and ask three 
further questions. Is the change envisaged merely marginal, affecting 
(albeit deeply) some peripheral sphere of social existence? Is it 
superficial, affecting a major sphere of social existence, but in such a way 
that it leaves the bulk of the social fabric untouched, unaffected? Or are 
the ramifications of the change envisaged deeply penetrative of the social 
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fabric, transforming society beyond immediate recognition? Clearly, opinions 
will differ as to the role of systems of distribution with respect to this 
point; and I do not intend to enter that debate here. 
(c) One criterion we might employ to assess the totality of the change 
envisaged is the extent to which it invol ves a transformation of the 
desire-profile. A question I shall pursue in the final section of this 
chapter is whether or not Marxian communism involves such a 
transformation. The question is crucial in determining the productive 
requirements of such a society; and indeed, in gaining .a grasp of what such 
a society might be like to live in. We need to know whether there will be a 
general moderation in desires (such as we find in arcadian idealisations 
and as we might expect in non-alienated society) or whether socially 
organised productive capacity will be dedicated to the satisfaction of the 
most gross of desires (the equivalent of a technological cockaygne.) As 
with the earlier discussion of agencies of transformation, these 
considerations should be taken as directi ve, marking out the grounds for 
interrogation and debate of any given would-be idealisation. 
These questions cannot be settled in advance of the critical 
examination of any given work; and indeed, there is a strong suggestion 
here that these are questions which might properly be asked of any work of 
poli tical theory and that the division between social idealisations (and 
thus utopias) and what we might think of as 'main-stream' political theory 
is somewhat arbitrary. 
Some brief comments on the other inclusions in the typology: Anarchism 
surely commands a place as an idealisation involving transformation of the 
desire-profile. In the absence of rulers, government, law, man's aggressive, 
acquisitive spirit gives way to one of mutuality and responsibility. 
Something of this sort can be seen in Robert Paul Wolff's theory (see 
Chapter Four above). The anarchist's view of law as essentially repressive 
and distortive of a naturally harmonious desire-profile finds a deeper 
reflection in idealisations involving psycho-sexual liberation; though here 
'law' is either public convention or an internalised self-regulation. 
Arcadianism, anarchism and psycho-sexual liberation all posit the 
return to some 'natural' state of harmonious being, specifically through the 
shedding of the artificiality of 'civilisation'. Utopianism and pansophist 
and Enlightenment theories (which equate the possession of a final and 
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complete knowledge with social harmony) reject this nostalgic ethic of 
return (to some presumed historical state of being or to an underlying 
human 'nature') but rather focus upon the gains of civilisation as the 
potential source of solution to the collective problem. 
The under-pinning of social reorganisation according to the need to 
satisfy simple qualitative desires can be found in theorists as diverse as 
John Stuart Mill (the culture of self-development) and in the craft-
production society pictured by Morris in News from Nowhere2 9 and in the 
self-sufficiency movements. 
The inclusion of the charismatic exemplar is crucial to a complete 
understanding of social idealisations. It is a familiar leit-motif 
throughout the work of Rousseau and in the person of the Law-Giver is 
central to du Contrat Social; and it may be that Machiavelli's Prince, as 
the man of virtu, plays a similar role in the founding of the great state.30 
The mere presence of such an individual transforms those around him. 
Clearly there. is a religious/prophetic derivative aspect to the role of such 
exemplarsi and this pin-points a further problem. The agency of 
transformation may be either naturalistic or transcendent (though not 
properly humanistic), but even if naturalistic the role played may be 
transcendent: for example, in du Contrat Social the role played by the Law-
Giver is very much that of deus ex machina. The appearance of such quasi-
divine individuals cannot be legislated for. Typically, as the law-giver, 
they provide a transcendent element to an otherwise humanistic solution of 
social and political reform. Mere mortals, it seems, can sustain but not 
initiate the virtuous society. 
Finally in this section I come to the central question of utopia; and 
here I distinguish between not only utopia and dystopia, but further 
between dystopia and cacotopia and between utopia and eunomia. The term 
'cacotopia' was coined by Ferguson:31 to apply to that condition political 
theorists will recognise as the Hobbesean state of nature, the war of each 
against all, where no attempt is made to solve the 'collective problem'. The 
term is derived from the Greek kakos ('bad') and is employed to describe 
the social condition of the Cyclopes, encountered by Odysseus in his 
travels: ' ... a fierce, uncivilised people ... [who] have no assemblies for the 
making of laws, nor any settled customs, but live in hollow caverns in the 
mountain heights, where each man is a lawgiver to his children and his 
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wives, and nobody cares a jot for his neighbours'. <Ironically, Homer sets 
the Cyclopes within an Arcadian context: '[they] never lift a hand to plant 
or plough but put their trust in Providence. All the crops they require 
spring up unsown and untilled, wheat and barley and the vines whose 
generous clusters give them wine when ripened for them by the timely 
rains'.32) In cacotopia there is no order, only social chaos. Dystopia, on 
the other hand, achieves order (or some outward semblance of order) by the 
active repression of discontent over the supply of satisfactions. The order 
displayed by dystopia is thus underpinned by fear. Here there is Ii ttle 
disagreement. The question is whether the apparent harmony and felicity of 
utopia is no more than a front for an underlying dystopic regime; ie. that 
there is no real distinction between the two. The typology assumes at least 
the possibility of such a distinction; and the matter will be further 
discussed below. 
Davis, as we have seen, asserts that 'Utopia ... accepts recalcitrant 
nature and assumes sinful man'; that is, in utopia the desire-profile 
undergoes little or no change. This I find problematic and will exmaine in 
some detail in the following sections. However, in order to clarify the 
grounds of debate I have reserved the term 'utopia' for those appropriate 
social idealisations in which some modification of the desire-profile is 
projected and have introduced the term 'eunomia' for those in which there is 
no such significant change. Plutarch employs the term to describe the 
request Lycurgus made of the Oracle at Delphi, that his constitutional 
reforms should be blessed with success and thus result in eunomia. Talbert, 
Plutarch's most recent translator, comments that eunomia '... has no one-
word equivalent in English. It signifies the condition of a stable state, 
well organised both socially and politically' .3::=: This implied causal 
connection between constitutional reform and a condition of felicity I take 
to be central to the utopist's quest. 
*** 
Before pursuing further the distinction between utopia and eunomia, it 
should be clear that Davis' approach is analytically more fecund than that 
employed by the Manuels. To reprise the problem of Rousseau's social 
idealisations, the Arcadian mode (in the derivative forms of the pastoral, 
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the rural idyll and the Edenitic quality of the pristine state of nature), 
the charismatic exemplar and the utopian/eunomian modes are all employed. 
To subsume them all, with little or no distinction, under the generic term 
'utopia' is to obscure rather than clarify the special character of the 
humanistic and expressly political solution to the 'collective problem'; the 
utopia/eunomia. 
Whilst I have no wish to be terminologically pedantic, the Manuels' 
approach serves to minimise the potential contribution of utopias to 
political theory. A model is now required which will serve to delineate more 
fully than I have hitherto at·tempted the utopian/eunomian from other modes 
of the ideal. The Manuels cite the birth of utopia as being the point of 
fusion of the Hellenic myth of the ideal city built by and for man, and the 
Judaeo-Christian belief in a perduring earthly paradise. This fusion in 
their view I becomes complete in a particular work of one man: Sir Thomas 
More's Utopia; and it his model to which I now turn. 
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(it) More and the Utopian Xodel 
The coronation of the young Henry VIII was greeted by Thomas More with a 
cry of celebration and relief: 'This day is the limit of our slavery, the 
beginning of our freedom, the end of sadness, the source of joy'.' Nor was 
More alone in singing the praises of the new king. Mountjoy, sometime 
patron of Erasmus, wrote to the latter: 'Heaven laughs and the earth 
rejoices; everything is milk and honey and nectar. Avarice has fled the 
country. Our King is not after gold, or gems, or precious metals, but virtue, 
glory, immortality'.2 This resurgence of humanist hopes for a new England 
was to prove short-lived; though some ten years later Erasmus at least was 
prepared to continue the prophetic mode: 'I see, I see, an Age truly Golden 
arising ... '3 The rise and subsequent disappointment of the aspirations of 
More and his fellow humanists forms the context for our examination of 
Utopia. 
• 
Al though for some time More hovered over the choice between the life of 
otium and retreat into the seclusion of the London Charterhouse, and that 
of negotiuJJtl and a legal, and most likely, political career, the balance was 
always in favour of the latter. The maternal grandfather, Thomas Graunger, 
was a lawyer and was elected Sheriff of London in 1503. John More, Thomas' 
father, scaled the ranks of the legal profession from the humble but 
respectable position of butler at Lincoln's Inn (a position his father 
before him had held), was made a Sergeant of the city of London (in the 
same year Thomas Graunger was elected Sheriff) and became a Judge of the 
Common Pleas and ultimately a Judge of the King's Bench; receiving a coat 
of arms from Edward IV and later a knighthood en route. S 
Thomas More received an education consonant with this legalistic family 
background. After an early grounding in the trivium· (Latin grammar, logic 
and rhetoric) at St. Anthony's School in Threadneedle Street, More wa.s 
placed, at the age of twelve, as page to the court of Morton, Archbishop of 
Canterbury, later Cardinal, and already Lord Chancellor to Henry VII. (As 
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the biographers are quick to note, the practice of securing such placements 
was by no means uncommon; however, Thomas More's placement does seem to 
have been particularly prestigious and somewhat felicitous in that it 
provided much anecdotal material for his writings.) Under Morton's guidance 
More went up to Oxford two years later to complete his study of the seven 
liberal arts by taking the Quadrivium: arithmetic, music, geometry and 
astronomy. It seems possible that More was first introduced to the study of 
Greek while at Oxford (William Grocyn was lecturing on Dionysius the 
Areopagite's The Celestial Hierarchy at that time); but if so, he did not 
pursue his studies with vigour till later. After a couple of years of 
parsimonious support by his father, More was sent to study law first at 
New and subsequently at Lincoln's Inn, becoming a Reader at Furnivall's Inn, 
and was made a Barrister at about the age of twenty-four. 
During this period, though there seems to be no exact dates, More took 
residence at the London Charterhouse as a COD versus. Roper tells us that 
More ' ... gave himself to prayer and devotion ... religiously living there 
without vow for about four years'.6 The Carthusians formed very much a 
minority Order in early sixteenth century England.7 They were austere 
ascetics, devoted to a life of contemplation and work. The eremitic 
influence was strong but incorporated into a communal structure. Each monk 
had his own cell, in which he celebrated alone all the divine offices except 
Vespers and Matins; and in which he took his meals alone (meat was 
forbidden and the Rule prescribed bread and water three days a week) except 
for Sundays and special occasions of the community calendar when meals 
would be taken in the refectory. Only in the afternoons of such days was 
conversation permitted. The spirit of poverty forbade all but the coarsest 
material for bed-linen and clothing; and further forbade the use of precious 
metals for all but the chalice. Each monk attended to his own garden plot 
at the back of his cell (the cells were adjacent, arranged around a central 
cloister, and the gardens walled); the rest of his time, typically, being 
given to the copying, illumination and binding of books. 
We have no grounds for thinking that the London Charterhouse was 
anything less than strict in its observance of the Rule; and so the role of 
someone such as More as a CODversus or lay-brother would be crucial to the 
well-being of the monastic community. The monastic seclusion wi thin the 
city of the Carthusians made it imperative that there be conversi to 
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conduct their day-to-day business with the temporal world: 'It was they who 
performed the manual tasks, did the necessary buying and selling, and dealt 
with visitors and guests'.e 
While at the Charterhouse (and, according to Chambers, before the close 
of 1501) More studied Greek under William Grocynj and lectured on 
Augustine's City of God at Grocyn's church of St. Lawrence Jewry.9 
Unfortunately, we do not know the content of More's lecturesj and whilst we 
may assume that More was a diligent scholar of Augustine, the claim put 
forward by Marius 10 that More 'would have been saturated with the teaching 
that those who fall to sensuality will continue their plummeting into hell 
itself' and thus would have shared Augustine's (eventual) repugnance towards 
sensuality is mere speculation and without secure grounding. Chambers 11 
finds evidence· in some later writings of Erasmus to suggest that even 
before his marriage to Jane Colt in 1505 'More's youth had not been 
altogether blameless' . But in general, a sense of propriety rather than 
outright prohibition is characteristic of Morej and so, Erasmus tells us 'as 
he could not overcome his desire for a wife, he decided to be a faithful 
husband rather than an unfaithful priest '.12 Certainly he took to the role 
of paterfamilias. Jane More bore him three daughters and a son before her 
death in 1511. He remarried within a month to Dame Alice Middleton who 
brought him a step-daughter. <In marrying a second time, as Marius points 
out, More turned his back forever on the possibility of entering the 
priesthoodj for under canon law such a man was deemed to be a bigamist and 
thus could not take the sacrament of ordination. More would surely have 
known thisj though this is far from establishing this as a principal motive 
for his remarriage. 13 ) In later years he further adopted a daughter, 
provided a home for William Roper, his future son-in-law, a small domestic 
staff (including Henry Patens on , his 'domestic fool ') and a base for the 
itinerant humanist scholars of northern Europe. 14 
Foremost among these scholars was, of course, Erasmus, whom More first 
met in 1499 and introduced to the young prince Henry.1s However, it was not 
Erasmus but Grocyn, John Colet and Thomas Linacre, the leading figures in 
England of Christian humanism, who influenced him most during the period 
of his Charterhouse retreat and early legal career. The Christian humanists, 
like the more secular 'civic' humanists throughout Europe, rejected the 
centrality of Aristotelian logic and teleology which characterised 
Page 163 
Chapter 7 Utopia_ 
scholasticism, and asserted instead the importance of the active pursuit of 
the good and virtuous life. 'It is better to will the good' Petrarch had 
said, 'than to know the truth'.1 6 Central to this project were the insights 
into 'human nature' provided by the classical authors, both greek and latin. 
But for the Christian humanists, whilst the fusion of these classical 
insights with Christianity was a major concern, the exemplification of the 
good life was to found not in the lives of Athenian citizens nor of Roman 
senators, but in the lives of Christ, the Apostles and the early fathers of 
the Church. Colet led the way in rejecting the obsessive ~llegorisation of 
the scriptures and argued that, whilst the Old Testament may not be 
entirely literal, the New Testament, except for explicit parables ' ... has 
the sense that appears on the surface' and that the Epistles were to be 
read as ' ... the real letters of a real man'.' 7 But for Grocyn, Linacre and 
Erasmus this 'humanisation' of the scriptures required a further stage: a 
return to the original greek texts and the preparation of a new translation 
<though still in Latin) to replace the corrupted Vulgate version. 
More's decision to seek the Christian life whilst remaining fully 
embedded in the quotidien life of the community is thus fully consonant 
wi th the reformist context of Christian humanism. But both marriage and 
remarriage were in the future when More left the seclusion of the 
Charterhouse. In 1504 More was elected as a burgess (presumably for the 
city of London constituency) to the Parliament summoned by Henry VII to 
supply 'two reasonable aids'. Henry proposed to raise these taxes on the 
pretext of the costs incurred in knighting Prince Arthur (this having taken 
place in 1489, Prince Arthur having died two years previously to this 
Parliament) and for the dowry to be paid for the marriage of his daughter, 
Margaret, to James IV of Scotland the previous year. The projected revenue, 
More's son-in-law Roper tells us, was halved; due largely to the arguments 
of More himself. Word was conveyed to Henry that: 
a beardless boy had disappointed all his purpose. 
Whereupon the King, conceiving great indignation towards 
him, could not be satisfied until he had some way revenged 
it. And, forasmuch as he, nothing having, nothing could lose, 
his Grace devised a causeless quarrel against his father, 
keeping him in the Tower until he had made him pay to him 
a hundred pounds fine.' e 
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There appears to be no independent evidence for this incident; though More 
later mentions that he studied in Paris and Louvain some four years later 
and it is thought that More was either exploring the possibility of, or 
actively seeking the security of exile. If so, then this would represent 
More's first direct experience of the problem of tyranny. Thus More's relief 
on Henry's death in 1509 expressed in his greeting of the new King's 
coronation: 'This day is the limit of our slavery, the beginning of our 
freedom, the end of sadness, the source of joy' . 
•• 
'Death, touched by pity, will with violent hand, while the tyrant rages, 
bring him down'.1 9 More's latin poems and epigrams, from which this line is 
taken, were first published in 1518 by John Frobel of Basel, along with the 
third edition of his Utopia. However, More's first appearance in print had 
come much earlier. In 1506 More had published wi th Erasmus a joint 
translation (from Greek into Latin) of works by Lucian. Amongst these was a 
parody of a Sophist's defence of tyranny; to which More and Erasmus each 
appended a refutation of the Sophist's position.20 But More's great and very 
personal concern with the problem of tyranny found its fullest expression 
in The History of King Richard III.21 
The History is as problematic a work as the Utopia. Written about 
1514-5 in in Latin but with an English version, unfinished, unpublished in 
his life-time, incorrect in minor details but rich with anecdotal material, 
More gives to the world the picture of the demonic King which Shakespeare 
later popularised. It is a drama with a clear five act structure, a moral 
lesson (though, in this incomplete form, hardly a political one), and the 
first great history in English prose. Whether, as Chambers22 suggests, More 
had intended to write a complete history up to the death of Henry VII 
remains uncertain; as does More's preCise thrust in his unrelenting 
blackening of a King with whom he shared a vital concern: the securing and 
administration of justice for the common people. 
By the time More was engaged in writing the History the humanist hopes 
for a new Golden Age of peace, prosperity and, above all, learning under the 
new King were dimming fast. Henry VIII, within two years of his accession, 
had begun a series of diplomatic and military manouevres, only partly at 
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the instigation of Julius IIi and central to which was the reassert ion of 
the claim of the English crown to France. That these military excursions 
mainly ended in debacle is not to the point: to the humanists they 
signalled the return to a world they had believed to have been left behind. 
'The whole genius of the island' Erasmus wrote of England in 1514, 'is being 
altered in these preparations for war'.23 In rejecting Aristotle's view of a 
purposive world (and thus also Augustinian pre-destination) the humanists 
had em braced a conception of history as cyclical: the age of learning, 
which characterised the ancients and was judged to have ended with the 
sack of Rome in 410, had been re-born ('re-naissance') . The return to 
militarism threw doubt on the genuineness of that rebirth. The problem of 
tyranny had simply not evaporated under the torch of learning. For Henry, 
the focus of humanist aspirations in England, had been tutored in the bonae 
littera€f24 and yet sought militaristic gloire. More's response seems to have 
been the analysis in the first instance of the psychological condition of 
kingship (and what we may call the propensity to tyrannise) rather than 
that of the political implications of the office of kingship (which was to 
come later in Book I of the Utopia). 
Yet, in the History More comes close to making Richard a caricature. 
Edward IV receives a glowing encomium: 
This nobel prince so heartily beloved with the 
substaunce of the people ... of heart courageous, politic in 
counsel, in adversity nothing abashed, in prosperity rather 
joyful than proud, in peace just and merciful ... of visage 
lovely, of body mighty, strong, and clean made. 
The contrast with Richard could not be sharper: 
... little of stature, ill-featured of limbs, crook-backed ... 
malicious, wrathful, envious, and from afore his birth, ever 
froward. 2s 
Thus begins the picture of a man who is evil incarnate. But such a picture, 
dramatic and moralising as it is, is in danger of missing the mark. For the 
question, as More must have realised, is not (or is not solely) what to do 
in the event of an evil person gaining political power but whether this 
possibility (and the possibility of a prince such as Henry VIII becoming 
tyrannical) makes monarchy an imprudent form of government. At some point 
More did realise this. In one of his Latin poems published in the edition of 
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1518 ('What Is the Best Form of Government') More debates the respective 
merits of a king and a senate. Both may be bad: 'But if both are good, then 
I think that the senate, because of its numbers, is the better and that the 
greater good lies in numerous good men'. Furthermore: 'A senator is elected 
by the people to rule; a king attains this end by being born. In the one 
case blind chance is supremej in the other, a reasonable agreement'. This 
short debate has a startling conclusion: 'Stop asking to whom you may give 
power. The prior question is whether to give it at all'.26 
It may be no accident that the History ends in mid-scene and that More 
found himself unable to deal satisfactorily with the first question of the 
legitimacy of rebellion. Richard has usurped the throne, has had committed 
a series of judicial murders, and has ordained the 'dolorous end of those 
babes'.27 At this point the focus changes to the instigation of Buckingham's 
rebellionj and the role of prime mover is given to John Morton, then Bishop 
of Ely (and under Buckingham's custody at Brecknock) and later to become 
chancellor under Henry VII and More's own master. Morton receives an 
ambivalent depiction at More's hands: 'The Bishop was a man of great 
natural wit, very well learned, and honorable in behaviour, lacking no wise 
ways to win favor'.29 Richard and Buckingham are condemned by More for 
dissemblingj if Morton differs from them both ('lacking no wise ways to win 
favor') it can only be in degree. Morton, despite having been embraced by 
Edward IV, seems to have remained a staunch supporter of the Lancastrian 
cause, for which he had fought and accepted exilej and More has him act as 
spur to Buckingham's dissatisfaction and pride, quickly guessing the tenor 
of the Duke's mind. More's accuracy in assigning this role to Morton is 
much in doubt; but this does not detract from the dramatic quality with 
which Morton expresses the problem: 
Surely, my lord, folly were it for me to lie ... but that if 
the world would have gone as I would have wished, King 
Henry's son had had the crown and not King Edward. But 
after that God had ordered him to lose it and King Edward 
to reign, I was never so mad that I would with a dead man 
strive against the quick. So was I to King Edward faithful 
chaplain and glad would have been that his child had 
succeeded him. Howbeit, if the secret judgment of God have 
Page 167 
Chapter 7 
otherwise provided, I purpose not to spurn against a prick, 
nor labor to set up that God pulleth down. 
Utopia 
To acquiesce in usurpation was one thing, for the very success of a 
rebellious enterprise could be construed as evidence of God's will; to 'labor 
to set up' (that is, against an annointed prince) was quite another. The 
problem, in contemporary (and secular) parlance, is that of 'dirty hands': 
someone, it seems, must take upon themselves the commission of a prima 
facie immoral act in order to restore justice.29 Here, Morton gives us the 
conventional view of the matter: Morton would swim with the tide but would 
not be an active agent in bringing about change. What More does not give us 
is a challenge to this view (whereas in the Utopia the same device of 
expounding conventional wisdom is always countered in debate). Morton is 
later drawn by Buckingham to express his thoughts on Richard: 
as for the late protector, si th he is now king in 
possession, I purpose not to dispute his title. But for the 
weal of this realm ... I was about to wish that to those 
good abilities, whereof he hath already right many little 
needing my praise, it might yet have pleased God for the 
beter store to have given him some such other excellent 
virtues meet for the rule of a realm, as our Lord hath 
planted in the person of your grace. 
And there the History ends. The problem is unresolved. Nor is it clear what 
answer More might have given without either giving licence to the rebellion 
of each and every malcontent or openly rejecting the office of kingship. We 
have already seen his muted advocacy of republicanism (in his Latin poem) j 
but wi thin the contextual bounds More set himself in the History no such 
opinion could be expressed. Implicit in this exposition of the History of 
King Richard III is the argument that, even if it was intended as a 
psychological examination of the propensity to tyranny, it becomes an 
analysis of the acute, practical and moral problem of what to do about it. 
No figure in the drama could provide the sort of answer for which More 
sought without radically disfiguring the historical record in order to 
change the grounds of debate. That would require another work. This one was 
incapable of completion. 
• •• 
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More may, of course, have had other, more explicit reasons for abandoning 
the History. As Marius (drawing on Pollard) underscores, accusations of a 
treasonable background <personal or familial) would not rest lightly with 
many of the contemporary magnates.30 Nor could Henry VIII be expected to 
recei ve wi th pleasure any veiled suggestion that his reign was veering 
toward tyranny. 
By the time More was writing the History his public career had 
advanced. He was elected to the position of Under-Sheriff to the city of 
London in 1510 whilst continuing his legal practice; he served on royal 
commissions of the peace; was a member of the Mercer's Company and 
represented the London merchants in disputes with the Hanseatic merchants 
of the London Steelyard. His position as Under-Sheriff brought him into 
contact with, amongst others, William Warham, Archbishop of Canterbury and 
Lord Chancellor, Cuthbert Tunstall, War ham 's own chancellor, and Thomas 
Wolsey, Archbishop of York and soon to be Lord Chancellor. But it was with 
Tunstall that More was appointed to a royal commission to Flanders in May 
1515 to renegotiate the terms of England's wool trade. 
This was only More's second <recorded) excursion abroad; and indeed 
(especially in comparison with his fellow humanists) it is remarkable how 
little More travelled. Apart from his time at Oxford and his 'exile' at 
Paris and Louvain in 1508 there is no record of him having left the 
immediate vicinity of London prior to this embassy. The embassy lasted six 
months instead of the expected two j and it was during this unfamiliar 
situation of separation from family and city that More began work on the 
Utopia.31 
The Utopia reports an apparently factual meeting between More, his 
friend Peter Giles and the mysterious traveller Raphael Hythloday. The 
Second Book, apart from the concluding peroration, is devoted to Hythloday's 
description of the island of Utopia. The First Book, after More's initial 
contextual remarks, takes the form of a dialogue between, for the most part, 
More and Hythloday. The latter is claimed to have sailed with Amerigo 
Vespucci on the three last of his four voyages; but having insisted on 
being one of the twenty-three put ashore during the last voyage, he then 
continued voyages of his own. With little further ado the main theme of 
Book I is then introduced by Peter Giles: 
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Surely, Master Raphael ... I wonder greatly why you get you 
not into some king's court. For I am sure there is no prince 
living, that would not be very glad of you, as a man not 
only able highly to delight him with your profound learning 
and this your knowledge of countries and peoples, but also 
meet to instruct him with examples and help him with 
counsel. And thus doing, you shall bring yourself in a very 
good case, and also be of ability to help all your friends 
and kinsfolk.32 
Utopia 
Thus the problem is set: should a man of wit and learning, ie. in early 
sixteenth century Europe, a humanist, place himself 'in bondage unto 
kings'33 as Hythloday starkly puts it? 
The question had become an acutely urgent one for More. On his return 
from the embassy in the autumn of 1515, already financially straitened, he 
was offered but refused a royal pension for fear that such patronage would 
compromise his position as a judge. Yet he seems to have begun to form an 
aversion to his only other viable alternative, his practice at lawj and his 
posi tion as Under-Sherrif to London no longer provided the financial ease 
his ever-growing family commitments demanded. His political career was 
beckoningj and it may have been that Wolsey and Varham had already put 
their case to More for him to join the royal council. Yet More has 
Hythloday give the argument from personal profit short shrift - that is not 
the issue. As this 'Dialogue of Counsel' unfolds, the issue becomes one of 
personal integrity. If philosophers and kings continue to occupy mutually 
exclusive classes, then is it not the duty of the philosopher (ie. the 
humanist) to instruct and advise kings? And as More learned shortly after 
his return from Flanders, his friend and fellow humanist Erasmus had 
embraced that duty and become councillor to Arch-Duke Charles of Burgundy. 
Hexter, in his Hore's Utopia: The Biography of an Idea3 4 has clarified 
the structure of the Utopia. It was during the period of enforced idleness 
as the English delegation waited for a response to their proposals that 
More took advantage of an introduction from Erasmus to visit Peter Giles at 
Antwerpj and there he wrote what is now the introductory section of Book I 
and the main body of Book II, the depiction of the island of Utopia. But it 
was not until his return to London that More gave point to the whole work 
by writing (and incorporating as the body of Book I) what Hexter terms the 
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'Dialogue of Counsel'. Thus the delay to which More refers in his letter to 
Peter Giles: 
I am almost ashamed, right well beloved Peter Giles, to send 
unto you this book of the Utopian commonweal th wellnigh 
after a year's space, which I am sure you looked for within 
a month and a half. And no marvel, for you knew well enough 
that I was already disburdened of all the labour and study 
belonging to the invention in this work, and that I had no 
need at all to trouble my brains about the disposi tion or 
conveyance of the matter ... 35 
More excuses himself solely on the grounds of pressure of work ('I 
therefore do win and get only that time which I steal from sleep and meat') 
and at no point suggests that he has been engaged on wri ting a major 
section which would transform the nature of the work. However, Hexter's 
analysis identifies clearly the point of insertion of the Dialogue of 
Counsel and thus More's silence is not here crucial. Having firmly 
introduced the character and background of Hythloday, More says: 
Now at this time I am determined to rehearse only that he 
[ie. HythlodayJ told of us of the manners, customs, laws, 
and ordinances of the Utopians. 
But this is not what happens in the text; for More immediately continues: 
But first I will repeat our former communication by the 
occasion and (as I might say) the drift whereof he was 
brought into the mention of that weal-public. 
Instead of proceeding straight into the depiction of the island of Utopia, 
the text digresses into the Dialogue. Again in the immediately preceding 
passage, More tells us that of 'those fond and foolish laws in those new 
found lands' he will 'in another place ... entreat'; however, the description 
of societies other than that of the Utopians is incorporated in the Dialogue 
which follows. Finally, the tone of the Dialogue is quite at odds with that 
of the declamation. Whereas the latter is generally calm, reflective, only 
mildly satirical and given in the uninterrupted flow of Hythloday's voice 
(until the final peroration from More) the Dialogue is sharply incisive in 
its critical bite and is urgent in its mood and in the movement of the 
debate between More, Giles and Hythloday, notwithstanding its setting in a 
garden in Antwerp.36 
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This creates some tension in the approach to analysis of the text: should 
Book I (the Dialogue) be understood only in terms of Book II (the 
declamation) or vice versa? Which is the prior work? The fact that Kore 
wrote the Dialogue after the declamation does not establish that he had not 
conceived of writing the former work before he reached Antwerp or while he 
was there. It may be that the problems he was to present in the Dialogue 
had already taken some rough shape in his mind, perhaps to be committed to 
some other, later work; and that only on his return to London did he see 
the essential congruence between the two. We thus have no option but to 
examine the work as Kore presented it to the world. 
The remaining problem to be confronted at this point is the question of 
which voice in the Dialogue represents More himself. There is no easy 
answer to this; and we cannot assume that the opinions offered by the 
'More' who appears in the drama are in every or any case those of the 
author of the work. It may be that all the voices represent different 
aspects of Kore's thought as he debated the question with himself. To avoid 
confusion, therefore, the fictional persona of More as he appears throughout 
Utopia will be identified in italics thus: Hare. 
As we have seen, on his return to London Kore discovered that Erasmus 
had accepted a position as royal councillor. But More was clearly not so 
sure as his friend. Against the argument from duty which Peter Giles 
raises, Hythloday opposes objections on the grounds of freedom, of efficacy, 
and ultimately of honesty. 
'Now I live at liberty after mine own mind and pleasure,' Hythloday 
insists, 'which I think very few of these great states and peers of realms 
can say' .37 But for a Christian, freedom can be no match for duty; and a 
quick admonition from Hare that 'though it be somewhat to your own pain 
and hindrance'38 silences Hythloday on that point. For, he continues, 'this 
shall you never so well do, nor with so great profit perform, as if you be 
of some great prince's council, and put into his head .. , honest opinions 
and virtuous persuasions. For from the prince, as from a perpetual well-
spring, cometh among the people the flood of all that is good and evil', 
And if he should elect to serve, what hope could he entertain of his 
advice being acceptable and thus followed? If in any way innovative, other 
councillors would counter it with an appeal to custom ,3'3 If merely honest 
in his advice, pointing out that a king's duty is to sue for peace not 
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launch aggressive foreign campaigns40 or that 'the commonalty chooseth 
their king for their own sake, and not for his sake ... and that therefore 
the king ought to take more care for the wealth of his people than for his 
own wealth'41 then he stands at best to be mocked - at worst, in mortal 
danger. 
This crise de conscience was not original to More, though he was 
perhaps more ruthlessly honest and less self-deceived in his reflections. 
As Skinner42 points out, the acceptance of the value of negotium as against 
otium, of, the life of virtuous and useful activity over that of pure 
contemplation, had increased amongst the humanists since the early 
fourteenth century. A common form in which this desire for negotium found 
expression, other than direct service, was that of the advice book, or 
'mirror of princes'. 43 Here was the perfect vehicle for the man of learning 
to expound on what constitutes virtuous and successful conduct for a 
prince, as well as detailing systems of government, the lessons of history, 
and so on. It was also, in More's time (and amongst the new educated 
class), fast establishing itself as the traditional and popular form of 
moralising and speculating on the political domain. Erasmus was working on 
his On the Education of a Christian Prince4 4 contemporaneously with More's 
work on the Utopia; and Machiavelli wrote The Prince4 5 whilst still in 
political exile at his farm at Santi Andrea in or about 1513. This was the 
final great flowering in a generation of such works beginning with 
Patrizi's The Kingdom and the Education of the King and Sacchi's The Prince 
in the 1470's,46 After this the genre underwent decline, the focus becoming 
first the role and conduct of the scholar/soldier at court, of which 
Castiglione's The Courtier ('the most representative book of the 
Renaissance') is the most famous; and finally degenerating into works on 
etiquette typified by della Casa's I1 Galateo.47 
The common theme of all these works was the detailing of the virtues 
appropriate to the prince or courtier, how they may be acquired and the 
benefits to be gained by their practice. Neither the cardinal virtues of 
temperance, fortitude, wisdom and justice, nor the Christian virtues of 
faith, hope and charity were disregarded but rather they were supplemented 
by specific virtues to be cultivated. Although Patrizi had listed some forty 
virtues the prince should exhibit, three central virtues were adopted from 
Cicero: liberality, clemency and honesty; the Italian humanists adding 
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magnificence and the northern humanists emphasisng godliness. Castiglione 
identified variously: 'lively wit and judgment', 'polite conversation and 
innocent pleasures', 'the most decorous behaviour', 'modesty and nobility' 
and the combination of 'the sharpest witicisms ... with a gracious and sober 
dignity' as the distinctive virtues of the court circle at the Palace of 
Urbino.As Citizens, subjects, priests, merchants: all had their own class of 
virtues assigned to them in the literature of the period. 
What we see here is a world in a state of flux self-consciously 
attempting to re-define itself. It is a world in which the old customs and 
certainties were fast disappearing and in which unsteady efforts were being 
made to construct bridges between the old and the new. But the new was 
itself ambivalent: rooted in and proclaiming itself the continuation of a 
classical heritage and yet confronting the emergence of a new political 
form: the nation state. Machiavelli captured this ambivalence by adopting 
the now traditional form of the speculu111, the mirror of princes, for The 
Prince and yet subverting the convention by arguing that the princely 
virtues (as adopted from Cicero) rather than providing the bulwark against 
the vicissitudes of fortuna as the humanists had believed, left the prince 
prey to the goddess's caprice. Adaptability and boldness are required of the 
prince if he is to conquer fortuna for 'being a woman, she favours young 
men, because they are less circumspect and more ardent, and because they 
command her with greater audacity'.49 The vir virtutis is not exemplified 
by the man who slavishly follows maxims of virtue or justice but who, sure 
of his goals, pursues his enterprise with vigour. 
Thus in his comedy The Nandrake Root (]a Xandragola) Machiavelli shows 
Callimaco winning his way to Lucrezia's bed (against the jealous precautions 
of her husband) by his belief that: 
Nothing is ever so impossible that there isn't a way to do 
it. Even though such hope may be fragile and vain, a man's 
desire and determination to accomplish a difficult task will 
blind him to the chances of failure. so 
Callimaco is prepared to deceive and adopt disguise, and to enlist the aid 
of distinctly unsavoury figures, to realise his desire: one which, at best I 
is of a dubious moral character. Yet, Machiavelli implies, Callimaco's 
scheme has a virtue of its own. Callimaco is not by nature an adulterer. 
Simply, he has fallen in love with a woman who is married and whose 
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reputation is jealously guarded. Neither his own dissembling nor his use of 
dissemblers, Machiavelli suggests, morally disfigures the intrinsic virtue 
of his plan. Callimaco's triumph is unbesmirched by the means adopted. The 
nobility of the end (the triumph of love) and the ardour with which it is 
pursued not only legitimises the means but attracts others to participate 
in its realisation. 
In The Prince Machiavelli identifies three noble ends for a prince to 
pursue: the maintenance of the state, the achievement of great things, and 
to cover himself (and by reflection, the state) in glory, honour and fame; 
and again, the pursuit of these ends legitimises such means as may be 
necessary. Thus, whilst it is useful for a prince to gain the reputation for 
liberality, clemency and honesty, he should be prepared to abandon these 
'virtues' should the circumstances so demand. Not all means are consonant 
with these ends; and not all ends are noble. Agathocles became king of 
Syracuse by a coup d'etat in which the senators and leading citizens of 
Syracuse were killed. Machiavelli comments: 
he maintained his position with many audacious and 
dangerous enterprises. Yet it cannot be called prowess 
[virbJ] to kill fellow citizens, to betray friends, to be 
treacherous, pitiless, irreligious. These ways can win a 
prince power but not glory.s1 
Power is essential if a prince is to maintain his own position and 
secure the state and achieve great things; but pursued for its own sake it 
is 'criminal' and cannot win the prince (and thus the state) the noble ends 
of honour, glory and fame. 52 
Machiavelli thus subverts the speculum genre by lauding the ways of the 
fox over those of the lion: dissimulation, where necessary, carries a 
greater guarantee of success than integrity.53 We have already seen More's 
attitude to dissimulation in his characterisation of Richard III and 
Buckingham in the History. In the Utopia he treats of it again and returns 
us to the problematic figure of his old master: (the now Cardinal) John 
Morton. 
Hythloday dismisses Hore's belief that, by becoming a member of 'some 
great prince's council', he might put into that prince's head 'honest 
opinions and virtuous persuasions·.5 .<1. As proof of the futility of such a 
posi tion Hythloday offers his recollections of the table-talk at Morton's 
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court. An array of almost comic figures raise the issues of the day, only to 
have their bumptious views demolished by Hythloday: the criminal justice 
system, which demands the death penalty for theft, the which nonetheless is 
on the increase; the idle rich and their excessive retinues; the enclosure 
movement with its dispossession and consequent vagabondage of ex-tenantsi 
and to this list of wretched beggary and miserable poverty55 Hythloday 
adds the symptoms of luxuria: 'great wantoness, importunate superfluity, and 
excessive riot proud newfangleness in their apparel, and too much 
prodigal riot and sumptuous fare at their table'. In his cataloguing of the 
evils of his time, More is at his very best: incisive, witty, damning. His 
swingeing attack on the values of Tudor England has never been equalled. 
Yet Morton's response to Hythloday's diagnosis and remedy is far from 
convincing. Pursuing the question of criminal justice More offers us, 
throug,h the mouth of Hythloday, the example of a fictional society, the 
'Polylerites' who operate a system of penal slavery for theft. Hythloday 
makes the case for the justice, humanity, and public utility of the system. 
The lawyer at Morton's table objects that 'this could never be so stablished 
in England but that it must needs bring the weal-public into great jeopardy 
and hazard.' Morton's initial response is eminently reasonable. The system 
could be tried and 'if then the proof should declare the thing to be good 
and profitable, then it were well done that it were established.' If, on the 
other hand, the lawyer's forebodings were shown to be accurate then 'the 
condemned and reprieved persons may as well and as justly be put to death 
after this proof as when they were first cast.' However, the Cardinal 
continues: 'Yea, and methinketh that these vagabonds may very well be 
ordered after the same fashion' .56 Morton has either missed or willfully 
disregarded Hythloday's point. The problem addressed was one of criminal 
justice. Morton seizes the opportunity for public utilitYi and in doing so, 
his suggestion is contrary to natural justice. 
Hythloday had diagnosed the cause of vagabondage and theft in terms, 
principally, of the dispossessions brought about by the enclosures. 
(Famously, that '[the] sheep ... be become so great devourers and so wild, 
that they eat up and swallow down the very men themslves. They consume, 
destroy, and devour whole fields, houses, and cities'.5?) More, doubtless as 
a result of his association with the London wool trade, adds a wealth of 
Page 176 
Chapter 7 Utopia 
detail and identifies oligopolistic practices as exacerbating the situation. 
The critical onslaught is not merely implied: 
Doubtless unless you find a rememdy for these enormities 
you shall in vain advance yourselves of executing justice 
upon felons. For this justice is more beautiful in 
appearance and more flourishing to the shew than either 
just or profitable. 
'[WJhat other thing do you do' Hythloday cries, 'than make thieves and then 
punish them?'Se 
Morton, then, has ignored the prior question of the cause of 
vagabondage and felony, has given a tempered response to the question of 
punishment, and has been shown to favour the adoption of a mode of 
punishment for dealing with a social rather than a criminal problem. We 
should note, however, that the first act against vagrancy was passed at the 
Parliament of 1495, while Morton was still Chancellor. The encounter between 
Hythloday and Morton took place 'not long after the insurrection that the 
western Englishmen made against their king' (in 1497) .59 So whilst vagrancy 
was properly subject to legal sanction (and Hythloday does not dispute 
this) the question of its conformity to natural justice remains. What More 
intends us to infer from Morton's response cannot be fathomed with any 
certainty. On the one hand, we might be expected to admire the wit and 
sagacity of one with high political responsibility in seeing the utility of 
such a system for dealing with a serious social problemj on the other, we 
might be expected to disapprove of a man who, as senior legal officer of 
the realm, has so little concern for natural justice. 
More gives few clues. This part of the conversation ends with Morton's 
commentj the various courtiers assembled (having scoffed at him hitherto) 
find themselves in agreement with Hythloday's sentiments now that Morton 
has endorsed themj and 'most of all was esteemed that which was spoken of 
vagabonds, because it was the cardinal's own addition'.50 Morton has 
surrounded himself with a court of fools and flatterers; and although he 
(Morton) seems to be under no illusions about their worth, there can be no 
doubt that the passage as a whole is offered as a critique of court life. If 
the character of Morton as presented here is intended to be held up for our 
admiration, then we can readily imagine how much worse the courts of less 
sagacious dignitaries, magnates and princes must be. If, however, Morton is 
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presented to us as (at best) a morally ambiguous figure or (at worst) a 
dissembling hypocrite, prepared to swim with the tides of fortune and 
lacking sincerity, then Hythloday's point goes through: such people are the 
focus of corruption and good advice will be mocked and/or corrupted in its 
turn. 
Hythloday concludes by discounting the possibility that he too might 
join the growing tradition by writing a speculum of his own in which his 
knowledge and understanding might be expressed. However, Kore eventually 
proposes a solution which, for once, Hythloday does not knock down but 
rather glances aside. Hythloday has argued at length that not only is it 
futile to proffer advice to kings but is incompatible with maintaining his 
own integri ty . To this Kore retorts: 'This school philosophy is not 
unpleasant among friends in familiar communication, but in the councils of 
kings, where great matters be debated and reasoned with great authority, 
these things have no place'. Precisely, Hythloday responds, ' ... philosophy 
has no place among kings'. Kore then continues: 
Indeed ... this school philosophy hath not, which thinketh 
all things meet for every place. But there is another 
philosophy more civil, which knoweth, as ye would say I her 
own stage, and thereafter, ordering and behaving herself in 
the play that she hath in hand, playeth her part 
accordingly with comeliness, uttering nothing out of due 
order and fashion. And this is the philosophy you must 
use.E.1 
The point is that the humanists had clearly not learned their own 
lessons and that the naive view of the demands of integrity and honesty 
that Hythloday has been espousing simply won't do. The study of rhetoric 
had been at the heart of the development of the humanist tradition€.2 and it 
is rhetoric, the appropriate form of expression for a given context, that is 
implicitly appealed to here. It is not inexact of More to term it a 
philosophy, calling as it does for a deep understanding of the 'passions', 
of modes of communication, and of appreciation of the salient features of 
context. Abused, it becomes a device for flatterers and deceivers; respected, 
it is the mark of a sincere desire to communicate, persuade, convince. 
But instead of now clinching his argument by djrectly suggesting that 
Hythloday should join the rank of councillors qua rhetorician <though he is 
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allowed to draw that inference), Hore prevaricates somewhat. After 
developing the analogy of the play, he continues: 
So the case standeth in a commonwealth, and so it is in the 
consultations of kings and princes. If evil opinions and 
naughty persuasions cannot be utterly and quite plucked out 
of their hearts, if you cannot even as you would remedy 
vices which use and custom hath confirmed, yet you must not 
leave and forsake the commonwealth. You must not forsake 
the ship in a tempest because you cannot rule and keep down 
the waves.53 
One must not give up, Hore is saying; but he does not explicitly say that 
one must belong to the inner council. 
No, nor you must not labour to drive into their heads new 
and strange information which you know well shall be 
nothing regarded with them that be of clean contrary minds. 
But you must with a crafty wile and a subtle train study 
and endeavour yourself as much as in you lieth, to handle 
that matter wittily and handsomely for the purpose.E.4 
We have already been given some indication of this 'crafty wile' and 'subtle 
train' at the beginning of the Dialogue of Counsel: 
But as for monsters, because they be no news, of them we 
were nothing inquisitive. For nothing is more easy to be 
found than be barking Scyllas, ravening Celaenos, and 
Laestrygons, devourers of people, and such like great and 
incredible monsters. But to find citizens ruled by good and 
wholesome laws, that is an exceeding rare and hard thing.6s 
The rhetoric, then, is expressly designed to extend the limits of the 
conceivable; for if the narrator (here, Hythloday) can convincingly portray 
a 'fabulous' society <whose citizens are ruled by good and wholesome laws) 
then so far do we admit it to the outer limits of the possible. It is a 
rhetoric aimed at establishing plausibility. To do so, the distancing effect 
of the hypothetical must be broken down: the society must be capable of 
being accepted as, in some sense, existing. A description couched in terms 
of "Let us imagine" or "Just suppose" makes no attempt to ground its 
plausibility. On the other hand, a description presented as factual (even if 
it pertains to times past or future rather than time present) invites us to 
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believe in the possibility of its existence. Should we find ourselves 
believing, or at the very least, able to suspend our disbelief, then we have 
made an initial grant of plausibility; and our horizons of the possible have 
been extended. 
This, then, is More's resolution of the problem of counsel. Should one 
find the political climate unpropitious to any direct counsel one might be 
able to give, then rather than forsake the commonwealth one should resort 
to 'subtle trains' and 'crafty wiles' in the hope of changing that climate. 
It is not enough merely to cry out against the evils and oppressions of the 
time: custom or sheer despair will always prove effective counters. A clear 
vision of a better alternative must be on offer. 
The philosophy More propounds in his utopian model is civil not only 
in its rhetorical ambition but also in its central concern: the optimal 
civil, ie. political, society. Utopia is not a perfect society. Crime 
persists, wars are fought, neighbours and relatives quarrel; though none of 
this amounts to a social malaise. But in contrast to his own Tudor society, 
More has no doubt that we will view it as a better society. And he has 
drawn the contrast between these two states so forcefully as to have been 
nigh-irresistible to his contemporaries . 
• * •• 
The portrait More has drawn of Tudor society is one of a society in the 
grips of untrammelled vice and rank injustices. One vice in particular More 
identifies as being at the heart of this malaise: pride, 'the princess and 
mother of all mischief'. 'This hellhound creepeth into men's hearts and 
plucketh them back from entering the right path of life, and is so deeply 
rooted in men's breasts, that she cannot be plucked out'. E.6 
The point is of the first importance. Augustine tells us that 'The 
beginning of all sin is pride'. It was Lucifer's belief in the sufficiency of 
his own judgment which was the cause of hi's original turning from God: 
'This was the first defect, the first impoverishment, the first fault of 
that nature, which was so created that it did not exist in the supreme 
degree'. 'What other name is there for this fault than pride?'67 An evil 
will, Augustine argues, has no efficient cause; rather it is a defect, a lack: 
a lack of awe, humility and obedience to God's will. To assert that an evil 
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will has an efficient cause would be to assert that God, as the author of 
all things, is ultimately the author of evil. An evil will, then, can have no 
cause but is a voluntary act, though a non-arbitrary one; for it is grounded 
in the confidence of its own judgment: 
Thus: 
And what is pride except a longing for a perverse kind of 
exaltation? For it is a perverse kind of exaltation to 
abandon the basis on which the mind should be firmly fixed, 
and to become, as it were, based on oneself, amnd so remain. 
This happens when a man is too please~ with himself: and a 
man is self-complacent when he deserts that changeless Good 
in which, rather than himself, he ought to have found his 
satisfaction.e.s 
Pride is not something wrong in the one who loves power, or 
in the power itself; the fault is in the soul which 
perversely loves its own power, and has no thought for the 
justice of the Omnipotent.e.9 
It was this perversion, this self-complacency, Augustine argues, which 
opened the minds of Eve and Adam to the seductions of the serpent and led 
to their fall from the state of grace; and it is thus pride which is the 
mark of original sin. Man 'bears about him the mark of death, the sign of 
his own sin, to remind him that you thwart the proud'.70 
We may safely assume that More, having lectured on the City of God 
while at the Charterhouse, would have been fully conversant with Augustine's 
doctrine; and thus it is that pride 'cannot be plucked out'. Neither the 
citizens of Utopia nor anyone else can undergo a complete moral trans-
formation. The solution to the 'collective problem' cannot, for More, take 
the form of a Perfect Moral Commonwealth; there can be no transformation of 
the desire profile. The best we can hope for is that pride may be subdued: 
thus More's own resort to the wearing of a hair-shirt.7l Yet, as More's own 
self-disciplining testifies, we might ordinarily think of the struggle 
against pride as a matter for personal effort and salvation. Hexter's 
conclusion on the argument of the Utopia, whilst seducti ve, is thus 
incomplete: 'The disciplining of pride ... is the foundation of the best 
state of the commonwealth. And more than that, it is pride itself that 
prevents actual realms from attaining to that best state' ,72 We need to 
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know why it is that the problem of pride should be seen as a political 
problem. 
There are two connections we can make here to ground pride as a 
political problem. In the first place, we have the first epistle of Paul to 
Timothy in which Paul declares: 
There is great gain in godliness with contentment; for we 
brought nothing into the world, and cannot take anything 
out of the world; but if we have food and clothing, with 
these we shall be content. But those who desire to be rich 
fall into temptation ... For the love of money is the root 
of all evils ... 73 
If pride is 'the beginning of all sin' and the love of money 'the root of 
all evils' then a first step in tempering the worst ravages of pride might 
be to control or even eliminate the use of money. If so, then we have 
already crossed the divide from the personal to the political. 
A second, though more tentative, connection is this. In the City of God 
Augustine addressed, albeit briefly, the question of 'The true felicity of 
Christian emperors'. Their felicity resides not in their long reigns, nor in 
their successes in conquest or suppressing insurrections; for all these 
rewards were enjoyed by pagan rulers. Rather: 
We Christians call rulers happy, if they rule with justice; 
if amid the voices of exalted praise and the reverent 
salutations of excessi ve humili ty, they are not inflated 
with pride, but remember that they are but men 7.4 
Augustine proceeds to list the virtues of the Christian emperor which 
guarantee his felicity: he is slow to punish amd ready to pardonj takes 
vengeance on wrong not to satisfy personal animosity but to protect the 
state; seeks the 'amendment of the wrong-doer'j tempers the severity of 
justice with mercy; restrains 'self-indulgent appetites'; has as his goal not 
'a burning desire for empty glory, but ... the love of eternal blessedness'; 
and above all, puts his power 'at the service of God's majesty' and offers 
to God 'the oblation of humility, compassion, and prayer'. 
Here, in what O'Meara recognises as a mirror of princes7S Augustine 
contrasts not only the sin of pride with the virtue of humility; but also 
contrasts the rule of pride with that of justice. Only the humble and pious 
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can rule with justicej and only a rule of justice can help subdue <though 
never eliminate) the promptings of pride. 
We can construct, then, a plausible link <and one with which Kore would 
certainly have been familiar) between the problem of pride and social and 
political organisation. Furthermore, the doctrine of the church was 
precisely that belief in the efficacy of the individual in his struggle 
against sin, unaided by the church and the intercession of its saints and 
martyrs, was itself the mark of pride. The escape from pride is not after 
all a matter of personal salvation. It requires collective effort and 
support. But More makes two radical departures from what we might expect 
of his own solution. First, that escape is accomplished as nearly as can be 
<though never perfectly) in the non-Christian society of Utopia. The church 
of late-medieval and early-renaissance Europe had come to be seen as the 
very embodiment of pride; upon which both More in the Utopia (particularly 
the depiction of the court of Cardinal Morton) and Erasmus in the Praise of 
Folly employed the full range of their scathing and satirical wit. Secondly, 
More seems to have found no solution to the propensity to tyranny among 
princes: although founded by a conquering prince, Utopian society is 
resolutely republican. It is not a speculum principii as such which More 
presents to us in Book II of the Utopia but a speculum mundi, a mirror of 
the world. 
**1** 
Indeed, the island of Utopia is very much the mirror of Kore's England. 
Hythloday had crossed the equator, passed beyond 'great and wide deserts 
and wildernesses', eventually finding 'the air soft, temperate, and gentle' 
and 'people, cities, and towns wherein is continual intercourse and 
occupying of merchandise and chaffare [trade]' .7E. Utopia is a large island 
(some 200 miles wide at its broadest) and consists of 54 city states77 
(none more than a stout day's walk from its neighbour) of which one, 
Amaurote, is acknowledged to be 'the chief city because there is the council 
house' .78 Amaurote (the only city Hythloday describes since 'whoso knoweth 
one of them knoweth them all ') is clearly modelled on London. It is an 
inland port lying alongside a tidal river (the Anyder), is cut by another 
river running down to the Anyder, is walled, and has four large hospitals 
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just outside the city walls79 The Utopians have twice been ravaged by 'a 
great pestilent plague' .eo They trade and are prepared to wage war with 
their mainland neighbours. 
There the resemblance ends. The Utopians fight only what they deem to 
be just wars and not wars. of aggression and expansion (except where land 
which they need is left in a state of neglect and dereliction by 
neighbouring statesj and even then they offE?r first to purchase the land) j 
and they refuse to enter into 'leagues' or be signatories to treaties since, 
they argue, such measures presuppose a state of animosity whereas the 
Utopians prefer to assume friendship in the absence of hostilities. War is 
not a source of glory: there is no trace of chivalric ideals; rather, 
mercenaries are employed as front-line troops (a citizen militia being held 
in reserve) and craft and stealth are used wherever possible so as to gain 
a quick victory and thereby minimise bloodshed. They trade at moderate 
prices, distributing free a seventh of their goods to the poor of the 
district, and are slow to call in their debts. 
In all of this More is heavily satirical of the codes of honour and the 
military and merchant practices of his contemporary Europe.sl The church 
also is further satirised in the depiction of Utopia. The Utopians, 
Hythloday tells us, had not been granted the revelations of Christianity 
prior to his arrivalj such religious tenets as they held being derived from 
a natural theology. A variety of religions and sects flourished (prosely-
tisation, though not discussion, being prohibited on pain of death) with a 
highly ecumenical form of common worship, administered by an elective 
clergy. The clergy are generally devout (exceptions occur, since 'man's 
nature is mutable and frail '82); the order of ascetics revered and the ,lay 
order respected. ('The Utopians count this sect the wiser, but the other the 
holier' .S3) 
The absence of divine revelation leaves the Utopians ignorant of the 
specifically Christian virtues of faith, hope and charity,84 In so far as 
they practice these virtues it is by the light of natural reason, The 
conception of virtue which the Utopians explicitly espouse is that of 'life 
ordered according to the prescript of nature' and that 'he doth follow the 
course of nature, which in desiring and refusing things is ruled by 
reason' ,E<S Al though reason counsels a life of plesasure this is not a life 
of satisfaction of gross appetites: 'they think not felicity to rest in all 
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pleasure I but only in that pleasure that is good and honest' .86 Their 
hedonism is heavily Epicurean: the senses and 'right reason' coincide in 
identifying 'whatsoever is naturally pleasant' as excluding injury to others 
and wrong-doing in general, the consequent loss of an equal or greater 
pleasure, or resultant pain to oneself. This theory of intrinsic pleasure 
allows the Utopians to draw a distinction between natural and 'counterfeit' 
pleasures ('For what natural or true pleasure dost thou take of another 
man's bare head or bowed knees? '87) and between mental and bodily 
pleasures: 
To the soul they give intelligence and that delectation that 
cometh of the contemplation of the truth. Hereunto is joined 
the pleasant remembrance of the good life past. 
The Utopians distinguish between two forms of bodily pleasures 'The first 
is when. delectation is sensibly felt and perceived' and the second 
... is that which consisteth and resteth in the quiet and 
upright state of the body. For this, if it be not letted nor 
assaulted with no grief, is delectable of itself, though it 
be moved with no external or outward pleasure ... [and] many 
take it for the chiefest pleasure. All the Utopians grant it 
to be a right sovereign pleasure and, as you would say, the 
foundation and ground of all pleasures, as which even alone 
is able to make the state and condition of life delectable 
and pleasant; and it being once taken away, there is no 
place left for any pleasure.se 
Just as health is the foundation for the enjoyment of pleasure, so is 
justice the foundation for the practice of virtue. The virtue 'most 
peculiarly belonging to man' is that of sympathetic aid and comfort to 
those in distress 'and by taking from them the sorrow and heaviness of life 
to restore them to joy' .89 But, as Hythloday declares in the peroration 
which concludes his depiction of Utopia, 'in other places they still speak 
of the commonwealth, but every man procureth his private gain' and 'knoweth 
not that he shall starve for hunger, unless he make some several provision 
for himself', so he finds himself 'compelled even of very necessity to have 
regard to himself rather than to the people I that is to say, to other I .90 
Without a foundation of justice there can be no commonwealth and thus no 
practice of virtue. 
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Utopia is a rigorously egalitarian society. With the exception of the 
priesthood and the higher political offices, there is a common obligation on 
all to work (though the working day· is rarely more than six hours). Sons 
are trained to a craft, usually that of their father. Daughters too learn a 
craft, though 'as the weaker sort [they] be put to the easier crafts, as to 
work wool and flax' .91 All spend two years in their youth working on the 
land and learning the arts of 'husbandry' as part of their general 
education. Meals form a central expression of Utopian commonality, being 
taken together in dining halls (one for every thirty families, the women of 
each family taking it in turns to prepare the food). The elderly are served 
first, and the only social distinction observed is that of a high table at 
which, normally, the syphogrant and priest and their wives would sit. The 
infirm and the aged are cared for in hospitals (though voluntary euthanasia 
is encouraged for the terminally ill). There is no system of public 
'honours'. There is no great distinction in cloth and clothes. There is no 
inheri ted wealth since there is no private property. Even the houses, each 
wi th its well-tended garden, are changed by lot once every ten years so 
that a sense of possession is not allowed to develop. 
This is the heart of Utopian justice: its thoroughgoing communism. All 
production is for the common stores, from which each head of the household 
may take freely as required 
without money, without exchange, without any gage, pawn 
or pledge. For why should anything be denied unto him, 
seeing there is abundance of all things, and that it is not 
to be feared lest any man will ask more than he needeth? 
For why should it be thought that that man would ask more 
than enough which is sure never to lack?92 
In the absence of an exchange economy <gift, barter or monetary), we are 
told, superfluity and the 'vain ostentation of things' can have no place. The 
abundance of goods results in part from there being no idle class to have 
to sustain, from the common obligation of all to work, from the absence of 
ostentation and status-seeking, and from the distribution of surpluses 
between the cities so that 'the whole island is as it were one family or 
household I ,93 
Laws are few: 'For all laws .. , be made and published only to the intent 
that by them every man should be put in remembrance of his duty.' '[1]he 
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simple, the plain, and gross meaning of the laws is open to every man '94 
and so each pleads his own case thereby obviating the need for 'all 
attorneys, proctors and sergeants at the law, which craftily handle matters, 
and subtly dispute of the laws'.95 Magistrates, elected officials, sit in 
judgment. Conviction results in slavery or, in extreme cases, in death. 
'[MJost commonly the most heinous faults be punished with the incommodity 
of bondage. For that they suppose to be to the offenders no less grief, and 
to the commonwealth more profit, than if they should hastily put them to 
death'.96 
There are three classes of 'bondsmen' in Utopia: those in penal 
servitude, both those condemned to death in other countries (whom they 
either purchase or receive free) and their own convicted ('whom they handle 
hardest') j . prisoners captured in battle (though only those fought by the 
Utopians themselves); and voluntary immigrants 'when a vile drudge being a 
poor labourer in another country doth choose of his own free will to be a 
bondsman among them' .97 These last are treated 'almost as gently as their 
own free citizens', though worked somewhat harder, and are not held in 
Utopia against their will. The condition of bondage ceases with the 
individual and is not imposed upon the off-spring. 
There is one other class denied full citizenship in Utopia, those who 
deny the existence of God and/or post-mortem sanctions: 
For you may be sure that he will study either with craft 
privily to mock, or else violently to break, the common laws 
of his country, in whom remaineth no further fear than of 
the laws nor no further hope than of the body.98 
Otherwise, all adults are citizens in Utopia's republican society. 
The political organisation is that of a representative democracy. Each 
ward of thirty households/farms elect annually a syphogrant to a popular 
assembly. For every ten syphogrants, a tranibore is elected to sit in the 
senate; though More fails to make clear who elects or appoints these 
tranibores. Neither is it clear whether the syphogrants are elected on a 
universal suffrage or by the heads of households only. The latter is the 
most likely interpretation, given More's patriarchal inclinations; and that 
it is the syphogrants who elect from amongst themselves the tranibores. 
The tranibores normally hold office for life; as does the governor99 
who heads the senate and is chosen by secret ballot from among four 
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candidates (one for each quarter of the city) by the syphogrants. Each city 
state is thus governed by a popular assembly comprising 200 syphogrants 
and a senate of 20 tranibores and the governor; and the family structure of 
Utopian cities is thus fully reflected in its government. (Vie may also note 
that since the syphogrants hold office for one year only, and since they 
represent and are chosen by thirty families, each household head might 
reasonably expect to serve as a syphogrant at least once in his life.) 
The senate meets at least once every three days, and includes in its 
number two of the syphogrants. <Thus rarely would a syphogrant attend the 
senate more than once, given approximately 100 senate meetings.) The 
syphogrants therefore act as a check on the powers of the senate; though 
these powers, given that laws are few, are not fully detailed in Hythloday's 
depiction. As a further check, 'it is provided that nothing touching the 
commonwealth shall be confirmed and ratified unless it have been reasoned 
of and debated three days in the council [senate] before it be decreed' ,100 
Nor can any matter be fully discussed on the first day that it is 
introduced at a senate meeting so as to encourage a studied response 
among the tranibores and thereby avoid gut-reactions; and to reduce the 
risks of tyranny or sedition, it is a capital offence to discuss matters of 
state outwith the senate and the popular assembly. 
The fifty-four city states of Utopia ('agreeing all together in one 
tongue, in like manners, institutions, and laws') maintain a federal 
structure by means of an island council which meets annually at Amaurote 
and consists of 'three old wise men and well experienced' (presumably the 
governor and two senior tranibores from each city, though More does not 
say so) 'there to entreat and debate of the common matters of the land'. 101 
Utopia, then, is a well-ordered, constitutional state which embodies 
justice as the founding principle of its social, economic and political 
organisation. It is eunomia.: that state, as Hythloday declares: 
which verily in my judgment is not only the best, but also 
that which alone of good right may claim and take upon it 
the name of a commonwealth or public weal. 1 02 
And it is justice which is 'the strongest and surest bond of a 
commonweal th '.103 
More's debt to Plato's Republic is made explicit throughout the work. 
Early in Book I Hythloday is compared to 'the ancient and sage philosopher 
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Plato'.' 04 Plato's opinion that philosophers should be kings is referred to 
in the Dialogue of Counsel; as are his metaphors of the ship of state and 
the futility of offering advice to a people who cannot be induced to keep 
out of the rain.' os Plato's works come first in the catalogue of works 
Hythloday cites as having introduced to the Utopians.' 06 More even gives us 
what may have been intended as the equivalent of Plato's founding myth: 
Utopus severed the original connecting isthmus, some fifteen miles to the 
mainland, by having it dug up. 
Yet More is no slavish follower of Plato. Whilst it is the case that 
the communism practiced among the philosopher-kings in Plato's-Republic has 
become the organising principle of the entire Utopian society; but 
knowledge, the exercise of reason and intellectual pleasures are not the 
preserve of a governing class; political power is radically democratised; 
and the family is accorded pride of place in social and productive life. 
Justice is seen by both More and Plato as the prime virtue underpinning 
social, economic and political organisation; but this does not exclude other 
virtues. For More, justice facilitates the exercise of the Christian virtues 
among this non-Christian people: charity is reflected in the care extended 
to all in need (though that need would rarely, if ever, be of a material 
kind) ; hope and fai th are expressed in the prayers of the ecumenical 
service; and although the princely 'virtues' so favoured by the renaissance 
authors <l i berali ty and magnificence, honour and glory) are derided 
throughout the text, clemency is deemed 'the gentlest affection of our 
nature'.' 07 
But the Utopians remain fully human: sin has not been eliminated, only 
much reduced. Crimes of passion can still occur, government is not left 
unchecked, priests can fail to live up to the high expectations held of 
them; yet what we may call systemic crime (principally those of political 
faction and sedition, of arbitrary arrest and punishment, those rooted in 
religious disputes, and theft) are virtually unknown. And the sin of pride, 
along with 'the superfluous and vain ostentation of things', if not quite 
fully 'plucked out' is the 'kind of vice [which) among the Utopians can have 
no place I. ' 08 And it is pride alone I 'the princess and mother of all 
mischief" 0'.3 which prevents us attaining the felicity of that eunomic state 
which 'alone of good right may claim and take upon it the name of a 
commonwealth or weal public'. 
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In the end, Utopia is a Christian commonwealth; one in which the Christian 
virtues are practiced notwithstanding the absence of divine revelation. The 
belief in post-mortem sanctions is crucial in underpinning the structures 
of justice. It is this conjunction of Christian and political virtue which 
gives the Utopia its peculiar force. 
Yet More once again introduces a note of ambiguity. Hythloday having 
completed his peroration, Hare endorses what he has heard but concludes: 
In the mean time, as I cannot agree and consent to all 
things that he said, being else without doubt a man 
singularly well learned and also in all worldy matters 
exactly and profoundly experienced, so must I needs confess 
and grant that many things be in the Utopian weal-public 
which in our cities I may rather wish for than hope for."o 
We can share Hare's hesitation here, though on different grounds. For 
despite these strictures and the institutional bulwarks against infection by 
pride, the Utopians yet seem to be a proud people. However, their pride is 
not individual but intensely patriotic in character. They refuse to enter 
into treaties yet will undertake what they and they alone deem to be a just 
war; they despise the mercenaries whom they will nonetheless place in the 
front-line of their battles; they dispense free one seventh of their trading 
goods to the poor of the host nation (regardless, we must assume, of the 
political consequences for that nation); and they are prepared to annex the 
under-utilised land of other nations should they require it to meet their 
own population pressures. In short, despite their openness to new ideas 
(such as the Christian revelations and the Greek texts Hythloday introduced 
to them) their relations with neighbouring states is nothing short of 
arrogant. The piety of the Utopian's prayer seems somewhat hollow: 
[Every man] thanks Him for all the benefits received, 
particularly that by the divine favor he has chanced on 
that commonwealth which is the happiest and has received 
that religion which he hopes to be the truest. If he errs in 
these matters or if there is anything better and more 
approved by God than that commonwealth or that religion, he 
pra ys that He wi 11, of His goodness, bring him to the 
knowledge of it, for he is ready to follow in whatever path 
he may lead him.'" 
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The humility and note of scepticism expressed here as to the foundation of 
their own commonwealth does not square with the fierce pride with which 
they regard themselves and as revealed by their external relations. Even if 
not fully convinced of the ultimate rectitude of their commonwealth, they 
express no doubts as to its superiority when compared against the social 
systems of their neighbouring states. Their pride has not been eliminated -
the Utopians remain fully human, their desire-profile has not been radically 
transformed - simply it has been transposed into patriotism. 
Page 191 
Chapter 7 Utopia_ 
(iii) Utopianism, Liberalism & Socialism 
Within a couple of years of his return from the diplomatic mission to 
Flanders More finally resolved or put to one side such doubts as he may 
have had and joined the royal council. Although Henry had proved something 
of a disappointment to the humanists' over-inflated hopes, Wolsey was now 
Chancellor and engaged upon a programme of reform of the judicial process. 
It may have been this, the chance to apply his learning and humanist 
principles to the practical business of reform rather than serve out his 
days as no more than an advisor, which tempted More into royal service. 
Indeed, More's first appointment was to the Court of Requests, the 'Court of 
Poor Men's Causes' as it was known (and ironically for More, a court 
established by Richard III to provide quick settlement for the poor in 
disputes against the magnates), a principal focus of Wolsey's reform. 
This is the one option More does not canvass throughout the Utopia as 
a solution to the humanists' dilemma presented in the Dialogue of Counsel: 
engagement at the cutting-edge of reform. We can construct an explanation 
for this with some degree of confidence. The direct impetus for reform can 
come only from those acknowledged to hold power, or by way of concession 
to those challenging for power. More (and the humanists in general) 
belonged to neither categorYi nor would there have been sufficient grounds 
in 1515 for believing that a project of reform emanating from the royal 
court was a serious prospect. In such a situation, the only option (other 
than withdrawal into the life of otium or the instigating of rebellion) for 
the would-be reformer is to attempt, indirectly, to stimulate the impetus 
for reform. 
This, I suggest, is the argument presented by More's Utopia. In the face 
of intransigent political authority (or dogmatic political ideology) which 
nullifies all direct attempts at stimulating reform, the would-be reformer 
must first create a conceptual climate within which reform can be embraced 
as a possibility. 
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Satire, as a mode of ridicule and denunciation, is clearly a central element 
in this, the utopian project. The mockery of established customs, 
institutions, practices and even identifiable holders of authority invites 
the question of who or what to put in their place. In the absence of any 
plausible suggestions, the force of satire quickly pales. It is the 
particular task of the utopian project to go beyond this first stage, of 
criticism and satire, and to offer plausible alternatives. This project has 
two levels: the first, typically, is the construction of a model which 
serves as an alternative to existing practices. It offers a radical re-
structuring of elements of social organisation, with attendant gains in 
social utility, but fails to go beyond this. The second level, however, 
posits not simply a change in customs, institutions etc., but a 
transformation of values which goes hand-in-hand with and underpins the 
structural changes. It is this fundamental critique of society alone which 
challenges existing authority and the prevailing ideology. To put it 
bluntly, utopia challenges both our conception of the 'natural' in social 
organisation and our conception of human 'nature'. For this challenge to be 
secure rather than absurd, it must induce us to grant a degree of 
plausibility. It is this, the attempt to ground as plausible these competing 
conceptions, which I shall describe as the utopian project. 
In order for the utopian project to achieve its aim of plausibility it 
must present itself as factual and thus be distanced from a hypothetical 
mode. This further suggests that it must be distanced from history. Not in 
the sense that the eunomic state must be static, an eternal now. There is 
no inner necessity that dictates the suppression of development in utopia. 
<In More's own model, the Utopians are introduced to the works of the 
classical authors, learn book-printing and are converted to Christianity.) 
Utopia does not presume a condition of perfection. Furthermore (and as I 
shall argue below) a perfect state would not be a political state at all. In 
the absence of crime, of conflict and war, of disputes over need and values, 
of corruption and vice; in the absence of these familiar items of experience 
there would be no political domain. This blissful condition pertains to the 
Millennial visions, to a restoration of paradise on earth. And although More 
might stretch our credulity a little in his portrayal of the good life, it 
remains firmly outside paradise and within the political domain. 
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Utopia is divorced from history in a more conventional sense. Utopus, on 
conquering the land 'caused fifteen miles space of uplandish ground, where 
the sea had no passage, to be cut and digged up, and so brought the sea 
round about the land'.l By severing the isthmus, Utopus thereby cut the 
umbilical cord by which it was connected not only to the mainland but also 
to the tide of historical events. From that time on it has its own 
independent history. The point is crucial given the rhetorical strategy of 
Utopia. Freed from the constraints of our history, located in another 
historical time, utopia is a field for free speculation. Free, that is, 
within the limits of plausibility. We must be able to recognise its 
inhabitants as people at heart like ourselves. A complete transformation of 
human nature contradicts the project of persuasion. If people in Utopia are 
transformed, are, in some sense, better than we are or could previously have 
imagined being, then we must be able to see the link. We must be able to 
identify the causal connections not in the developmental history but in how 
the social structure supports and maintains that transformation. Once we 
can see that link then we are well on the way to granting plausibility. 
Yet, it is not part of the utopist's project to provide us with 
instructions to get there. The precise whereabouts of Utopia remains a 
mystery. More 'recalls' in his letter to Peter Giles that ' ... neither we 
remembered to inquire of him, nor he to tell us, in what part of the new 
world Utopia is situate'.:2 In any case, Hythloday assures us that the 
approach is hazardous: 
The forefronts or frontiers of the two corners [of the 
island], what with fords and shelves and what with rocks, 
be very jeopardous and dangerous .. . Other rocks there be 
lying hid under the water, which therefore be dangerous. The 
channels be known only to themselves, and therefore it 
seldom chanceth that any stranger unless he be guided by an 
Utopian, can come into this haven ... 3 
The utopist's role, to pursue the metaphor, is not that of furnishing us 
with a chart for the voyage but that of stimulating our desire to undertake 
the journey. Yet that journey is not to anyone specific land but to a 
region, a continent of possibilities; in addition to the Utopians, Hythloday 
mentions the Polylerites and their humane system of penal slavery, the 
Achorians who forced their king to abandon a second kingdom to which he 
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had laid claim and then conquered to the ruin of his own people, and the 
Macarians who bind their kings with a solemn coronation oath that they 
'shall never at any time have in [their] treasury above a thousand pound of 
gold or silver'.A. Among the various peoples to be found on this continent 
there may be one which 'alone of good right may claim ... the name of 
commonwealth'S but they are all worth exploring and we can learn from them 
all. 
What then of the problem of Rousseau's du Con tra t Social? Is it 
'utopian '? Certainly it is concerned with eunomia in the form of the Just 
State. But it is not presented in a fictional mode, it makes no claim about 
its existence. 
The fictional mode has bedevilled definitional attempts: how essential 
is it to the genre? I want to suggest a qualification to the emphasis I 
have placed on the rhetorical structure. Let us assume that all governing 
ideologies will make some claim to justice - perhaps not perfect, but 
sufficient to counter criticism. Anyone convinced of present injustices 
would need to adopt one of three approaches. First, a call for a moral 
transformation with no substantial change in the social arrangements: the 
Perfect Moral Commonwealth. Clearly this is no challenge but rather an 
endorsement of the existing institutions and their ideology. The second 
approach is to call for reform. This presents a challenge to aspects of the 
social structure, but not to the fundamental concepts and values embedded 
in its ideology. The utopian project, I have argued, is precisely that of 
initiating a radical challenge to the prevailing ideology: the reformulation 
of the under-pinning of the state. But we should not expect the first 
efforts to be exact, consistent or even coherent. Their purpose is fulfilled 
if they create a climate of interest and thus ground the possibility of 
reform. Others can then revise and polish the details in the light of 
objections, but without having to resort to the grand rhetorical design. A 
new conception of eunomia would thus reqUire the fictional mode in order to 
invite our belief, but a reworking and further development of that 
conception would have no such requirement. The argument, then, is that 
Rousseau's du Contrat Social is a derivative not an initiating utopia . 
• 
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Rousseau's du Contrat Social, along with Plato's Republic and More's Utopia 
have become targets for a series of liberal critiques which coalesce around 
a central charge: that the over-riding concern for justice and social order 
which such works manifest involves a disregard of individual rights and 
liberties. One of the more thoughtful of these critiques is that presented 
by J C Davis, to which I now turn. 
Davis levels three central charges against utopias. First, in accepting 
man's fallibility, utopia becomes 'a holding operation, a set of strategies 
to maintain social order and perfection' /5 He thus shares Kateb's view that 
utopias exhibit 'a rage for order'j and adds that the utopist's 'prime aim is 
not happiness, that private mystery, but order, that social necessity'.7 This 
leads to an emphasis on bureaucratic government and the regulation of all 
aspects of life, private and public. And thirdly, whilst the intended aim is 
one of 'moral efficiency', utopias de-humanise man by effectively depriving 
him of the opportunity to exercise moral choice. His moral character is to 
be fully determined by the social structure and its intensive systems of 
regulation and supervision such that moral recidivism becomes impossible. 
The project may not be capable, quite, of completion: man's nature remains, 
at the last, 'frail' in its egocentric tendencies. Nonetheless, the utopist's 
desire is to push to the furthermost limit the possibilities of social and 
moral change. Utopia, then, is characterised by the triad 'totality, order, 
perfection.'El 
But the thrust of Davis' argument is more than this. The utopist's 
'vision of a total, perfect, ordered environment'9 reflects a search for 
unity; not merely the unity of purpose which gives cohesion to any co-
operative enterprise, but a harmonisation of values and functions such that 
the state comes to represent a perfectly integrated organism. Thus Davis 
approvingly cites Dahrendorf to the effect that 'utopia's greatest enemy is 
pluralism'. If the poli tical domain is primarily the forum for the 
expression of the clash of values then it follows that 'one of the utopian's 
deepest urgings is to end politics'.lO This further implies, though Davis 
does not pursue the point, that not only must all dissent be suppressed, 
but also that there can be no change from within utopia which transcends 
and transforms the existing value system. If change there is, it must come 
from without. 
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This accounts for the situation Hythloday describes in Book II of Utopia. 
Hythloday introduces three elements of change, all of which are embraced by 
the Utopians: the works of classical authors and the Greek language; the 
arts of paper-making and printing; and the revelations of Christianity. Any 
of the three might have posed a threat to any given value system and thus 
have exerted a de-stabilising influence; yet all are congruent with Utopian 
values. The Utopians are committed to learning and have a system of well-
attended public lectures; they pride themselves in their technological 
abilities ('[their] wits be marvellous quick in the invention of feats 
helping anything to the advantage and wealth of life'.ll); and they express 
faith in God and hope for revelation in their prayers, and practice charity 
in their social lives. Thus the introduction of neither the Greek texts nor 
the art of printing conflicts with, let alone transforms, the Utopian's 
values. Whether the introduction of Christianity, congruent as it is with 
their religious beliefs, could be said to have transformed their values 
beyond what was already latent in them is doubtful. A change in religious 
observance, in the form of ritual and the specific content of belief, is 
heralded. But it does not seem to go beyond this. So, such change as is 
initiated by Hythloday's visit seems to represent the development of what 
was latent within, rather than a transformation of, the existing value 
system. 
More's Utopia, as Davis points out, is anything but a closed society and 
in this is held up as a contrast to More's contemporary Europe. '2 The 
Utopian system displays that religious thirst for knowledge of the natural 
world which was to inspire so much of the early scientific enquiries: 
'therefore He beareth (say they) more goodwill and love to the curious and 
diligent beholder and viewer of His work ... than He doth to him which, like 
a very brute beast without wit and reason ... hath no regard to so great 
and so wonderful a spectacle'.13 But its 'openness' is relative to a given 
set of values. In this case, those values are thoroughly 'modern' in so far 
as they are reflected in the Utopian spirit of learning and enquiry; though 
it need not have been so. 
We may conclude, then, that the utopia is not necessarily st~tic, 
unchanging; but that the internal dynamic for change is a factor of the 
particular values embraced. We can put this differently: it is a question of 
whether the values held in any given field are of a first- or a second-
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order. Both piety and the pursuit of learning have an established place in 
Utopian society. Yet there is extensive religious toleration (limited only 
by the prohibition on both 'vehement' and 'fervent' proselytisation and the 
denial of post-mortem sanctions) i and although it is 'a solemn custom ... to 
have lectures daily early in the morning' there is no compulsion on the 
individual to attend any particular lecture, or even to attend at all. Nor is 
there any direct indication of any given field of study being proscribed.1 4 
Piety and learning, then, have the status of second-order values in Utopian 
society. Both are encouraged and respected, but ~ach is accorded a high 
degree of toleration allowing individuals to exercise their choice as to the 
specific content and role of each in their daily lives. 
The same cannot be said of other matters, both the apparently trivial 
and those central to Utopian life. The hours of the working day are fixed 
and there is a common obligation on most (with but few exceptions) to 
worki the forms of dress are standard; houses are exchanged by lot every 
ten years; there is a limited degree of choice with respect to one's 
occupation; but the communist economy admits of no exceptions. Nor should 
this surprise us, for Utopia is presented to us as a customary societYi one 
which, at the time of Hythloday's visit, had been in existence for some 
1760 years since Utopus' conquest and which subsequently had undergone 
little or no change in its laws, customs or economic practices. The reported 
longevity of Utopian society is surely mythic, indicating a settled, stable 
society.15 That so many elements of quotidien existence should thus assume 
the status of 'givens', ie. of first-order values, is hardly surprising. 
Indeed, even in comparatively 'new' pluralist societies (ie. those of the 
western liberal democratic states) there are a number of such 'givens' 
which can be quickly identified. Social taboos on sexual display and 
congress in public and matters of personal hygiene remain strong. Even in 
the private sphere some taboos, one assumes, remain firmly entrenched: the 
vast majority of the population wear some form of underclothing; toilets 
and not, say, kitchen sinks are used for defecation; plates, knives, forks, 
spoons, cups, glasses are still the standard utensils for the dining table 
or breakfast bar. 
There are two points to be made here. In the first place, in all three 
examples we can refer to a certain rationale grounded in comfort, hygiene 
and general utility for these practices. That is to say I they conform not 
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merely to established custom but to standards of reason which seem, at 
least at first glance, to be incontrovertible. They seem to us to be self-
justifying and to defy such practices would certainly be deemed odd, if not 
<in one case) tantamount to madness. It does not require a massive leap of 
imagination to see that in a customary society a more extensive range of 
such first-order values would exist. And to be sure, More provides us with 
the Utopian rationale which invites us to accept their practices as 
similarly self-justifying; particularly, the Utopian account of pleasure, and 
the distinction drawn between 'natural' and 'counterfei t' or artificial 
pleasures. 
The second point to be made is this. Although <to take but one of the 
examples) dining utensils are standard household items in the western 
world, the variety of forms these may take, of design and materials used, 
is enormous. There is no agreed sub-first-order standard to which such 
items are required to conform. Aesthetic values, especially those of a 
purified and a utility-based aesthetic sensibility, conflict and contend in 
the market place. What we don't know from More is whether such a conflict 
of values at a sub-first-order level might be tolerated in his Utopia. The 
point is crucial if a defence of the utopian project is to be constructed. 
For, at the heart of the liberal critique of utopianism, as in that offered 
by Davis, is the belief that utopias suppress all expressions of 
individuality. 
To explore this, let us construct the case of a carpenter living in 
Amaurote, the 'head city' of Utopia. His home is his work-shop, his two sons 
have trained under him and are carpenters too. His speciality is chairs, 
wonderfully carved, ornate, beautifully finished chairs, all of which go into 
the common stores when completed for anyone to take. His sons prefer to 
make tables, the sort used in the parish dining halls, and plain and simple 
affairs by comparison. Across the street lives an old friend of our 
carpenter who also specialises in chairs, but he prefers to make chairs 
which are elegant but plain. The two men live in the same street, wear the 
same forms of dress, are obliged to work the same minimum of six hours 
daily, perhaps have each been elected syphogrants at some stage, and have 
fought side by side in the same wars. Yet, if they differ in nothing else 
<though we could have them adhere to different religions and one, say our 
maker of ornate chairs, not attend the public lectures, as would be his 
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right), yet their respective individualities would be firmly and richly 
expressed through their work. 
More places great value on 'profitable occupations 11 e. in the Utopia, but 
we cannot go much beyond this. The most we can ask is whether such 
expressions of individuality through labour would be at odds with the 
Utopian system of values. It would be unlikely to cause a problem in terms 
of the supply of chairs, assuming the production of the ornate chairs to 
require much longer. The Utopians keep good stocks of everything and have 
an ethic of careful use and repair.'7 Besides, the syphogrants <whose main 
function seems to be that of over-seeing the productive enterprise in 
general) would doubtless keep them informed if sto<?ks were running low. 
Nor, I suggest, is the question simply one of a pluralism in matters of 
taste. It is a question of whether such expressions of individuality would 
give rise to a sentiment of pride and a perception of social distinctions. 
If our carver of ornate chairs were to deem himself better as a person, and 
not just more skilled as a carpenter, because of his expertise, and if some 
social standing were to accrue to him as a result, then there can be no 
doubt that More would not allow such 'vain ostentation'.' e Chairs would be 
the same as clothes: uniform. 
That is as far as we can follow More on this. The point is endlessly 
debatable and Utopia does not provide us with sufficient clues to settle the 
matter. But the example is merely illustrative and does not need finalising. 
If we can take it that expressions of taste through one's labour is 
permissible, that individuality may be expressed at this sub-first-order 
level of values, then utopia is not, or is not necessarily, as repressive as 
the liberal critique suggests. 
** 
The above argument takes us further in the construction of a defence 
against Davis' critique. The 'rage for order' whereby the content of many 
values is specified in detail at a first-order level is, as I have 
suggested, what we may expect of a long-established customary society. As 
such it typifies a high degree of conservatism but not necessarily of 
repression. There is indeed a strong emphasis on organisation throughout 
utopian workS; and this implies a central focus on bureaucratic control. But 
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this, at least in the Morean model, does not seem as problematic as Davis 
suggests. Priests and bishops, syphogrants, tranibores and the governor: 
these are all elective posts. There is a class of academics (no more than 
300 per city-state19) who are exempted from labour, and it is from this 
grouping alone that the elective officials (except the syphogrants) are 
chosen. However, the status of academic is open to all and is determined by 
secret ballot of the syphogrants. Indeed, if there is a central figure of 
authority and key to the efficient organisation in More's utopia it is that 
of the patriarch. It is the latter who administers the household and 
determines the children's occupations, who hears confessions, chastises and 
punishes (in less than heinous cases) wife and children, and who is most 
likely to be elected as syphogrant.2o The bureaucracy in the Morean model 
is thus democratised to a considerable extent. 
Nor does it seem that the citizens of Utopia are effectively denied 
moral choice. Whilst it is the case that if the laws, institutions, social 
customs and economy of Utopia can be said to be just then the virtuous 
citizen needs only to follow those established practices; yet, the field of 
moral choice still exists. There are the two holy orders which anyone may 
join and both of which, inspired by the fervour of their faith, take upon 
themselves 'whatsoever unpleasant, hard, and vile work is anywhere from the 
which labour, loathsomeness, and desperation doth fray other'.21 There are 
the sick and the elderly to be cared for. Adultery is a temptation to be 
resisted, though the innocent partner of an adulterer may choose to share 
the punishment of slavery in the hope of earning a pardon for their spouse. 
Patriarchs are to exercise their discretion in chastising and punishing 
wives and children. Citizens are not conscripted but must volunteer for 
wars fought on the mainland. In all these cases (and many others which we 
might construct from. the text) there is a question of moral choice. They 
are, generally speaking private and personal in nature, rather than public 
and official, but that does not dissolve their moral character. Public 
pressure through the established customs and 
institutional structure facilitate the life of 
eliminate nor replace the need for moral choice. 
the just design 
virtue, but they 
of the 
neither 
It may be that Davis has a deeper concern. The embodiment of a 
particular conception of virtue (or specific mix of virtues) in the 
institutions and social practices of the state, effectively channels the 
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individual's moral vision. The choice becomes straightforwardly that between 
virtue and vice, as opposed to a choice between competing conceptions of 
virtue <and between any of these and vice). There is no existential moment 
to individual morality; no point at which, here, the Utopian citizen must 
choose the content of the good. The most extreme choice which confronts 
them is that of following or not following the good (with its embodied, 
pre-given content). It is not that we need place a special value attached to 
the individual choice of the moral content of their lives, rather that the 
absence of this field of choice leaves little room for either a healthy 
scepticism wi th regard to all values or for those who find themsel ves 
unable to concur with them. For these reasons, main-stream liberal political 
thought has held back from endorsing a 'thick' conception of the good, one 
which details moral content at a first-order level, and insists on the 
state's role as being no more than that of neutral arbiter in cases of 
first-order disputes. At most, the state is to embody a 'thin', second-order, 
conception of the good; typically enshrining the valup's of toleration, 
freedom and rights, constrained ~y some form of the harm principle.22 
Individuals are thus seen as free to choose their own first-order values 
within the limits set and administered by the state. Hence, liberal 
pluralists argue, by embodying and imposing first-order values the 
(utopian) state not only de-moralises man but also de-politicises him. 
Either way, so the argument runs, utopia gets it wrong. Either it posits 
a transformation of the desire-profile such that no disputes occur (in 
which case it is simply unrealistic) or there is no transformation of the 
desire-profile and disputes over first-order values are actively repressed 
so that they fail to emerge (in which case utopia not only provides an 
illusory and delusory picture of the harmonious society, but is also 
implicitly tyrannical>. In fact, utopia <in its eunomic form) attempts to 
escape the horns of this dilemma by insisting on the possibilities of a 
common agreement on a central core of (though not necessarily all) first-
order values and the non-transformation of the desire-profile. People 
remain at heart as we understand them, ie. ourselves, to be. 
Before pursuing in more detail this, the heart of the debate, the claim 
that only a pluralist society can be considered to be 'political' must be 
challenged,23 If allowed to stand the claim serves to de-legitimise all but 
the pluralist conception of the state. It glosses over cruci~l distinctions 
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between the different forms of social idealisation, especially that between 
eunomia and the other utopic forms. It is precisely because eunomias share 
some central assumptions of the liberal state that they present themselves 
as radical challenges to the liberal pluralist conception. Two aspects of 
the eunomic strain (as typified by the Morean model) are distinctive: the 
form is that of the state, a unit of organisation transcending in size, 
population and complexity those of the family, the village or small 
community and the city <Utopia is a federal state); and secondly, the 
solution of the 'collective problem', that failure to supply sufficient 
satisfactions to both simple and contrastive desires, is achieved by the 
restructuring not of those desires but of the institutional arrangements for 
the production and distribution of material and social goods. 
By their emphasis on the pluralist conception of the state, this now 
dominant strand of liberalism turns away from not only competing, non-
li beral conceptions of the political domain but from a distinguished part 
of its own heritage. That heritage focused not on the individual pursuit of 
happiness, with its attendant need for guarantees won by the legislature 
from the executive of freedom and rights, but on the role of the citizen 
and the development of civic consciousness: 
It is a central irony of the intellectual life of our times 
that one of the effects of the enormous growth of political 
science has been the deplacement of the concept of 
citizenship, and the theory of the state, from the centre of 
political theory.24 
That conception of citizenship seeks, as Plant and Vincent put it, 
to connect an understanding of political life, action and 
experience with a conception of man, his needs, capacities 
and powers, in an attempt to throw mutual light on each and 
to provide some concrete detail for the worn platitude that 
man is a political anima17s 
It is this belief, that there is 'an expressive and moral character' to 
political life, which has underwritten the primacy of both the role and the 
status accorded to the citizen in liberal political thought until recent 
times. The burden of citizenship has been traditionally one of duties and an 
internalised commitment to the political entity, ie. the community. 
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Davis does indeed make some recognition of this: 
What has to be acknowledged is the surprising capacity of 
early modern thinkers to see society as a system of 
interrelated parts which might be based on a common, even a 
single set of principles, as evidenced by the utopian 
wri ters .:26 
Utopia 
It is this capacity which is termed 'civic consciousness I by Davis 
(borrowing from Hanson) and central to it is the perception of society as a 
network of 'shared problems and purposes' which is accorded primacy in 
'political ideas and conduct'. The eunomic strain of utopianism thus serves 
to remind us that the liberal pluralist conception of politics and the state 
is but one such conception. 
*** 
Has the nature of human desires undergone a radical transformation in 
More's utopic vision? Do we find, as Rousseau claimed for his own utopian 
work, 'men as they are, and laws as they might be '?27 Or are the citizens 
of Utopia demi-saints, virtually unrecognisable to us as human? 
There are a few clues in More's text to suggest that no such radical 
transformation of the desire-profile has been brought about. Vie are told 
that crimes of passion do occur; that there is a competetive spirit, though 
somewhat muted; that in war the Utopians, though they seek to minimise 
bloodshed, do not hesitate to place mercenaries, whom they despise, at the 
forefront of the battle, nor themselves to kill where necessary; when the 
Island of Utopia itself is under attack, they place those deemed to be 
cowards on the city walls or in their navy so that they may not flee the 
battle.28 These are small though not insignificant strands of straw at 
which to clutch; more revealing, in this context, is the comment that to 
cities on the mainland which they have conquered in the course of their 
just wars, the utopians Isend forth some of their citizens as lieutenants, 
to live there sumptuously like men of honour and renown I .2'3 This is in 
marked contrast to the plain living native to Utopia. 
Davis is not the only commentator to grasp that what More envisages is 
not the transformation of desires but, through the transformation of the 
institutional structure, the relocation of manls interests; and through this, 
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a change in what constitutes appropriate conduct.30 The point is never far 
from the surface of the Utopia. In the Dialogue of Counsel, Hythloday 
stresses that neither a Christian nor a more secularly reasonable counsel 
would be meet among courts typified by flattery and self-seeking. The 
Utopians resort to 'Machiavellian' strategies of decei t which would be more 
than frowned upon in their own land. Ambassadors to Utopia, initially be-
decked in gold, jewels and finery, quickly 'laid away all that gorgeous 
array whereof they were so very proud' on discovering that the Utopians 
mocked such ostentatious display and 'counterfei t' pleasure. and regarded 
them as fools.31 
The heart of Kore's argument is disarmingly iI;ltuitive: in the first 
instance, one's interests equate with doing what is appropriate in the 
particular social context, and that the appropriateness of conduct is a 
function of the customs, mores and social practices of any given society or 
of any given situation. The point is so familiar to us from our daily lives 
that it barely needs expansion. Conduct which may not be out of place in 
the home or at a party would be so out of place in the school-room or the 
church as to rarely occur in such situations. Language used with hardly a 
second thought in one's local bar is effortlessly disgarded in front of a 
favourite aunt. To queue orderly for bus or train when no-one else does so 
is an irrelevant gesture of politesse, and so on. Thus it would be an idle 
hope on the part of the Utopians to expect those of their citizens who go 
abroad as 'lieutenants' to maintain the simplicity of the Utopian way of 
life. Instead, they live abroad 'sumptuously', as expected of them. 
There are two reservations we must air. It is sometimes thought that 
our interests lie in appropriate conduct only in the first instance; and 
that all too often our interests may be furthered by breaking the social 
conventions governing appropriateness, given that we can do so without too 
great a risk of incurring subsequent penalty. That everyone else pays their 
taxes, so it is argued, is not of itself a sufficient reason for me to do 
so, given I believe I can get away with it. How great a problem would these 
'free-riders' pose in More's Utopian society? 
More provides us with three responses to this. The economic system 
minimises the possibilities for illicit gain and reduces both the need and 
the attractiveness of such non-appropriate conduct; and positions of power 
are elective and regulated to the same effect. Utopian life is closely 
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supervised by the heads of households, the syphogrants and the clergy, with 
little that is private and thus secret. And lastly, Utopians are required to 
espouse the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and post-mortem 
rewards and punishments. These three elements, in minimising the 
possibilities for and advantages of non-appropriate conduct, serve to create 
a framework of trust. Within this framework, interest and appropriateness 
of conduct coincide as nearly as is possible. It does not eliminate fully 
the possibility of 'free-riding', but it does serve as a brace for those who 
would otherwise be tempted to pursue their interest in non-appropriate 
conduct. Outwith this framework of trust, where there can be little 
confidence that others will identify their interests with the conventions of 
appropriate conduct, these conventions rapidly lose their force and become 
merely the outward show of appropriate conduct. 
This brings us to the second reservation. The point about the 
appropriateness of conduct with respect to manners, etiquette and social 
conventions is relatively uncontroversial. But does it apply with equal 
force to moral character? Are we really to believe that the moral character 
of the Utopian citizens is such that, on living outside Utopian society (as 
in the case of the 'lieutenants ') they do not fall prey to the vices now 
suddenly tempting them, even though it would no longer be 'appropriate' to 
resist them? 
An intriguing example we can construct here is that of the Utopian 
merchant navy. The Utopians trade extensively with the mainland peoples, 
are skilled in navigation and are prepared to wage war at sea. They must 
thus retain a naval fleet. Sailors, of course, have long had a quite 
understandable reputation for riotous living during their time ashore; and 
ports world-wide have developed amenities to cater for this. Though not in 
Utopia, for we may assume that, even in the ports: 
Dice-play and such other foolish and pernicious games they 
know not:32 
and that: 
there be nei ther wine-taverns, nor ale-houses, nor stews, 
nor any occasion of vice and wickedness, no lurking corners 
33 
Yet such and more would be available to the Utopian sailors on reaching 
ports on the mainland. If moral conduct is merely a function of the 
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conditions of appropriateness, then we would expect the Utopian sailors to 
enjoy their pleasures whilst in port abroad and to re-adapt their conduct 
on returning to Utopia. That image, it must be said, is somewhat absurd and 
lacks credibility. In which case, the Utopian mariners presumably maintain 
their stoic distinction between natural and counterfeit pleasures, and can 
be expected to abjure the temptations offered to them when ashore. But if 
so, must we concede that their moral character is so altered as to amount 
to a transformation of the structure of their desires, thereby impaling 
Kore's utopic vision on one horn of the dilemma? 
There are two last points we can make to conclude this part of the 
discussion. We have been discussing the matter in te~ms of particular acts 
at particular moments whereas what is at stake is a particular life-style 
with all its habits and internalised values. This is not something which is 
easily abandoned for short periods of time. So we need not assume that a 
spell in port would constitute a 'serious moral threat to the Utopian 
sailors. (Besides, we may properly assume that a syphogrant would be master 
of each ship: the supervisory system would continue.) But for those posted 
overseas as 'lieutenants', living in sustained isolation from the Utopian 
community, the dangers of moral slippage would be so much greaterj though, 
paradoxically, these dangers are lessened by allowing them to live 
'sumptuously' in so far as the Utopian values are not then exposed to 
ridicule through their manifest inappropriateness. 
So much of this is constructed from little more than half-hints in 
Kore's text that we cannot regard the treatment of it as conclusive. In the 
end, we are dealing with deeply held beliefs about moral character and 
which are not ultimately open to persuasion through argument. The most I 
can hope to have done is to have extended the ground of plausibility for 
More's original case for a solution to the collective problem which escapes 
both horns of the dilemma: one in which there is no irreversible 
transformation of the structure of our desires and in which the absence of 
conflict is not the product of suppression. Utopia is a political society; 
and as such, stands as a radical challenge to the liberal pluralist 
conception of the state. 
* ...... 
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Given the argument as presented here, the absence of a strong and 
influential utopian tradition within Marxian socialism is all the more 
surprisingj for both take as central the possibility of a humanistic 
solution to the collective problem. It is not the question of either/or, of 
socialism or utopianism, which is to be considered here, but of the possible 
role of a utopic strain within socialism. Indeed, I shall argue that there 
is a positive need for a series of eunomic conceptions of socialist society 
if socialism is to complete its self-appointed task of furnishing the 
leading critique of liberal pluralism. 
The position towards utopianism adopted by Marx and Engels has been 
subject to serious misinterpretation, as Geoghegan h~s shown in his recent 
Utopianism and Harxism .34 The polemical attack is directed against the 
movements established by the followers of the utopian socialists Saint-
Simon, Owen and Fourier in particular. In part this is to be understood in 
terms of competition in the political market of the time; in part, it stems 
from their analysis of the work of the utopian socialists as necessarily 
primitve: rich in insight but, since produced at a time when the class 
relations of the bourgeois epoch were still developing, lacking a 
fundamental grasp of the role of class struggle. 
The founders of these systems see, indeed, the class 
antagonisms, as well as the action of the decomposing 
elements in the prevailing form of society. But the 
proletariat, as yet in its infancy, offers to them the 
spectacle of a class without any historical initiative or 
any independent political movement.35 
Thus the adherents of the utopian socialists failed to grasp what was vital 
in this body of work: 
They hold fast by the original views of their masters, in 
opposition to the progressive historical development of the 
proletariat. They therefore endeavour ... to deaden the class 
struggle and to reconcile the class antagonisms.3G 
In so doing they form 'mere reactionary sects'. 
Ultimately, however, the dispute is methodological. There are three 
t d t th ' 11 interconnecting: utopianism is claimed to be s ran SOlS, a 
unscientific in its approach; is futuristic, lacking a firm grasp of the 
historical process and especially of the role of class struggle in that 
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process; and utopianism lacks an understanding of the centrality of 
praxis37 As a result of these methodological deficiencies, utopianism 
<whilst acute in its critical perceptions) tends to be qUietist or 
gradualist, rationalist and idealist in its abstractions, and paternalistic 
in its approach to the working class. I shall comment only briefly on these 
before moving on to consider the central question of the nature of post-
revolutionary society. 
The claim that utopianism is unscientific is part of the larger claim 
that Marxism alone is scientific. As with the claim advanced by the liberal 
pluralists for their conception of 'politics' so too this conception of 
'science' <itself not unproblematic) is unacceptably restrictive. It serves 
to obscure and de-legitimise, rather than clarify, the competing 
conceptions. As I have already argued, utopianism manifests the fundamental 
belief in the causal connections between social and political organisation, 
broadly construed, and both the structure of our desires and conduct and 
the source and possible resolution of the conflicts which give rise to the 
'collective problem '. To be sure, this is science of a low order; rarely if 
ever displaying a systematic collection of data and the generation of 
falsifiable hypotheses which have become the characteristic of empirical 
science. <Though one might attempt an argument to the effect that the 
utopia is itself a crude form of hypothesis.38 ) Nevertheless, utopias fall 
wi thin that humanistic project of attempting to explore and explain the 
world in terms of causal mechanisms. 
Of course, Marxism grounds its special claim to scientific status in 
its comprehension of the materialist dialectic, the subtle interplay of the 
tensions within and between those elements which form the productive core 
of society and its systems of regulation and expressions of justification; 
in short, the materialist conception of history. Yet not all utopias have 
been a-historical in the sense of the Morean model: the historical schema 
presented by Rousseau, Saint-Simon and Fourier (and Hegel) form the basis 
for the Marxian analy:3is of historical development. There is a tension in 
this theory which has been much commented upon. It turns on whether the 
transition from bourgeois to communist society which Marx posits as 
bringing to a close 'human pre-history' is fully within the compass of 
human agency, or whether it is to be the product of some ineluctable law of 
social development or the realisation of the essence of the social 
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organism.39 My understanding of Marx on this, which I state without much 
further argument, inclines towards an activist, humanistic interpretation in 
which choices are constrained but not determined by historical (ie. 
materialistic) factors. 
Yet Marx's theory of human social development is ultimately 
teleological: the telos of all human 'pre-history' is the classless, 
communist society in which there is no unjust appropriation of the product 
of labour (as in the present form of surplus value). With the harnessing 
for the benefit of all of the productive powers developed by the capitalist 
economy, man passes from the realm of necessity to that of freedomi ie. man 
becomes free to enjoy and express himself in his labour. 40 Production and 
distribution will (famously) be organised on the principle of 'From each 
according to his a bili ties, to each according to his needs! '4 1 But beyond 
this sort of broad, sweeping statement we are given desperately little 
indication of what life would be like in the post-revolutionary society. 
This is largely accounted for by Marx's humanism, centred on the concept of 
praxis: that knowledge is gained only through our interaction wi th the 
world, and the consequent revealing of the limits of our capacities and 
understanding i and that our capaci ties and understanding, our needs and 
aspirations, are themselves shaped by that process of interaction. Human 
existence is to be understood only through this process of interaction, 
which is always interrogatory. Thus, the argument runs, we cannot know in 
advance the precise nature of the post-revolutionary society, since its form 
will in large part be determined by the process of creating it. Furthermore, 
to construct a blue-print to be realised would be to constrain the freedom 
of that creative process, thereby inviting a reign of terror in the attempt 
to force the development into this pre-determined mould. The most that can 
safely be done is to sketch the broad outlines and the fundamental 
principles of that society. 
This, I think, misconstrues the role of utopianism and also fails to 
fully comprehend the concept of praxis. Utopias, once published and set free 
in the public domain, are no longer the property of their authors. How we 
choose to regard, interpret and use them is for us to decide. The author 
may regard his work as a unity, a work of art complete unto itself and in 
which no one part may be set aside without destroying its essential 
harmony. Vie, on the other hand, may regard it as a prototype, an 
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illustration, an exploration of possibilities within given constraints from 
which we may draw some interesting ideas and deepen our understanding of 
the problems it confronts. Utopianism presents a threat to the Marxian 
schema of historical development only if it is regarded in this first way: 
as a work of art, a blue-print. But if regarded in the second way, as a 
heuristic device which serves to illustrate, educate and stimulate 
(specifically, here, to stimulate the desire for change) then utopias would 
seem to present no such threat. 
This is to cast utopianism in a benign but ancillary and optional role. 
There is, however, a more forceful point to make. Praxis is a function of 
human intentionality. The active interrogation of the world (and the 'world' 
here includes the mental furniture of desires, values, memory, etc.) through 
the attempt to bring about change requires that such activity be purposeful, 
goal-directed. It is not clear to me what, say, a sculptor can learn about 
his skills and values, or about the qualities of the stone he is working 
upon, unless he has some initial conception of what it is he is seeking to 
create. That initial conception will undergo change during the interrogatory 
process of sculpting, perhaps resulting in a piece which bares only the 
most distant relation to the initial conception. Without that starting 
point, the work is formless and aimless. It lacks any concrete element of 
intentionality and thus, in this sense, does not constitute practical 
activity. 
If this admittedly brief analysis holds, then revolutionary activity 
wi thout some clear though initial conception of the goal to be achieved 
would lack the element of praxis and, in Marx's own terms, be not fully 
human activity. That there is an absence of such an initial conception is, I 
think, abundantly clear. One only has to ask such apparently trivial yet 
deep-cutting questions as: What would life be like on our local shopping 
streets (would there still be shops, cars and buses, pubs)? or, Would there 
still be cricket, football, snooker? to discover that absence. It is not that 
any of these or any other precise questions need to be given a definitive 
answer, rather that these questions are embedded in a nexus of desires, 
values and traditions. Without some indication of which of these elements 
would be retained, which disgarded and which transformed; without some 
grasp of how we might approach answering the precise questions; without 
some clear understanding of the possibilities, the alternatives, the 
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implications of each and how they may be sorted, then the process of 
change will be blind and thus not fully humanistic. 
It may also be that the failure to address these questions (both 
precise and general) reveals a deeper problem. Without the utopian 
conception of life after the revolution, the Marxian theory remains 
uncomfortably millennial in form. The revolution heralds the end of 
injustice and oppression i it is final, ushering in the telos of all human 
social development. The revolution itself is transformative, restoring man 
to an unalienated state of beingi and in which the 'collective problem' is 
irreversibly solved. And so we must ask the question we put to More's 
depiction of Utopia: how is the collective problem to be solved? 
At first sight, Marx gives two independent answers: the productive 
powers created by the development of capitalist industry is sufficient (in 
a classless society) to satisfy all material desiresi and the non-alienated 
condition of social existence removes the egocentric, competitive sources of 
conflict. 
The first response , attractive as it must have seemed to Marx, is now 
far from conclusive. It is less than clear that post-industrial society can 
satisfy limitless material desiresi nor is it clear that it could ever have 
done so. This is not a question of productive capacity, but of the structure 
of desires. The belief that quantitative desires could be met without limit 
amounts to a technologically-based Cockaygne. It is a fantasYi and one 
which comes surprisingly close to the surface of Marx's thoughts and is 
revealed i'n his use of such similies for the productive powers developed by 
capitalism as that of 'the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the 
powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells'.A2 The 
implication is that we need only to master the spells ourselves to be able 
to summon up these magical powers. The resonance with the cockaygne 
literature requires no further comment. 
It would seem implausible, then, that our appetitive desires are to 
remain unchanged and be fully met. Some re-structuring of the desire-
profile is envisaged. It is possible that the condition of non-alienation is 
quasi -arcadian in structure: that it represents a return to our 'natural' 
selves. Our material desires would be met (here by a super-productive 
technology as opposed to a super-abundant nature) but only as a result of 
having become moderated and harmonised. There is a certain credibility to 
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this interpretation of Marx. Central to his analysis is the argument that 
there is no fixed and immutable structure to human desires (or 'human 
nature') but that it is a product of the social condition of his existence. 
Given the revolutionary change in those conditions (and the consequent 
emergence of non-alienated being), the transformative experience of the 
revolution itself, and the capacity of the productive system to meet all 
moderate desires, then the structure of desires must undergo a radical 
change. 
We cannot travel much further along this road. Although Marx furnishes 
us with a characterisation of alienated being, and thus of non-alienated 
existence (of which the central features are the fl:'ll integration of the 
indi vidual wi thin the producti ve and regulatory processes and the 
appreciation of that common bond which unites all humanity, the species-
being) we cannot be precise: 
The communist revolution is the most radical rupture with 
traditional property relations; no wonder that its 
development is the most radical rupture with traditional 
ideas.43 
A final point can be drawn from this discussion. The Marxian solution to 
the collective problem, with its reliance on a somewhat mysterious and 
unspecifiable transformation of the desire-profile, is less thoroughly 
humanistic than that provided by More in his Utopia.. In so far as that 
transformation is fully determined by the interaction with a causal process 
<though here it is a social rather than a 'natural' process) then we may 
classify this solution as naturalistic mode of social idealisation. 
Frankly, I doubt that this discussion finally settles the matter of 
Marx's theory. Nor do I think it vi tal that it shou ld be settled. If the 
transition from pre- to post-revolutionary society is to be so radical, then 
we cannot spell out in advance the precise changes in the desire-profile. 
But that does not necessarily imply that we have no field of choice. The 
question is not finally predictive but aspirational: it is a question of 
what sort of society we want, which of our desires we wish to satisfy. The 
field of choice may be prove to be greater or narrower than we had 
antiCipated. Until such time as the limits of choice can be established, 
speculation as to the structure of our desires and how they may be met 
remains not only appropriate but also vital. 
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There is then, a double role for the utopian project within Marxian 
socialism. Not only is there a need for utopias which will ground the 
plausibility of the solution to the collective problem presented by post-
revolutionary society, thereby stimulating the desire for change; but also 
there is a need for the utopian spirit of exploration to make some attempt 
to cash out the various implications of changes in the desire-profile. 
That there is a need for the utopian project is slowly becoming 
accepted within Marxian socialism. The utopic strain is no longer identified 
with lone voices from the past such as Bloch and Karcuse but is now self-
consciously advanced under the pressure of social change which challenges 
two key elements in Marxian orthodoxy. The exhaustion of the earth's 
natural resources and the accumulation of toxic long-term waste, together 
with the increase in the world's population, bring into question the 
capacity of the productive enterprise to provide satisfaction for all of a 
full range of material desires. Scarcity rather than abundance threatens to 
be the condition of the post-revolutionary state. And secondly, there is the 
emergence of the post-industrial society and its consequent erosion of an 
urban proletariat. 
These developments have issued in radical critiques of the Liberal 
Democratic State independently of orthodox socialist thought. Critiques from 
both the 'New Right' and the Green movement have challenged socialism's 
self-acclaimed primacy as the leading critic of bourgeois society. Under 
this double pressure <of social change and the emergence of non-socialist 
critiques of liberal democracy) a vigorous utopian response has attempted 
to regain for socialism its former position. I shall not here review that 
response, but note a serious gap in this strain of thought; a gap which 
Frankel also notes: 
[AJpart from Jones who sees the post-industrial transition 
[to the 'new society'J being assisted by conventional 
parties, unions, businesses and social movements, in a 
slowly evolving 'mixed economy', the post-industrial 
theorists appear to have no real sense of the political 
dimension. That is, one can read much in their writings 
about the need for new social relations, organizations and 
practices, one can also read much about how exisitng 
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societies fail to work properly; but one reads very little 
about how to get there from here.44 
Utopia 
The reflective model of medial democracy has been offered partly as an 
attempt to supply such gaps in present utopian speculation. 
Al though the model of medial democracy as popular assent is offered as a 
reflecti ve model, serving as a focus for reflection upon the nature and 
value of democracy, it also represents a transformati ve step I a next-move 
in the democratisation of the expressly political mechanisms of society. If 
part at least of the utopian project is the desire to stimulate reform (or 
more properly I to stimulate the desire for reform) and if the eunomic 
strain of utopian thought is that concerned with the humanistic 
transformation of the political environment, then this work may properly be 
seen as being within that (eunomic) tradition of utopianism. 
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